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 ABSTRACT 
 
 
This thesis includes four empirical studies on the effects of bank behaviour on bank 
performance in European and North American countries up to the 2007-08 financial crisis. 
First, we investigate the effects of non-traditional bank activities, i.e., off-balance-sheet (OBS) 
items, and traditional activities, i.e., loans, on bank performance, and then, considering a risk-
based capital requirement, show an optimal bank portfolio. Second, we examine the impact of 
interbank lending on bank risk-taking, considering the consequence of “Too big to fail” 
(TBTF) and show differences in bank activities and risk-taking between large and small 
banks. We then study the effect of changes in bank behaviour on the determinants of interest 
margins. Finally, we identify the reasons of individual bank failure towards understanding the 
mechanism of the recent financial crisis. Our empirical findings provide the following results. 
First, the negative effect of OBSs on bank performance is found and banks prefer moving 
away from OBSs, given the risk-based capital requirement. Second, interbank lending 
increases the large banks’ risk level under TBTF. Third, product diversification has a 
negative impact on interest margins. Finally, the housing price index has a significant impact 
on the probability of bank failure in the context of the recent financial crisis.  
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 CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The existence of the banking industry is a major outcome from the development of modern 
society. The positive effect of bank behaviour has been observed and applied in the various 
areas of economy. Smith (1776[1937], p305) pointed out a basic economic function of banks:  
 
“The judicious operation of banking, by substituting paper in the room of a great part 
of this gold and silver, enables the country to convert a great part of this dead stock 
into active and productive stock; into stock which produces something to the country.”  
       
In this respect, banks as an intermediary can maximise profits, by their nature, which is of 
importance not only for individuals’ finances, but also for countries’ development. On the 
other hand, the debate related to the bank sector is still on-going and even becoming 
prominent, considering the financial crisis 2007-08 that is still significant in the developed 
countries. This has been a main motivation for calls for a comprehensive investigation into 
bank behaviour. Therefore, this thesis provides a study on the effect of bank behaviour on 
bank performance up to the recent financial crisis. 
 2 
1.1 The Importance of Bank Behaviour 
 
What does a bank do? The answer to this question varies country by country, owing to the 
different legal systems; however, the common argument is that a bank plays an intermediary 
role between taking deposits and granting loans in order to reallocate capital in the economy 
(Heffernan, 2005). In contemporary banking theory, the economic functions of banks include 
the intermediary role, the transformation of assets, the liquidity service and risk management 
(Freixas and Rochet, 2008, p2). 
 
The basic function of banks is an intermediary role in reallocating capital in the economy. 
Because of the economies of scale, banks can lower operational costs when facing a large 
amount of lending and depositing; moreover, the information economies of scope enable bank 
lending to be costless compared with other institutions, since banks can access more 
privileged information on borrowers (Heffernan, 2005, p3). Stiglitz and Weiss (1988) suggest 
that, although firms can finance in a convenient way by issuing bonds, external funds from 
banks can be used as a signal of the credits of borrowers. Since the 1980s, many banks in the 
developed countries have adopted a universal banking model that is a combination of 
commercial and investment banks, so non-traditional activities
1
 have become prevalent. 
However, taking the recent financial crisis into consideration, non-traditional activities are 
coupled with higher risk-taking, given inappropriate bank regulation, which leads to an 
unstable financial market. Thus, an application of a universal banking model has raised 
                                                        
1 Non-traditional activities contain off-balance-sheet items, such as speculation through derivatives and hedging activities, 
and financial trading, such as selling of financial services, insurance and mobile phone. These activities can be measured by 
trading revenues and commissions and fees, respectively. 
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concerns as to whether the diversification is safe or not and, furthermore, what an optimal 
bank portfolio is, based on traditional and non-traditional activities. 
 
Another core activity provided by banks is a liquidity service, which is an important function 
that can distinguish banks from other institutions, as suggested by Heffernan (2005). The 
public has different liquidity preferences. As a bridge, banks tend to satisfy the liquidity 
requirement of both savers and borrowers. A bank lends liquidity to a firm, which is usually 
financed by deposits. Generally, the maturity of deposits is shorter compared with loans.  
This implicitly indicates that the liquidity preferences of borrowers and savers are 
simultaneously satisfied through this bank service. In addition, the allocation of liquidity is 
not restricted between banks and non-financial institutions. The interbank lending offers a 
chance for banks with a shortage of liquidity to borrow from other financial institutions, and 
the interbank rate can be an indicator of market risk, especially in a downturn, when an 
increase in interbank assets might lead to a higher risk level of lending banks, so they demand 
a higher interbank rate. Figure 1-1 displays interbank rates (3-month) in the developed 
countries
2
 over time, and generally shows a decline of the interbank rate until 2006 in order 
to support the refinance of problematic banks through the interbank market, while it slightly 
increased since 2007, following the scenario in the financial markets (financial crisis 2007-08) 
that lending banks demanded a higher rate for fear that borrowers were unable to repay. 
 
                                                        
2 These developed countries in Europe and North America are the sample in this thesis, while they may vary in each chapter 
due to data availability. 
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 Figure 1-1 Interbank Rate (3-month) 
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 Data of the US is not available. 
 
Considering the basic function of bank activities, banks have to face the challenge of 
risk-taking. In Figure 1-2, SL is the supply of loans, SD is the supply of deposits and DL is 
the demand of loans. As mentioned above, owing to the information economies of scope, 
banks can monitor the risk level of borrowers and charge a risk premium (a loan rate Li ), 
banks also pay a deposit rate Di  and the difference between the deposit rate and loan rate is 
the interest margin, which can offset various costs including operation costs, intermediation 
costs and risk premiums, and OV is the volume of the supply of loans and deposits in 
equilibrium (Heffernan, 2005 p2). However, a change in interest rates makes costs from 
short-term funding higher than interest income from long-term loans. Thus, the volatility of 
interest rates requires higher interest margins to cover the additional costs (Ho and Saunders, 
1981). In addition, considering greater competition in traditional credit markets, product 
diversification may increase non-traditional activities associated with non-interest income to 
 5 
offset the losses from traditional activities (intermediary role), leading to a lower interest 
income, as suggested by the theoretical model of Valverde and Fernández (2007). Therefore, 
we may argue that not only traditional interest risk but also a change in bank behaviour has an 
impact on interest margins, considering the development of financial markets.  
 
             Figure 1-2 Intermediation and Interest Margins 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.2 The Development of the Banking Industry 
During the past three decades, the banking industry of industrial countries has experienced 
significant changes to achieve efficiency and profitability. The root of these changes is that, 
banks would like to maximise returns at lower costs, thus, the banking industry presented a 
trend in the diversification of financial services and consolidation of financial institutions 
prior to the financial crisis in 2007-08. Figure 1-3 displays net interest income from 1980 to 
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2009. Overall, it does not suggest any significant change other than in the US; moreover, 
France, Denmark and Belgium experienced a slight decline since 1990. This may indicate that 
banks in the developed countries moved away from traditional intermediation to 
non-traditional financial services, i.e., off-balance-sheet activities, in order to earn 
non-interest revenue, owing to deregulation and greater competition in traditional credit 
markets (Mishkin, 2002, p274). In Europe, the Second Banking Coordination Directive has 
been addressed since 1993, which allows banks to be involved in both traditional activities 
and non-traditional activities; in the US, Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act was proposed in 1999, 
removing barriers between commercial banking and investment banking. The application of a 
universal banking model changes the bank income structure towards non-interest income. 
Figure 1-4 shows the ratio of net non-interest income to total income. Compared with net 
interest income, the non-interest income increased significantly for all countries until 2006, in 
general. The rapid growth of off-balance-sheet activities played an important role in the rise 
of non-interest income. Since 2007, there has been a decline in non-interest income, which is 
consistent with the situation of the financial markets. Many economists (see Stiroh, 2002, 
2006; Saunders and Walter, 1994; Welfens, 2008; DeYoung and Roland, 2001; 
Demirgçü-Kunt and Huizinga, 2009) point out that a large involvement of new lines of 
financial businesses leads to higher risk-taking, further causing bank failure and financial 
instability. Table 1-1 presents the number of listed banks in 10 countries. We find that the 
largest number of listed banks dominates the US financial market partly due to the serious 
regulation that restricted the establishment of branches (Mishkin, 2002, p248). Switzerland as 
 7 
one of the important financial centres appears in second place. Generally, European financial 
markets, i.e., the UK, have been dominated by 5 largest listed banks, including HSBC, 
Barclays, Standard Chartered, Lloyds Banking Group and Royal Bank of Sctl (Datastream); 
in the US, although a large number of financial firms had existed since the 1980s, this 
decreased owing to a national consolidation through which banks could increase their size in 
order to benefit from the economies of scale (Mishkin, 2002, p256). 
 
One of the causes of these changes is the development of financial systems. Compared with 
the past 30 years, the financial system has undergone a reform that has been rarely seen before. 
The improvement of bank management and application of advanced technology enable banks 
and non-financial firms to access information easily. On one hand, this encourages 
non-financial institutions to be involved in financial services, further increasing 
competitiveness (Canals, 2006, p329); on the other hand, in this context, banks move away 
from traditional activities to non-traditional activities to achieve higher revenue (non-interest 
income) because of the greater competition in traditional credit markets (ECB, 2008).  
  
The alternative reason for the changes is financial market competition. Financial liberalisation 
plays an important role in generating higher competition. A rise in the number of new 
branches of foreign financial institutions has reduced the market shares of domestic banks. 
Therefore, increasing competition forces banks to engage in new financial products. 
Diversification is a major approach to reduce operation costs; however, Canals (2006) points 
 8 
out that some banks considered the switching costs from traditional bank activities to new 
activities, so they still concentrate on traditional behaviour but make an effort to improve the 
efficiency of financial operations. Thus, in these cases, banks have more incentive to become 
large through consolidation in order to benefit from the economies of scale.  
 
As indicated by Heffernan (1995), bank regulation and supervision may contribute to the 
development of the banking industry. Following the Basel Capital Accord proposed in 1988 
and 2004, banks have to increase the amount of capital holding against potential risk-taking as 
a regulatory cost, which might have a negative impact on bank profitability. Therefore, 
governments propose deregulation to lower operation costs and encourage banks to become 
involved in diversification. On the other hand, regulators have to face challenges from new 
lines of financial businesses with complex characteristics. Taking the recent financial crisis 
2007-08 into consideration, Basel III agreed by the Basel Committee in 2010-11 mainly 
focuses on bank liquidity and bank leverage in order to control for the risk level of 
securitisations (Bank for International Settlements, 2011). 
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 Figure 1-3 Net Interest Income of Banking Sector from 1980 to 2009 
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Source: OECD.StatExtracts: Finance: Bank profitability Statistics. 
Data of the UK is not available. 
 Figure 1-4 Ratio of Non-interest Income to Total Income from 1980 to 2009 
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Source: OECD.StatExtracts: Finance: Bank profitability Statistics. 
Data of the UK is not available. Data of Belgium is too small to be compared with other countries so that it cannot be 
presented in one graph. 
 Figure 1-5 Income before Tax from 1980 to 2009 
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Data of the UK is not available. 
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Table 1-1 The Number of Listed Banks (1988-2009) 
   Year 
 
Country 
1980- 
1987
3
 
 
1988 
 
1989 
 
1990 
 
1991 
 
1992 
 
1993 
 
1994 
 
1995 
 
1996 
 
1997 
 
1998 
 
1999 
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
2006 
 
2007 
 
2008 
 
2009 
Austria NA 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 6 6 6 6 6 
Belgium NA 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Canada NA 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 
Denmark NA 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
France NA 2 3 3 3 3 5 5 5 6 6 7 7 7 7 8 8 8 8 8 9 9 9 
Germany NA 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 6 6 6 6 6 6 
Sweden NA 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 
Switzer 
-land 
 
NA 6 11 13 13 13 14 14 15 15 15 16 16 16 17 18 18 18 18 19 19 19 19 
The UK NA 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
The USA NA 20 21 21 21 23 23 24 24 25 25 25 28 28 28 28 28 28 30 30 30 32 32 
Source: Datastream
                                                        
3 Data from 1980 to 1987 is not available for all sample countries. 
11 
 
1.3 Study Questions 
 
The main motivation for this thesis stems from the recent financial crisis in 2007-08, which 
initially occurred in the US and spread to other countries. In 2007, the US experienced a 
decline in national wealth and deterioration in the credit market. A decrease in housing prices 
led to a large number of defaults by borrowers with less credit (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008). 
The new lines of financial products with non-transparent characteristics aggravated this 
situation by increasing volatilities, though theoretically this can provide risk-sharing. This 
gives rise to a debate on the issue of whether traditional activities and non-traditional 
activities should be separated, which has prevailed among financial studies recently. Besides 
this, many researchers have pointed out that an inappropriate regulation of non-traditional 
activities with non-transparent and complicated characteristics is one of the reasons for the 
recent financial crisis. In addition, the contagion risk in this financial event has been 
emphasised, since the failure of a key bank may result in a banking panic, especially in the 
context of the interbank markets, where banks with illiquidity borrow from others with 
sufficient liquidity. On one hand, the default of a borrowing bank may put the lending bank at 
risk, particularly in a downturn; hence, in this case the central bank as a lender of last resort 
(LLR) is willing to rescue the lending bank if it is in a key position, i.e., money centre bank 
(too-big-to-fail, TBTF) in order to maintain a stable financial system and enhance public 
confidence; on the other hand, a moral hazard problem is generated from LLR intervention, 
which provides an opportunity for banks to engage in risky activities, potentially implying 
that regulation does not work for big banks; LLR also encourages all banks to make an effort 
to be large by increasing the capacity of bank activities in order to benefit from TBTF; while 
the expansion of bank activities, especially non-traditional activities, may increase the 
volatilities of bank returns. Figure 1-5 displays bank income over time, which does not show 
12 
 
a significant increase other than in the US, despite an increase in non-interest income (see 
Figure 1-3); since 2007, all countries experienced a decline in bank returns, especially in the 
US, due to the financial crisis. In addition, the recent financial crisis highlights the effect of 
macro-shocks, especially housing prices. As mentioned before, the return of financial 
derivatives, i.e., Credit Default Swaps (CDS) and Mortgage Based Securities (MBS), related 
to mortgages and subprimes, depends on housing prices. When housing prices go down, the 
default of these financial products starts. Empirical evidence from Hegen and Ho (2007), 
Godstein et al. (2000) and Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998, 1999) implies that interest 
rate risk, GDP, M2 and international trade should be considered to predict banking crises, the 
banking crisis preceded economic recession, and therefore, can be predicted by these 
economic indicators. However, they do not show analyses on the effect of housing prices. 
Overall, we find that bank diversification with a risky product line, inappropriate bank 
regulation, moral hazard resulting from TBTF in the context of the interbank markets, 
fundamental bank risk-taking and macro-shocks are possible reasons for the financial crisis of 
2007-08; therefore, this thesis aims to investigate bank behaviour surrounding these issues. 
The lessons drawn from the investigation are essential to design a desirable bank regulation 
that influences bank activities ex ante in the run-up to a crisis (Llewellyn, 2003). The research 
questions are as follows: 
 
 Off-balance-sheet activities have been enhanced during the last 30 years, and the benefits 
of bank diversification also have been observed. However, is there any negative effect of 
off-balance-sheet activities on bank performance that should be considered, particularly 
in the context of the recent financial crunch? In other words, how should banks choose an 
optimal portfolio by combining traditional activities with non-traditional activities?  
13 
 
 
 The interbank market is used efficiently to provide credit for banks with a shortage of 
liquidity. Nevertheless, it may give rise to higher risk-taking by large banks during 
downturns, since large banks are inclined to engage in risky assets under TBTF. Thus, we 
attempt to examine the question: does an increase in interbank lending lead to higher 
risk-taking of banks, particularly considering the bank size effect? 
 
 Although interest rate risk has been found to be a main factor affecting interest margins, 
the introduction of financial innovation, i.e., product diversification, may have an impact 
on interest income structure and interest margins. Thus, we would like to investigate the 
effect of a change in bank behaviour on the determinants of interest margins. 
 
 The financial crisis in 2007-08 initially stemmed from individual bank failure, thus, it is 
necessary to consider the bank-level and macro-level variables as candidates to examine 
the reasons for bankruptcy. Therefore, the last question in the thesis is why some banks 
exhibit failure while others do not.  
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1.4 Outline of the Thesis 
 
This thesis combines four empirical studies on off-balance-sheet activities, interbank lending, 
interest margins and interest rate risk, and bank failure at the bank and country levels. The 
empirical chapters are based on developed countries in Europe and North America, including 
the run-up to the recent financial crisis and the episode of the crisis. The remainder of the 
thesis is organised as follows: 
 
Chapter 2 starts by identifying the effect of off-balance-sheet activities and traditional 
activities, i.e., loans, on bank performance on the basis of a standard portfolio theory and 
portfolio theory considering credit rationing in traditional credit markets, in order to show an 
optimal bank portfolio; we also examine the effect of a risk-based capital requirement on 
banks’ strategy for choosing an optimal portfolio on the basis of the theoretical work on 
maximising banks’ expected return with and without the capital requirement, respectively. 
 
Chapter 3 discusses the effect of interbank lending on the risk-taking of banks in terms of two 
bank groups determined by bank size, endogenously chosen using the threshold method of 
Hansen (2000) and Caner and Hansen (2004). We modify Dinger and Hagen’s (2005) model 
by considering the effect of “too big to fail” suggested by Freixas et al. (2000), in order to 
identify differences in bank risk-taking and activities between large and small banks. 
 
In Chapter 4, on the basis of the dealership model of Ho and Saunders (1981) and the 
multi-product bank model of Valverde and Fernández (2007), we examine the effect of 
changes in bank behaviour up to the recent financial crisis on the determinants of interest 
margins by controlling for institutional imperfections, such as implicit payment, opportunity 
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cost and capital ratio, using the Two-Stage-Least-Squares (2SLS) method. We provide a 
country-by-country study in the context of interest margins under the heterogeneous 
assumption identified by a robustness test.  
 
In Chapter 5, we firstly identify the main causes, including bank- and macro-level candidates, 
that lead to bank failure using a logit model, on the basis of the modified theoretical model of 
Gonzalez-Hermosillo (1999) by considering product diversification and size effect. Then, 
after controlling for the country specific effect, the empirical work shows the role of product 
diversification in determining the probability of bank failure for each country. Finally, we 
respectively identify the reasons for bank failure in the run-up to the recent financial crisis and 
the crisis period. 
 
In Chapter 6, we provide a summary of the answers to the four questions, and indicate the 
main conclusions based on the empirical results. Comments on possible future research are 
also given.  
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                       CHAPTER 2 
 
THE OPTIMAL BANK PORTFOLIO SELECTION BASED ON THE 
EFFECT OF OFF-BALANCE-SHEET ITEMS AND LOANS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                    
           
2.1 Introduction 
 
Since the 1980s, employment of non-traditional bank activities has emerged among financial 
institutions owing to an increase in the competition level of financial markets. As shown by 
Figures 1-4 and 1-5 in the Introduction, the ratio of non-interest income rose in the developed 
countries before 2008, while total bank income did not show a significant increase over time 
(other than in the US). The changes mentioned above have an impact on bank income 
structure and the range of bank activities, suggesting that a universal banking model is 
acceptable in the developed countries. However, an increase in non-traditional activities, i.e., 
off-balance-sheet items, might be associated higher risk-taking, especially considering the 
collapse of derivative markets and securitisations leading to the financial crisis in 2007-08: 
this enables us to question the positive effect of off-balance-sheet items (OBSs) on bank 
performance.  
 
The empirical research regarding this issue suggests that the effect of OBSs can be either 
positive or negative: an increase in OBSs generates a higher level of return and reduces the 
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capital regulatory costs, and the application of a universal banking model enables banks to 
diversify risk-taking, while OBSs associated with higher leverage lead to significant 
volatilities of bank returns, which potentially implies that traditional banking activities cannot 
be completely replaced by non-traditional activities. Banks should be cautious about choosing 
an investment portfolio, especially regarding OBSs. Nevertheless, most studies (see Stiroh, 
2006; Stiroh and Rumble, 2006; Stiroh, 2004; Stiroh, 2002; DeYoung and Roland, 2001) are 
based on US financial institutions, which cannot be applicable in other countries’ markets, 
particularly the European financial market, because of differences in bank regulation and the 
structure of the banking industry. Non-interest income, as a measure of non-traditional bank 
behaviour, has been investigated in previous papers; however, they do not show an optimal 
bank portfolio selection regarding both non-traditional activities, i.e., OBS items, and 
traditional activities, i.e., loans, especially in the context of the recent financial crisis. In 
addition, risk-based capital regulation has an impact on the composition of bank portfolios, 
since banks have to take the regulatory costs for risky assets into account. Therefore, the lack 
of evidence mentioned above makes it interesting to investigate the effects of OBSs and loans 
on bank performance and how to choose an optimal portfolio under a risk-based capital 
regulation, bearing in mind data on banks not only in the US, but also in European countries. 
 
The structure of this chapter is organised as follows: both a theoretical and empirical review 
are introduced in Section 2; we present a description of the data in Section 3; the model 
specification and variables are shown in Section 4; an introduction to the econometric 
methodologies is presented in Section 5; in Section 6, we present the results of empirical 
estimations, and the last section concludes.  
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2.2 Literature Review  
2.2.1 Standard Portfolio Theory 
 
Modern portfolio theory was applied by Pyle (1971) and Hart and Jaffe (1974) to investigate 
bank behaviour. This model treats a bank as a portfolio of assets and liabilities to be managed 
to maximise profits. The diversification of bank behaviour employing OBS items has been 
analysed from a standard portfolio view
4
 (Stiroh and Rumble, 2006; Stiroh, 2006). A 
universal bank is engaged in both traditional activities, such as loans and deposits, and 
non-traditional activities, such as letter of credits, securities and fund management. Portfolio 
theory is shown as follows:  
 
( ) ( ) ( )(1 )p obs traE R E R q E R q                                                (2-1) 
2 2 2 2 2(1 ) 2 (1 )p obs tra obs tra obstraq q q q                                                (2-2) 
 
where, 
( )pE R  is the expected return of the portfolio including traditional banking behaviour and 
OBS. 
( )obsE R  is the expected return of OBS. 
( )traE R  is the expected return of traditional banking activities. 
q is the proportion of OBS to total activities, where 0 1q  . 
1-q is the proportion of traditional activities to total activities. 
2
p  is the variance of returns of the portfolio. 
                                                        
4 In a financial institution, different traditional activities may interact in various ways with OBS activities, i.e., combining 
traditional activities with OBSs in a financial product; a standard portfolio view is one of the approaches to examining these 
two kinds of bank activity; however, it is suitable for this study as we attempt to investigate the effect of traditional activities 
and OBSs on bank performance in order to suggest the composition of an optimal portfolio for bank investment. 
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2
obs is the variance of returns from OBS.  
obs is the standard deviation of returns from OBS. 
2
tra  is the variance of returns from traditional activities. 
tra is the standard deviation of returns from traditional activities. 
obstra  is the correlation among the returns from OBS and traditional activities, where 
11  obstra .  
 
This portfolio approach shows a return-risk relationship in terms of different correlations of 
OBS with traditional activities
5
. The remainder of this section follows Sharpe et al. (1999, 
pp171-175). With the correlation coefficient +1 (perfect positive correlation), the standard 
deviation (risk) and the return of the portfolio are a linear combination. An increase in the 
level of the risk is associated with a higher level of the return of the portfolio. With the 
correlation coefficient 0, the risk and return are a non-linear combination. However, 
considering the proportion of OBS (q), we can minimise the risk level of the portfolio 
at
obstra
tra
q
22
2



 . With the correlation coefficient -1 (perfect negative correlation), the 
relationship between the risk and return is linear but segmented. The risk of the portfolio is 
equal to zero when the proportion of OBS is the ratio of the risk of traditional activities to the 
sum of the risks of traditional activities and OBS (
obstra
traq



 ). 
 
Figure 2-1 represents the relationship between the risk and return of the portfolio based on 
different correlations. The linear line AB represents the relationship given that the correlation 
                                                        
5 The mathematic transformation is shown in Appendix 1. 
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is equal to +1. The curve AOB represents the relationship given that the correlation is equal to 
0. The segmented linear line ASB represents the relationship given that the correlation is 
equal to -1. The area between the line AB and the line ASB is the limit within which all 
portfolios of banks must lie for a correlation if less than 1 and more than -1: this is called the 
efficient set. Based on this theory, Stiroh (2002, 2004 and 2006), Stiroh and Rumble (2006) 
and Chiorzazzo et al. (2008) investigated the effect of non-traditional activities on bank 
performance. Their empirical results are consistent with the implications of the efficient set 
theorem that a positive and significant correlation between traditional activities and 
non-traditional activities (cross-selling) indicates weak diversification revenue. However, they 
do not show an optimal portfolio selection considering the effects of both traditional activities 
and non-traditional activities. Therefore, we develop the portfolio framework by considering 
product diversification and traditional credit markets, in order to show an optimal bank 
portfolio both in the run-up to the recent crisis and during the crisis period. 
 
 
     
S 
p  
 pR  
     A 
B 
O 
     
 
  
 
O 
Figure 2-1 Relationship between Expected Return and Risk in a portfolio        
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2.2.2 Portfolio Selection and Credit Rationing 
 
As regards the traditional credit market, banks allocate loans not only depending on the price, 
but also on a non-price device to ration credit, considering asymmetric information. Jaffee 
(1971, p15) shows a basic definition of credit rationing:  
 
 “Credit rationing is defined as the existence of an excess demand for commercial 
loans at the quoted commercial loan rate.” 
 
 
Freixas and Rochet (2008, p174-175) argue that, given credit rationing, the supply of loans 
depends on loan rates, and might not be a monotonic function of loan rates, owing to an 
adverse selection. A higher level of loan rates will increase bank returns below a threshold of 
loan rates, while it may reduce bank profits beyond the threshold, and higher loan rates may 
squeeze out borrowers with good credit as they are not willing to tolerate this higher interest 
rate; while risky borrowers accept that, because they have a lower probability of a successful 
project with higher return. Therefore, in this case, banks should decrease the supply of loans 
as shown in Figure 2-2: an equilibrium credit rationing occurs at the i* point. Beyond i*, 
banks are reluctant to lend even though borrowers are willing to pay a higher interest rate. In 
this case, banks might prefer to be involved in non-traditional activities, i.e., OBSs, to make 
profits, as shown in Figure 2-3, given a fixed capacity of bank activities. The curve in black 
shows OBSs before 2000 (checking from the right hand side to the left hand side in terms of 
the box of bank activities capacity). Initially, the involvement of OBSs generates a higher 
expected return, which is reduced as the proportion of OBSs increases. When OBSs are 
accompanied by a higher level of risk, the expected return sharply falls, so that A is the 
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equilibrium. The shift of OBSs in blue curve shows OBSs in post-2000
6
: we can find three 
cross points A’, B and C7, in terms of traditional activities and OBSs curves. The expected 
return at A’ is higher than at C, therefore, banks should choose A’ as an equilibrium, where the 
expected return with a higher proportion of OBSs is more than that pre-2000 (A), since 
Chiorazzo et al. (2008) suggest that economies of scale enable the long-run average costs of 
operating OBSs to be reduced. The green curve shows the shift of OBSs in 2007 and A’’ is the 
equilibrium, leading to a lower expected return compared with previous periods partly due to 
the large proportion of OBSs associated with higher risk-taking at that time. This framework 
presents an increase in the proportion of OBSs in different sub-periods, considering credit 
rationing in traditional credit markets; however, the optimal amount of OBSs may depend on 
the risk level of bank activities in each sub-period.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                         
 
 
                                                        
6 Taking 2000 as a break in this framework is based on the change in non-traditional activities, as shown by the statistics on 
the size of the derivative market (http://www.bis.org/statistics/derstats.htm), suggesting that the size reduced from $18,718 
billion to $15,665 billion during the period 1998-2000, and then, sharply increased until 2007, especially in 2007, the growth 
rate is nearly 50%.  
7 For A’ and C, the moving trends of LHS and RHS are going to A’ and C, which are stable equilibrium points; while for B, 
the moving trend is going outside, so B is not a stable equilibrium. 
Supply 
Loan rate 
Demand of loans  
Excess demand 
Supply of loans 
  i* 
                      Figure 2-2 Credit Rationing      
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In addition, we introduce another framework showing that the capacity of bank activities 
including both OBSs and loans changes over three sub-periods. Taking the pre-2000 period as 
a basis, banks are involved in loans and OBSs, so that point A is the equilibrium indicated in 
the black curves, as shown in Figure 2-4. During the period 2001-2006, banks are able to 
enlarge the range of activities
8
 so both traditional activities and OBSs are increased at the 
same proportion to generate a higher expected return (A’) with an increase in the proportion of 
loans in equilibrium, as shown by the solid blue curves. In 2007, an increase in the capacity of 
bank activities leads to a higher expected return with an increase in the proportion of loans 
and A’’ is the equilibrium, as shown by the green solid curves. Another case9 is shown by the 
dotted curves post-2000 and 2007, showing that the shift of loans is more than OBSs, which 
leads to higher bank return with a higher proportion of loans in equilibrium at E’ and E” 
(E’<A’, E”<A”) than in pre-2000. In general, this framework shows that the size of the box of 
                                                        
8 The motivation for this is first, that the economies of scale can reduce the long run average costs of bank operations; 
second, the economies of scope can save costs of joint financial products; and third, given higher competition in financial 
markets, especially after 2000, banks have to engage in non-traditional activities in order to make profits to offset the losses 
from traditional bank activities. 
9 Canals (2006) suggests that in some circumstances, banks might consider switching costs from traditional activities to 
non-traditional activities, so they concentrate on traditional activities and make efforts to enlarge the size of that in order to 
benefit from the economies of scale.   
                 Figure 2-3 Expected Return and OBSs 
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bank capacity increases, so A (E) is the equilibrium at higher expected return with a higher 
proportion of loans
10
, suggesting an optimal strategy for choosing bank activities in a bank 
portfolio based on two cases: one is that both activities change in the same proportion and the 
other is that the shift of loans is more than OBSs. 
 
     Figure 2-4 Expected Return of LOANs and OBSs (case 1 and case 2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Regarding the growth of bank activities, there might be another case, as shown in Figure 2-5 
that the shift of OBSs curve is more than loans, since OBSs as a financial innovation that 
enable bank behaviour to be more profitable. Banks can gain experience from the operation of 
OBSs pre-2000, as explained by “leaning-by-doing”. However, stable equilibriums are 
indicated by A’ (2001-2006) and A’’(2007), with a higher proportion of OBSs and lower 
                                                        
10 In Cases 1 and 2, since both the bank capacity and equilibriums (A’A” or E’ E”) move to the right, we cannot show 
whether the proportion of OBSs in a bank portfolio increases or not. However, we can still find a higher expected return in 
equilibrium accompanied by an increasing proportion of loans. This implies that in these two cases, as long as the proportion 
of loans increases, it leads to a higher expected return; while the proportion of OBSs does not matter.  
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proportion of loans in a bank portfolio, which show a reduction in the expected return 
compared with that in pre-2000, especially in 2007. This might suggest that inefficient risk 
management of new financial products associated with complicated bundling of obligations 
leads to higher risk-taking, which increases the volatilities of bank expected returns, based on 
the view of Deyoung and Roland (2001), Stiroh (2002, 2004) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2008). 
Moreover, it highlights that a fast growth strategy might be coupled with risky borrowers, 
which increases the risk level of bank activities. Thus, this framework
11
 implies that an 
overcapacity problem, especially regarding OBSs, causes a decline in bank profits (Milne and 
Wood, 2003).  
 
The fourth case
12
 regarding the change of bank activities, as shown in Figure 2-6, is that the 
shift of the loan curve is down in 2007 owing to its lower profitability compared with OBSs 
and higher competition in the traditional credit market, which leads to a substitution in the 
bank portfolio away from loans towards more OBSs. Therefore, a stable equilibrium is shown 
by A’’ with a higher proportion of OBSs and lower proportion of loans, which is the cross 
point of the two green dotted curves: the expected return in equilibrium in 2007 is lower than 
that in previous sub-periods, as the overall portfolio risk might be higher. In this case, we also 
find that the expected return in 2007 is lower than that of Case 3, as shown in Figure 2-5
13
, 
suggesting that a shift from traditional activities to OBSs generates higher volatilities of bank 
returns. 
 
 
                                                        
11 In Figure 2-5, A’ and A” are the equilibriums in 2001-2006 and 2007, respectively.  
12 The difference between Case 3 and Case 4 is indicated only in 2007. 
13 Comparing A’’ in Figure 2-6 with that in Figure 2-5, we find A’’ in Case 4 is lower than Case 3, as OBSs squeeze out 
traditional activities in a portfolio, leading to higher volatilities of bank returns.  
26 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Figure 2-5 The Expected Return of LOANs and OBSs (case 3)     
          Figure 2-6 The Expected Return of LOANs and OBSs (case 4)    
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Basically, we present two frameworks considering credit rationing. The first is that, given a 
fixed capacity of bank activities, the shift in OBSs curve leads to the change in the OBSs 
proportion in a bank portfolio in determining bank expected returns in three sub-periods 
(1996-2000; 2001-2006 and 2007); the second is that we discuss the shift in the capacity of 
bank activities including OBSs and loans, leading to the change in the proportion of the 
composition of a bank portfolio in equilibrium in three sub-periods (1996-2000; 2001-2006 
and 2007). In this framework, four cases are discussed above, taking the sub-period pre-2000 
as a base. Figure 2-4 shows two cases: one is that both OBSs and loans shift increase in the 
same proportion owing to the economies of scale and benefits from TBTF, and the other is 
that the shift of loans is more than OBSs, considering switching costs and information costs 
transfer from traditional activities to non-traditional activities. Both cases lead to an increase 
in the expected return in equilibrium with a higher proportion of loans in post-2000 and 2007, 
no matter what the proportion of OBSs is; however, these expected returns are higher in Case 
1 than in Case 2. Figure 2-5 shows that the shift in OBSs is more than loans due to their 
higher profitability and competition in traditional credit markets, leading to a decrease in 
expected returns with a higher proportion of OBSs and lower proportion of loans in a bank 
portfolio in equilibrium; Figure 2-6 presents the shift of loans being down in 2007, which 
leads to a lower expected return in equilibrium with a higher proportion of OBSs and lower 
proportion of loans in a portfolio in 2007 compared with that in Case 3 as shown in Figure 2-5. 
Table 2-1 shows a summary of the four cases in terms of OBSs and loans. Therefore, we 
empirically estimate the effects of changes in bank activities (OBSs and loans) on bank 
returns in the three sub-periods to support the scenarios presented in the frameworks. 
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Table 2-1 The Capacity of Bank Activities and Bank Return   
        OBSs       LOANs Return (R) Figure 
Case 1   increase increase increase (R1) 2-4 
Case 2   increase increase more than OBSs increase (R2) 2-4 
Case 3   increase more than LOANs increase decrease (R3) 2-5 
Case 4   increase decrease decrease (R4) 2-6 
Notes: R1>R2; R3>R4; The difference between Case 3 and 4 is indicated only in 2007; Since this study 
concentrates on the effect of product diversification, we do not discuss the case of a decline in non-traditional 
activities. 
 
2.2.3 Portfolio Selection and Capital Regulation 
 
The above discussion suggests the effects of changes in OBSs and loans on the selection of an 
optimal bank portfolio in three sub-periods. The huge losses from the recent financial crisis 
have already called into question the positive expectation of the impact of OBSs, which may 
require a policy response to recognise the distinction between traditional activities and OBSs; 
therefore, we attempt to show how to choose an optimal bank portfolio including OBSs and 
traditional activities, considering a risk-based capital regulation. According to Santos (1995), 
who constructed a theoretical model to explain the impact of capital requirement on bank 
asset composition, assuming that a bank behaves like a monopolist and is the unique external 
financial source for a firm, an increase in the capital requirement raises the losses of the 
bank’s shareholders in the case of bankruptcy, which in turn forces banks to reduce assets 
associated with the higher risk level on behalf of shareholders’ interests. This shows a 
theoretical interpretation of the issue that bank portfolio composition depends on its capital 
structure. Based on Furfine (2001), Mullings (2003) and Francis and Osborne (2009), we 
derive a theoretical model to compare the composition of bank portfolios in two cases: one is 
accompanied by a risk-weighted capital regulation, and the other is not, as shown in Appendix 
2. This model suggests that a reduction in the marginal benefit of OBSs is more than that of 
loans in the presence of a risk-based capital requirement, which leads to a shift away from 
risky assets to safe assets in a portfolio. Therefore, in this respect, we may show the 
29 
 
composition of bank portfolios, considering the effect of capital regulation on bank 
performance. It is worth noting that we pay more attention to the return per unit of risk rather 
than the absolute level of risks or total returns, so the Sharpe Ratio (SR)
14
, as a measurement 
of the return per unit risk, is considered. 
 
The Sharpe Ratio is defined as:  
 
)(
)(
R
RE
SR

                                                               (2-3) 
 
where,  
E(R) is the expected excessive return. 
)(R  is the standard deviation of return (risk). 
Following the implications of standard portfolio theory,  
 
;0
)(

dq
SRd Tra   0
)(

dq
SRd obs                                                (2-4) 
 
where,  
TraSR  is the Sharpe Ratio of traditional activities. 
obsSR  is the Sharpe Ratio of OBSs. 
q is the proportion of OBSs to total operating activities (where 10  q ). 
According to the extent of capital requirement in determining the composition of the portfolio, 
                                                        
14 In this study, the Sharpe Ratio is related to a portfolio or particular bank activities, such as traditional and non-traditional 
activities in a bank. The SR used here is not a traditional Sharpe Ratio, therefore, we call it the “Internal Sharpe Ratio”. For 
simplicity, we still use Sharpe Ratio in the text. 
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there are two cases to be discussed.  
 
Case 1:  
We assume that the extent of capital requirement (CR) on OBSs is the same as traditional 
activities. CR has an impact on the Sharpe ratio and is a function of the composition of a 
portfolio and interest rates, as suggested in our theoretical work
15
. To simplify matters, we do 
not show a specific function of CR, since in this case they are the same in terms of OBSs and 
traditional activities. Therefore, recalling Eq.2-4, we can define two functions of SR of the 
traditional activities and OBSs, respectively.  
  
kqSRTra   (k>0)                                                         (2-5) 
)1( qkSRobs  (k>0)                                                      (2-6) 
 
where, 
k is used to reflect CR and is a slope of TraSR function. 
-k is a slope of obsSR  function. 
In equilibrium, the value of TraSR  should be equal to obsSR , in other words, Eq. 2-5 is equal 
to Eq. 2-6, as shown in Figure 2-7.  
 
kqkq )1(                                                              (2-7) 
5.0* q
 
                                                        
15 Capital requirement in Case 1 is defined as ]1[
1
1
tOBS
d
trtS
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trtL
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o
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
 , 
see Appendix 2. 
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The optimal value of the proportion invested in OBSs ( *q ) is 0.5 in Case 1. Figure 2-7 
explicitly describes the relationship between SR and q to identify the value of q in equilibrium 
with the same extent of capital requirement for bank activities. 
        Figure 9 The relationship between SR and q of in case 1 
 
 
Case 2: 
In this case, we consider a risk-based capital requirement imposed on different bank activities. 
Assume that   is the risk weight of traditional activities and   is the risk weight of OBSs, 
 + =1,  > >0 and 1>  >0.5. Two functions of SR are defined as below:  
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where,  
q 
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Figure 2-7 Relationship between SR and q (case 1)    
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K is the capital requirement without considering the different risk weights of bank activities. 
The right-hand-side of Eq. 2-8 (
)1)(1( q
K
 
)
16
 shows a risk-based capital requirement for 
traditional activities. As 0)1(
)1(
' 2 

 q
K
SRtra

 and 0)1(
)1(
2
'' 3 

 q
K
SRtra

, traSR  
is an increasing function and convex with 10  q . 
The right-hand-side of Eq. 2-9 (
q
K

) shows a risk-based capital requirement for OBSs. 
As 0' 2  q
K
SRobs

 and 0
2
'' 3  q
K
SRobs

 , obsSR  is a decreasing function and 
convex with 10  q . 
As suggested in Case 1, the optimal value of q occurs given that Eq.2-8 is equal to Eq.2-9, 
thus, 
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


q  (1>  >0.5)                                          (2-11) 
                                                                                    
As 1>  >0.5, *q  is a decreasing function and is strictly between 0 and 0.5 (0< *q <0.5). The 
mathematic transformation is shown in Appendix 3. 
 
Figure 2-8 gives an optimal strategy for the composition of a portfolio in terms of Case 2. The 
SR functions are non-linear according to Eqs. 2-8 and 2-9. The value of q in equilibrium is 
lower than that of Case 1. This implies that a risk-based capital requirement forces banks to 
                                                        
16 For the functions of capital requirement in Case 2 please see Appendix 2.  
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shift away from OBSs to traditional activities in portfolios and highlights the substitute effect 
between OBSs and traditional activities. 
 
Figure 10 The relationship between SR and q in case 2  
 
Based on this theoretical framework, under the same capital requirements for traditional 
activities and OBSs, banks should choose half-and-half between traditional activities and 
OBSs in equilibrium; however, given a risk-based capital requirement, banks prefer holding 
fewer OBSs than traditional behaviour in order to minimise the regulatory costs. This 
provides an intuition that traditional activities cannot be completely replaced by OBSs in a 
portfolio, even though OBSs are associated with a higher level return. Considering a 
risk-based capital regulation, through empirical work, we expect that an increase in OBSs 
leads to a lower level bank return, as banks have to pay a higher level of capital regulatory 
costs when choosing more OBSs; while the risk-based capital regulation may have no (less) 
impact on traditional activities, i.e., loans. As this theoretical work considers the effect of 
bank activities on SR, the risk-adjusted bank performance should be used in the estimation. 
q 
SR 
1 *q <0.5 
 
 
 
*SR  
 
0 
TraSR  
obsSR  
Figure 2.2.8 The relationship betw en SR and q in case 2 
          Figure 2-8 Relationship between SR and q (case 2)      
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2.2.4 Empirical Evidence 
 
The previous studies on OBSs include three aspects: the relationship between OBSs and bank 
risk, the factors facilitating OBSs, and the effect of OBSs on bank performance
17
. However, 
our study contributes to the third stream, that is, an investigation into the effect of OBSs on 
bank performance, further to draw a conclusion about an optimal bank portfolio selection; 
therefore, we would like to present more detailed review in this perspective.  
 
There have been several evaluations on the effect of increasing non-traditional activities on 
bank performance; however, the results of the effect of non-traditional activities vary. On one 
hand, the new lines of bank activity generate stable profits and reduce regulatory costs, and at 
the same time, diversify bank risk, as suggested by Chiorazzo et al. (2008). Using data on 
Italian banks, they investigated the effect of diversification of bank activities on risk-adjusted 
returns. They find a positive relationship between them for large sized banks. Large banks 
have advantages (advanced technologies and efficient management) in operating activities, 
which in turn reduces marginal costs and increases risk-adjusted returns. Baele et al. (2007) 
indicate that functional diversification improves the trade-off between return and risk by 
taking European banks as a sample from 1989 to 2004. A higher level of non-interest income 
share increases a bank’s franchise value. Davis and Tuori (2000) find that non-interest income 
has been enhanced to offset losses from traditional banking activities in the EU financial 
market. 
 
Nevertheless, banks may increase the volatilities of their returns by using non-traditional, due 
to switching costs, higher financial leverage and higher operational leverage, as summarised 
                                                        
17 As my work contributes to the third stream of OBSs study, we present a more detailed review of the effect of OBSs on 
bank performance; however, the review regarding the other two streams is summarised in Table 2-1.  
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by DeYoung and Roland (2001). As suggested by Calmes and Theoret (2010), a significant 
higher volatility of bank returns has been found when increasing OBSs in the Canadian 
banking sector. Therefore, the results suggest that better pricing on risk-taking of OBSs 
should be emphasised. From a portfolio view, Stiroh (2006) indicates that an increase in 
non-traditional activities yields fewer returns, while it generates a higher level of risk-taking, 
considering the US banking sector. Stiroh and Rumble (2006) find that diversification 
increases bank returns, but this is offset by exposure to non-traditional activities. Similarly, 
Stiroh (2004) suggests that a higher level of diversification has a negative impact on bank 
performance, based on community banks in the US. The volatility of banking returns may 
result from less experience of operating non-traditional activities. Stiroh (2002), considering 
the US banking industry from 1984 to 2001, suggests that a diversification of banking 
activities increases the volatilities of banking profits. Excessive reliance on non-traditional 
activities generates a higher risk level and reduces bank profits. Deyoung and Roland (2001) 
show that a higher volatility of bank returns appeared in US commercial banks from 1988 to 
1995. Regarding non-traditional activities, there is a less stable bank-customer relationship 
compared with that of traditional bank activities. Most previous studies use non-interest 
income share as a measure of the employment of non-traditional activities based on a standard 
portfolio view (see Eqs 1 and 2 in Appendix 1); however, they do not show an optimal 
portfolio selection combining the effects of OBSs and loans. In addition, although some 
previous papers point out the importance of regulation in determining bank performance, they 
do not provide empirical analyses on the effect of bank regulation on bank portfolio selection, 
especially considering the recent financial crisis. Therefore, this chapter aims to present an 
optimal bank portfolio selection to support the scenario described in the frameworks as shown 
in Figures 2-3, 2-4, 2-5 and 2-6, and also show an optimal bank portfolio considering the 
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effect of risk-based capital regulation, both in the run-up to the recent crisis and the crisis 
period. Table 2-2 presents a summary of the literature review.  
 
From the theoretical and empirical implications, we can obtain some important variables to be 
used in this study. First, Calmes and Theoret (2010), Baele et al. (2007), Stiroh and Rumble 
(2006) and Stiroh (2004) suggest that non-interest income can reflect the effect of bank 
diversification, as it is mainly generated from managed securitised assets, guarantees, 
committed credit lines and other non-traditional bank behaviour. Thus, the ratio of 
non-interest income to total operating income as a proxy of the investment in non-traditional 
activities can be used in this study. According to the standard portfolio theory mentioned 
above, if a negative effect of non-interest income share can be found, this suggests that a 
positive correlation between interest income and non-interest income reduces diversified 
benefits; while a positive effect suggests diversified bank gains. Second, Hauston and Stiroh 
(2006), Calmes and Theoret (2010) and Delis and Kouretas (2011) point out that 
non-traditional activities are more sensitive to aggregate shocks (macroeconomic shocks) than 
traditional bank activities, therefore, in this study, we investigate the effect of macro-shocks 
measured by GDP growth rate and interbank rate (market risk) on bank profitability. Third, 
based on the frameworks related to the effect of OBSs and loans on bank expected return 
introduced before, we attempt to use OBSs and loans as two measures of the composition of a 
bank portfolio in the estimation. Fourth, based on the theoretical model related to the effect of 
capital regulation, in this study, capital regulation should be considered.
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Table 2-2 A Summay of Literature Review 
(1) The relationship between OBS and bank risk 
Author  Year Sample 
countries 
Sample 
time 
Dependent variable Explanatory variables            Main results 
Hassan, 
Karels and 
Peterson 
1993 US 
 
Bank-level 
data 
1984-1988 Bank asset risks 
measured by deposit 
insurance premium, 
equity variance and risk 
premia (default risk) of 
subordinated debts, 
respectively 
(1) OBSs: commitments, swaps, commercial 
letters of credit, standby letters of credit, 
securities and participations 
(2) Ratio of liabilities over total assets 
(3) Portfolio diversification 
(4) Ratio of loan loss reserve to total assets 
(5) Bank assets 
(6) Ratio of net positions
 
(total market rate 
assets minus market rate liabilities) to 
total assets 
(1) OBS items reduce the asset risk, 
since market participants price 
OBSs as risk-reducing by 
considering market discipline of 
OBSs.  
Hassan and 
Sackley 
1994 US 
Bank-level 
data 
1984-1988 Bank asset risks 
measured by equity 
variance and risk 
premia (default risk) of 
subordinated debts, 
respectively 
(1) OBSs: loan commitments deflated by total      
assets  
(2) Ratio of liabilities over total assets 
(3) Portfolio diversification 
(4) Ratio of loan loss reserves to total assets 
(5) Bank assets 
(6) Ratio of net positions
 
to total assets 
(1) Loan commitments reduce bank risk 
(2) Loan commitments contribute to the 
overall diversification of bank 
portfolio. 
Hassan 1993 US 
Bank-level 
data 
1984-1988 Bank asset risk 
measured by equity 
variance 
(1) OBSs: commitments, swaps, commercial  
letters of credit, standby letters of credit, 
securities and participations 
(2) Ratio of liabilities over total assets 
(3) Portfolio diversification 
(4) Ratio of loan loss reserves to total assets 
(5) Bank assets 
(6) Ratio of net positions
 
to total assets 
(7) Ratio of cash dividends to net income 
(1) OBS items reduce the total risk of 
portfolio. 
(2) OBS items have an insignificant 
impact on the systemic risk of the 
portfolio. 
Lepetit, Nys, 
Rons and 
Tarazi 
2008
a 
European 
countries 
Bank-level 
data and 
macro-level 
data 
1996-2002 Risk measures (the 
standard deviation of 
the return on average 
assets, the standard 
deviation of the return 
on average equity and 
(1) Noninterest income ratio 
(2) Ratio of net commission income to net 
operating income 
(3) Ratio of net trading income to net 
operating income 
(4) Bank size 
(1) Generally, banks with higher 
non-traditional activities are 
indicative of higher risk-taking 
(2) Small banks having trading 
activities are associated with lower 
risk-taking. 
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loan loss provision 
ratio)  and Insolvency 
risk measures ( z-score 
and distance to default) 
(5) ROA and ROE 
(6) Loan ratio 
(7) Personal expenses 
(8) Growth rate of total assets 
(9) Equity ratio 
(2) The factors facilitating OBS 
Jagtiani, 
Nathan and 
Sick 
1994 US 
Bank-level 
data 
1988-1990 Earning assets (1) Deposits 
(2) OBSs: swaps and loan securitizations 
(3) Price of capital 
(1) Capital requirement is a main 
factor facilitating OBSs. 
(2) OBSs cannot reduce bank 
operational costs 
Pavel and 
Phillis 
1987 US 
Bank-level 
data 
1983-1985 Ratio of loans sold to 
total assets 
(1) Regulatory taxes 
(2) Diversification of loans  
(3) Non-interest expenses to total assets 
(4) Growth rate of loans  
(5) Loan charge-off  
(6) Asset size 
(1) Regulatory cost is the reason for 
banks engaging in OBSs (swaps 
and loan securitizations). 
(2) Size effect and Non-interest 
expenses also contribute to  
OBSs (swaps and loan 
securitizations). 
Benveniste 
and Berger 
1987 US 
Bank-level 
data 
December, 
1985 
The probability of 
issuing SLCs (Stand 
letter of credit). 
(1) Capital to total exposure ratio 
(2) Ratio of the sum of equity capital and 
loan loss reserve to the sum of SLCs and 
TA (Total Assets)  
(3) Probability of a poor CAMEL rating  
(4) Ratio of operating costs to the sum of 
SLCs and TA  
(5) Dummies of whether a bank is in 
violation of its capital adequacy 
(6) Dummies of whether a bank has 
international deposits. 
(1) Riskier banks prefer to be involved 
in the securitization. 
(2) Higher operation costs and 
international banking behaviour 
also enable banks to increase the 
OBSs (standby letter of credit and 
guarantees). 
Boyds and 
Gertler  
1994 US 
Bank-level 
data 
1983-1991 Non-econometric 
methods are Basel 
credit equivalents and 
non-interest income 
capitalization credit 
equivalents, 
respectively. The 
former provides a 
    N.A. (1) Competition with non-financial 
industries leads to an increasing of 
OBS (securitizations). 
(2) A fast increase in OBS 
(securitizations) is not good for 
banks. 
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Cheng and 
Fung 
2004 Hong Kong 
Bank-level 
data 
1990-2000 (1) Contingent 
liabilities 
(2) Exchange rate 
contracts  
(3) Interest rate 
contracts 
(1) Lagged variables of dependent variables 
(2) Total assets 
(3) Return on equity 
(4) Provision for bad debts 
(5) Interest income 
(6) Herfindahl-Hirschman index 
(7) Market share based on NII (Non-interest 
income) 
(1) The positive effect of market 
competition and information 
complementarity on the diffusion 
of OBSs is found. 
(2) Little evidence of the size effect is 
found on OBSs. 
Sinha 2006 India 
Bank-level 
data 
1996-1997, 
2000-2001 
Total OBS items (1) Capital to risk weighted asset ratio 
(2) Net non- performing assets 
(3) Operating profits 
(4) Working fund 
(5) Total assets 
(6) Loan loss provision 
(1) OBSs are negatively linked with 
non- performing assets but 
positively related to the operating 
profits. 
(2) Negative relationship between 
OBSs and loan loss provision 
(3) Negative relationship between 
OBSs and the size effect 
Nachane 
and Ghonh 
2007 India 
Bank-level 
data and 
macro-level 
data 
1996-2004 Total OBS items (1) Total assets 
(2) Capital adequacy ratio  
(3) Ratio of non-performing loans to net 
advances 
(4) Interest spread 
(5) GDP growth rate 
(1) Positive relationship between 
capital adequacy ratio and OBSs 
(2) Positive relationship between non- 
performing loan ratio and OBSs 
(3) Negative relationship between 
spread and OBSs 
Casu and 
Girardone 
2005 European 
countries 
N.A. Non -econometric 
method: Malmquist 
total factor 
productivity 
N.A. (1) Employing OBSs is significant in 
banking output over time. 
(2) OBSs play an important role in 
determining banking productivity. 
(3) The effect of OBS on banking performance 
Baele, 2007 EU15 1989-2004 (1) Franchise value (1) Non-interest income share (NII) (1) OBSs are positively related to the 
measure of OBSs in 
units of 
on-balance-sheet 
activities. The latter is 
used to estimate OBSs 
by non-interest income 
relative to net interest 
income. 
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Jonghe and 
Vennet 
Bank-level 
data 
(2)Variance of revenue (2) NII squared 
(3) Loans to total assets (Loan) 
(4) Loan squared 
(5) Revenue diversity 
(6) Asset diversity 
(7) Equity ratio 
(8) Equity squared 
(9) Cost to income 
(10) Bank assets 
franchise value. 
(2) OBSs increase systemic risk. 
(3) OBSs reduce idiosyncratic risk. 
Demsetz 
and Strahan 
1997 US 
Bank-level 
data  
1980-1993 (1) Market return 
(2) Variance of market 
return 
(1) Bank assets 
(2) Loans to total assets 
(3) Deposits to total assets 
(4) Total OBS items 
(5) NII share 
(6) Book value of capital to asset 
(7) Turnover 
(1) A large bank is better diversified 
than a small bank. 
(2) OBSs do not reduce risk-taking. 
(3) A diversification encourages banks 
to be consolidated in order to pursue 
higher profits. 
 
Davis and 
Tuori 
 
2000 
 
EU countries 
Bank-level 
data 
 
1979-1995 
(1) Ratio of non- 
interest income to 
total assets 
(2) Ratio of non- 
interest income to 
average assets 
(1) Total assets 
(2) Ratio of total costs to total income 
(3) Ratio of return on average equity  
(4) Ratio of interest income to average asset 
(1) Large bank is able to obtain higher 
non-interest incomes. 
(2) The higher cost to income ratio 
leads to an increasing non- interest 
income. 
(3) Little evidence on the issue that 
higher non-interest income could 
offset the losses from interest 
income. 
Calmes and 
Theoret 
2010 Canada 
Bank-level 
data 
 
1988-2007 (1) Return on asset 
(ROA) 
(2) Return on equity 
(ROE) 
(1) NII share 
(2) Loan loss provision 
(3) One lag of dependent variables 
(1) OBSs do not yield benefits. 
(2) The risk premium is associated with 
OBSs between 1988 and 1996. 
(3) OBSs do not negatively impact the 
bank return during 1997 to 2007. 
Chiorazzo, 
Milani and 
Salvini 
2008 Italy 
Bank-level 
data 
1993-2003 (1) Sharpe Ratio for 
ROA 
(2) Sharpe Ratio for 
ROE 
(1) Bank assets 
(2) Non-performing loan ratio 
(3) Equity ratio 
(4) Loan ratio 
(5) Net interest income 
(6) Non-interest income ratio 
(1) A positive relationship between 
product diversification and 
risk-adjusted return in large banks 
(2) The amount of non-interest income 
is more important than the source 
of non-interest income in 
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(7) Share of net trading income to operating 
income 
(8) Share of net commission income to 
operating income 
(9) Proxies of diversification 
determining the level of 
risk-adjusted return. 
Stiroh 2006 US 
Bank-level 
data 
1997-2004 (1) Market return 
(2) Variance of market 
return 
(3) Market beta 
(1) NII share 
(2) Bank assets 
(3) Equity to total assets 
(1) NII does not yield a higher equity 
return. 
(2) NII generates a higher level of risk- 
taking. 
Stiroh and 
Rumble 
2006 US 
Bank-level 
data 
1997-2002 (1) Return on asset 
(2) Return on equity 
(1) NII share 
(2) Diversification of activities 
(3) Bank assets 
(4) Equity to total assets 
(5) Loan to total assets 
(6) Asset growth 
(7) Asset growth squared 
(1) The benefits from diversification are 
offset by the exposure to OBSs. 
(2) NII generates more volatilities of 
bank profitability than traditional 
bank activities. 
 
 
Stiroh 2004 US 
Bank-level 
data 
1984-2000 (1) Mean of ROA 
(2) Variance of ROA 
(3) Mean of ROE 
(4) Variance of ROE 
(5) Z-Score 
(6)Risk-adjusted 
banking performance 
(1) NII share 
(2) Diversification of activities 
(3) Bank assets 
(4) Equity to total assets 
(5) Loan to total assets 
(6) Asset growth 
(7) Asset growth squared 
(8) Average age of banks 
(1) NII decreases the risk-adjusted 
return. 
(2) The traditional bank activities 
(loans) also reduce the return. 
Stiroh  2002 US 
Bank-level 
data 
1984-2001 (1) Net income growth 
(2) ROE 
(3) Z-Score 
(4) NII revenue 
(5) Interest income 
(1) Bank assets 
(2) Equity to total assets 
(3) Asset growth 
(4) NII share 
(5) NII share squared 
(6) Total OBS items 
(7) Four lags of dependent variables 
(1) OBSs yield a higher volatility than 
traditional banking activities. 
(2) Relying on OBSs increases a higher 
risk level and reduces the 
risk-adjusted return. 
(3) The close correlation between 
interest income and non-interest 
income is suggested.  
DeYoung 
and Roland 
2001 US 
Bank-level 
data 
1988-1995 The degree of total 
leverage 
(1) Deposit revenue share 
(2) Loan revenue share 
(3) Investment revenue share 
(4) Fee-based revenue share 
(1) OBSs enhance a higher volatility of 
revenues. 
(2) OBSs increase the degree of          
total leverage. 
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(5) Trading revenue share 
(6) Total revenue 
(7) Total revenue squared 
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2.3 Data Selection 
In this study, we use both bank-level data from Bureau van Dijk Bankscope
18
 and 
country-level data from Datastream and international financial statistics (International 
Monetary Fund, IMF). The sample period is from 1996 to 2007
19
 owing to data availability in 
Bankscope. We consider the banks with OBSs data disclosure during the study period. To 
avoid abnormal values in the sample, we drop eight banks that were beyond the interval of the 
1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles in terms of bank performance, as measured by the ratio of net income 
to total assets. Therefore, we obtain the un-balanced panel data on 359 banks in seven 
developed countries, of which 50 are from Austria, 20 are from Belgium, 27 are from 
Denmark, 92 are from France, 48 are from Germany, 31 are from the UK and 91 are from the 
US. 
2.4 Model Specification and Variables 
2.4.1 Basic Empirical Model 
 
The basic empirical work is used to identify the scenario described in the framework as shown 
in Figure 2-3 in three sub-periods (1996-2000, 2001-2006 and 2007). In this work, 
considering credit rationing, banks are inclined to engage in more OBSs in order to make 
profits. However, the optimal amount of OBSs holding varies depending on the risk level of 
bank activities in different periods. Thus, we attempt to investigate the effect of OBSs on 
bank profitability in the three sub-periods. We expect that a positive effect of OBSs should be 
found in the earlier sub-periods; while a negative effect should be found in 2007. In addition, 
from the summary of previous empirical research, researchers have already identified the 
significant effect of non-interest income ratio (NII) as a measure of bank diversification on 
                                                        
18 The estimated sample in this thesis is commercial banks. 
19 I downloaded data for Chapter 1 in 2008, and at that moment, the maximum period of data in Bankscope is from 1996 to 
2007. 
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bank performance, although this effect is either positive or negative; as a result, non-interest 
income ratio should be included in this estimation. Based on standard portfolio theory, a 
negative effect of non-interest incomes ratio suggests a positive correlation between 
traditional activities and OBSs and a weak diversification gain. Moreover, loan loss provision 
(LLP) as a proxy of default risk from traditional activities, i.e., loans, should be used. In 
addition, regarding the impact of macro-shocks, we take the GDP growth rate into 
consideration, and interbank rate (Interb) as a proxy of market risk is also used. Therefore, the 
empirical model is shown as: 
 
),,,,,(ityProfitabilBank InterbGDPLLPNIIsOBSsc                           (2-12)                               
 
In order to present the evidence of splitting estimated period into three sub-periods following 
the theoretical work as shown in Figure 2-3, we use the Chow test (1960). Based on this study, 
to test whether there are two breaks (1996-2000, 2001-2006 and 2007) within the sample 
period, we estimate a combined equation shown as follows: 
 
 XdfgdXdecdXbaY

3322  
 
where, 
Y is a dependent variable (return on assets) as a measure of bank performance. 
a is a vector of constant. 
X

is a vector of 5 explanatory variables (see Eq.2-12) in the whole period from 1996 to 2007.  
b

is a vector of 5 coefficients. 
2d  is a dummy variable and is defined as 1 between 2001 and 2006, 0 otherwise. 
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3d  is a dummy variable and is defined as 1 in 2007, 0 otherwise. 
e

is a vector of the coefficients of 5 interaction variables in terms of the sub-period 
2001-2006. 
f

 is a vector of the coefficients of 5 interaction variables in the sub-period 2007. 
  is an error term. 
c and g are the coefficients of dummy variables. 
 
The null hypothesis is that the parameters (c, g, e

 and f

) are jointly equal to 0, indicating 
that there is no break within the whole sample period; the alternative hypothesis suggests that 
there are two breaks, giving 1996-2000, 2001-2006 and 2007. We can construct a F-statistic 
with the degree of freedom ( 1K , N-K ). 1K  is the number of tested coefficients (c, g, e

 
and f

), N is the number of total observations and K is the number of independent variables in 
the combined equation. By using a Wald test, F (12, 3441)=17.47, which is greater than the 
critical value (1.75) at the 5% significant level, so we can reject the null hypothesis and 
confirm that there is the difference between these three sub-periods. 
 
Therefore, recalling Eq.2-12, the empirical models with three sub-periods (1996-2000, 
2001-2006 and 2007) in terms of NIIs, OBSs, and LLPr, respectively, are indicated.  
 
, , 1 , , 1 2 , , 2 3 , , 3 2 , , 3 1 , 2 ,
, ,
i j t i j t i j t i j t i j t i, j,t j t j t
t i i j t
Y c NIIs NIIs NIIs OBSs LLPr GDP Interb      
  
       
  
 (Ⅰ) 
i, j,t 1 i, j,t1 2 i, j,t2 3 i, j,t3 2 i, j,t 3 i, j,t 1 j,t 2 j,t
t i i, j,t
Y = c+ OBSs + OBSs + OBSs +a NIIs +a LLPr +b GDP +b Interb
+k + +
  
 
 (Ⅱ) 
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i, j,t 1 i, j,t1 2 i, j,t2 3 i, j,t3 2 i, j,t 3 i, j,t 1 j,t 2 j,t
t i i, j,t
Y = c+ LLPr + LLPr + LLPr +a NIIs +a OBSs +b GDP +b Interb
+k + +
  
 
 (Ⅲ) 
where, 
Y=NI/TA is a measure of bank performance, bank profitability is measured by the ratio of net 
income (NI) divided by total assets (TA) and it is in the form of a natural log.  
 
/OBSs OBS TA , based on the framework introduced before as shown in Figure 2-3, 
considering credit rationing, banks restrict the supply of loans beyond a threshold of interest 
rate, so banks are involved in OBSs in order to make profits. Since the 1990s, the amount of 
OBS assets has been greater than that of on-balance-sheet assets in the US (Kaufman, 1992, 
p479). The development of OBS items has transferred the intermediary role of banks to the 
role of risk management, which is accepted by the modern banking industry (Heffernan, 1996, 
p28). Thus, this offers us a chance to use OBSs
20
 as a measure of bank diversification. Large 
involvement in OBS items was initially seen as a source of higher return, while benefits from 
OBS assets might be offset by exposure to OBSs, especially when taking the recent financial 
crisis into consideration. 
                    
/NIIs NII TOI , a proxy of bank diversification is considered as another main independent 
variable. Based on the standard portfolio theory, the effect of diversification on bank 
performance depends on the correlation between interest income and non-interest income. 
According to Stiroh (2006), this can be measured by the ratio of net non-interest income (NIIs) 
to total operating revenue (TOI): NII is defined as the sum of gains (losses) on trading, 
                                                        
20
 OBSs include Managed Securitised Assets Reported off-balance sheet, Other off-balance sheet exposure to securitisations, 
Guarantees, Acceptances and documentary credits reported off-balance sheet, Committed Credit Lines and Other Contingent 
Liabilities based on the definition of Bankscope.  
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derivatives and other securities, fees and commissions, and other non-interest income minus 
the sum of operating expenses; TOI is defined as the sum of net interest income and net 
non-interest income.  
 
LLPr = LLP/TA , regarding the exposure of traditional bank behaviour, we use the ratio of loan 
loss provisions (LLP) to total assets. The ratio of LLP (LLPr) has been employed in numerous 
studies (see Gonzales and Hermosillo, 1996; Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 1998; Nys, 2003; 
Fonseca and González, 2007; Baele et al., 2007; Chen, 2007; Calmès and Théoret, 2010) to 
measure the credit risk of banks. In this study, we use the ratio of loan loss provision, which 
shows the effect of traditional activities, i.e., loans, associated with credit risk, on bank 
performance. The higher level risk of loans requires an increasing amount of loan loss 
provision, which is used as a buffer against potential risk-taking. Thus, a large LLP has a 
negative impact on bank performance. 
 
11 /)(  tt GDPGDPGDPGDP , The value of the GDP growth rate in the year t is calculated 
by dividing the value in the year t minus the value in the year t-1 by the value in the year t-1. 
Data are chosen from international financial statistics (IMF). GDP as an indicator of the 
economy describes the relationship between bank performance and the development of the 
economy. A close link between these has been identified in many previous papers (see Bikker 
and Hu, 2002; Stiroh, 2004b; Gerlach et al., 2004; Fonseca and González, 2007). The GDP 
growth rate reflects a change in the macro-economy, which determines the environment of 
bank diversification. The rapid development of the economy provides a chance for banks to 
make profits from diversification and lower the risk level. 
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Interb is the interbank rate
21
 (three-month) as an indicator of the money market. As suggested 
in Panetta et al. (2004), the short-term money market rate reflects the marginal lending costs. 
A higher level of interbank rates increases lending costs, which may absorb borrowers with 
bad credit and increase the risk level (an adverse selection). The money market rate is also a 
proxy of market risk, whose significant volatilities have an impact on bank profits and capital 
holdings. Thus, a higher interbank rate is associated with large expenses and lower benefits.  
 
Pr, 111 LLandOBSsNIIs   are interaction variables in terms of non-interest income share, 
off-balance-sheet share and loan loss provision ratio, respectively. This is equal to the original 
value of variables for the period 1996-2000, and 0 otherwise. 
 
Pr, 222 LLandOBSsNIIs 
 
are interaction variables in terms of non-interest income share, 
off-balance-sheet share and loan loss provision ratio, respectively. This is equal to the original 
value of variables for the period 2001-2006, and 0 otherwise. 
 
Pr, 333 LLandOBSsNIIs   are interaction variables in terms of non-interest income share, 
off-balance-sheet share and loan loss provision ratio, respectively. This is equal to the original 
value of variables in 2007, and 0 otherwise. 
 
i=1,…, 359 (individual bank).  
j= 1,..., 7 (individual country).  
t=1996,…, 2007 (year). 
c is a constant.  
                                                        
21 Interbank operation in the US is usually overnight; thus, we use federal funds rates as a replacement in this work. Data 
source: Datastream. 
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  is a time fixed effect 
 is a bank fixed effect.  
  is an error term.  
2.4.2 Extended Estimation 
The extended estimation aims to identify the scenarios described in the framework as shown 
in Figures 2-4, 2-5 and 2-6 in the three sub-periods (1996-2000, 2001-2006 and 2007), 
considering the shift in both OBSs and loans’ curves leading to different proportions of the 
composition of a bank portfolio. In this study, therefore, we examine the effect of both OBSs 
and loans on bank profitability in order to show an optimal bank portfolio in different 
sub-periods. The empirical model is therefore shown as below: 
 
1 , , 1 2 , , 2 3 , , 3i, j,t 1 i, j,t1 2 i, j,t2 3 i, j,t3 i j t i j t i j t
2 i, j,t 3 i, j,t 1 j,t 2 j,t t i i, j,t
Y = c+ OBSs + OBSs + OBSs + LOAN LOAN LOAN
a NIIs +a LLPr +b GDP +b Interb +k + +
     
 
  
        (Ⅳ)
 
 
where,  
/LOANs LOAN TA , a proxy of traditional activities is associated with less risk-taking 
compared with OBSs.  
1 , , 1 2 , , 2 3 , , 3,i j t i j t i j tLOAN LOAN and LOAN    are interaction variables of the loan ratio for three 
sub-periods 1996-2000, 2001-2006 and 2007, respectively. 
 
2.4.3 Empirical Model with Capital Requirement 
 
This estimation is based on the theoretical work related to the effect of capital requirement on 
the selection of a bank portfolio. In this empirical model, following the basic and extended 
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empirical models, banks are assumed to be involved in traditional and non-traditional 
behaviour to make profits. Thus, we use OBSs as a measure of non-traditional bank activities 
and loans as a measure of traditional bank activities. Bank risk-taking and macro-shocks are 
included in this work. The year dummy variable is used to capture the time specific effect of 
changes in banking structure and financial systems. Since we show the effect of OBSs and 
loans on the Sharpe ratio (SR) in the theoretical work, risk-adjusted bank performance is used 
in the estimation. Without considering risk-based capital regulation, the empirical model is 
shown: 
 
, , 1 , , 2 , , 3 , , 4 , , 1 , 2 ,
, ,_
i j t i j t i j t i j t i j t j t j t
t i i j t
Y c a NIIs a OBSs a LOANs a LLPr b GDP b Interb
D year k  
      
            (2-13) 
                                                                      
 
where, 
Y includes two variables, one is return on asset as a measure of bank profitability following 
the basic model, the other is risk-adjusted performance as a measure of SR and it is defined as 
the return on asset to the standard deviation of return on asset (calculated over the sample 
period for a bank), following Stiroh and Rumble (2006).  
D_year is year dummy variables to capture the time specific effect, taking 1996 as a base. 
 
Basel Accord II proposed a risk-based capital regulation to require that banks hold sufficient 
capital accordingly to the risk weights of asset categories. When facing a heavy capital 
requirement, banks have to either increase capital holdings or reduce risky assets in order to 
meet the requirement. Francis and Osborne (2009) and Furfine (2001) suggest that the 
adjusted cost of raising capital is higher than other bank assets, so banks are inclined to 
change the composition of portfolios, and this highlights the substitute effect between 
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traditional activities and non-traditional activities. According to the Basel Agreements, a 
risk-based capital requirement sets a target ratio to risk weights at 8%, thus we attempt to 
investigate the effect of capital requirement on bank portfolio selection in two cases, one 
when the capital ratio is above 8% and the other when it is below 8%
22
. 
 
The theoretical model suggests that without considering risk-based capital regulation, banks 
prefer holding the same proportion of traditional bank behaviour and OBSs; while under a 
risk-based capital requirement, banks choose fewer OBSs than traditional bank activities 
against higher regulatory costs. This suggests that the capital regulation may have a negative 
effect on bank performance when choosing more OBSs. Therefore, recalling Eq. 2-13, an 
empirical model to check the impact of capital requirement on bank performance is indicated 
below:  
 
, , 1 , , 2 , , 3 , , 4 , , 5 , , 1
2 1 , 2 , , ,
* _
* _ _
i j t i j t i j t i j t i j t i j t
j t j t t i i j t
Y c a NIIs a OBSs a LOANs a LLPr a TA LOANs d cap
OBSs d cap b GDP b Interb D year k

  
      
                                                                        
(2-14)
  
where, 
d_cap is a dummy variable and is equal to 1 when capital ratio is more than 8%, 0 otherwise.  
LOANs*d_cap is an interaction variable to identify the effect of capital regulation on 
traditional activities, i.e., loans. According to the implications of the theoretical model, we 
expect that regarding traditional activities, serious capital regulation may have less or little 
impact on bank performance given the lower risk-taking of traditional activities, so banks are 
willing to choose more traditional activities instead of OBSs. 
                                                        
22 Based on the sample in this chapter, 138 of 359 banks held at least 8% capital from 1996 to 2007; this might be because 
Basel Accord II which requires no less than 8% capital holding was addressed in 2004.  
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OBSs*d_cap is an interaction variable to identify the effect of risk-based capital requirement 
on OBSs. Based on the conclusion of the model, we expect that an increase in OBSs leads to a 
decline in bank returns, as banks have to pay higher level regulatory costs when choosing 
more OBSs, which has a negative effect on bank performance. Therefore, in this context, 
banks prefer holding traditional activities. Table 2-4 shows a summary of the statistics and 
definitions of variables. Table 2-3 shows the matrices of correlation among bank-level 
variables. 
 
. 
 
Table 2-3 The Matrices of Correlation among Bank-level Variables 
 ROA NNIs OBSs LOANs LLPs 
ROA 1.000     
NNIs 0.141 1.000    
OBSs 0.114 0.382 1.000   
LOANs 0.122 0.042 0.016 1.000  
LLPs -0.032 0.278 -0.007 0.441 1.000 
Note: ROA is the percentage of net income to total assets; NNIs is the percentage of net non-interest income 
to total operating income; OBSs is the percentage of off-balance-sheet items to total assets; LOANs is the 
percentage of loans to total assets; LLPs is the percentage of loan loss provisions to total assets. 
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Table 2-4 Summary Statistics and Definitions of Variables   
Year Income        NNIs             OBSs       LOANs  LLPr   GDP    Interbank 
Definition The percentage of 
net income to total 
assets  
The percentage of 
net non-interest 
income to total 
operating income 
The percentage of 
off-balance-sheet 
items to total 
assets 
The percentage 
of loans to total 
assets 
 The percentage of 
loan loss 
provisions to total 
assets 
GDP growth rate 
as the ratio of the 
difference 
between the 
current year and 
the last year to 
the value of last 
year 
Interbank rates 
(3-month) for the 
European 
countries; Federal 
Funds rates 
(middle rate, 
overnight) 
1996 0.663 1.414 9.956 73.492  0.321 3.831 4.286 
1997 0.616 1.124 9.283 73.860  0.309 4.160 4.416 
1998 0.633 1.667 9.339 73.418  0.340 4.312 4.381 
1999 0.585 1.365 9.264 73.345  0.294 4.398 3.929 
2000 0.670 1.515 10.582 72.253  0.336 5.347 5.248 
2001 0.626 2.202 10.550 72.181  0.368 3.304 3.965 
2002 0.638 1.667 11.683 73.639  0.362 3.228 2.880 
2003 0.690 2.018 13.779 74.230  0.345 3.185 2.117 
2004 0.688 1.885 15.335 72.397  0.269 4.585 2.216 
2005 0.754 3.081 17.343 71.964  0.211 4.555 2.833 
2006 0.788 2.188 17.764 71.320  0.212 5.281 3.952 
2007 0.669 2.042 19.790 72.325  0.203 5.020 4.807 
Mean 0.666 1.786 12.418 72.615  0.294 4.267 3.752 
Std. 0.479 10.897 15.317 15.280  0.532 1.481 1.314 
Max 0.840 79.150 49.659 99.800  3.602 6.633 7.35 
Min 0.004 0.000 0.000 1.832  0.000 0.940 1.22 
Note: Data of each year is mean values of various variables across banks; Data of Mean, Std., Max and min are presented across the entire period 1996-2007; GDP is an 
average of GDP growth rate across countries in each year. Sources: Authors’ computation; Bankscope and Datastream. 
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2.5 Econometric Methodology with Panel Data 
 
The two main methods to fit the regression with panel data are the fixed effect model and 
random effect model. According to Wooldridge (2006, pp485-493), given a panel data set, the 
estimated regression is shown as: 
                  
tiititi Xy ,,,                                                      (2-15) 
 
where, 
y is a dependent variable. 
X is a vector of independent variables. 
 is a vector of coefficients of X. 
  is an unobserved individual-level effect. 
  is a disturbance term. 
i= 1,…,n is the number of units and t= 1,…,T is the number of years. 
Either the fixed effect model or the random effect model can be applied in Eq. 2-15, which 
depends on whether the unobserved effect and X are correlated. Thus, two approaches are 
respectively introduced as follows. 
 
2.5.1 The Fixed Effect Model 
 
Assume that an unobserved unit-level effect (the fixed effect)   is correlated with 
explanatory variables, which leads to biased and inconsistent coefficients. Thus, one 
reasonable approach to eliminate the fixed effect is shown. 
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For unit i, the averages of variables in Eq. 2-15 over time are respectively generated and 
presented as follows. 
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Since the unobserved unit-level effect is fixed, ii   . Therefore, we subtract the averages 
from Eq.2-15,  
 
)()()( ,,, itiiiitiiti XXyy                                   (2-16)                                         
                                                                 
Or 
tititi Xy ,,,                                                           (2-17)                            
                                                                  
 
According to Eq. 2-17, the fixed effect estimator FEˆ  can be obtained using the OLS.  
 
2.5.2 The Random Effect Model 
 
The key difference between the fixed effects model and the random effects model is whether 
unobserved effect is correlated with independent variables. The random effects model 
assumes that there is zero correlation between the unobserved effect and explanatory variables, 
i.e., cov ( , X)=0, so   can be an additional random disturbance. 
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tiktiti Xy ,,,                                                   (2-18)                                                   
                                                                 
where,  
tiiti ,,   , and it is a composite error term. 
 
As the fixed effect i  is in the composite error term over time, the serial correlation is 
indicated. 
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where,  
),( ,, litiCorr   is the serial correlation in the error term. 
)(2 iVar    , and is the variance of the unobserved effect. 
)( ,
2
tiVar    , and is the variance of the disturbance term. 
 
As pooled OLS standard errors cannot eliminate the serial correlation, generalised least 
squares (GLS) should be employed to estimate models with serial correlation. Thus, the Eq. 
2-18 is transformed and shown as follows: 
 
)()( ,,,, itititikiti XXyy                                 (2-20)                              
                                                                
where,  
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  is an estimator of 2  with ti ,ˆ and 
li ,ˆ , which are residuals from estimating Eq. 2-18 by using pooled OLS. 
2ˆ
 =
22 ˆˆ
   , and it is an estimator of 
2
 . 
2ˆ
 is the square of the standard error of Eq. 2-18 by using pooled OLS. 
Using ˆ  instead of  in Eq.2-20 can obtain the random effects estimators, which are 
consistent and asymptotically normally distributed. 
2.5.3 Hausman Test  
 
This study aims to investigate the effect of OBSs on bank performance. The unobserved 
effects, including the bank’s age, the experience of bank managers, the qualification of 
employees and the technological level, contribute to the development of OBSs and the 
efficiency of OBSs management, so they may have a significant correlation with explanatory 
variables, such as OBSs and non-interest income. Thus, the fixed effect model can be 
acceptable in this estimation. However, in order to identify whether the fixed effect model or 
random effect model is appropriate, a standard approach Hausman test (Wooldridge, 2002, 
p288) should be used, which is constructed to compare the estimators of the fixed effect 
model and random effect model. The original form of the Hausman statistic (HS) is shown as 
follows. 
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                         (2-21)                    
                                                                 
where, 
FEˆ  represents the vector of coefficients in terms of the fixed effect estimation. 
REˆ  represents the vector of coefficients in terms of the random effect estimation. 
)ˆ(ˆ FEraV  represents the variance-covariance matrix of coefficients based on the fixed effect 
estimation. 
)ˆ(ˆ REraV   represents the variance-covariance matrix of coefficients based on the random 
effect estimation. 
 
The Hausman statistic is distributed asymptotically as Chi-square with the degree of freedom 
equal to the number of explanatory variables. The null hypothesis is that the unobserved effect 
is uncorrelated with the explanatory variables, so that we can reject the fixed effect model, as 
it includes an unnecessary dummy variable set. The alternative hypothesis is that the 
unobserved effect is correlated with the explanatory variables, which generates biased and 
inconsistent estimators. Thus, we accept the fixed effect model, as it is systemically different 
from the random effect model. The results of the Hausman test are reported in Tables 2-4 and 
2-5. In this study, the Chi-square values are more than the critical value, given that P-value is 
zero, so we can reject the null hypothesis and use the fixed effect model in the estimations. 
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2.6 Empirical Results and Analyses 
2.6.1 Results of Empirical Models 
 
Table 2-5 displays the results of four empirical estimations. RegressionⅡis used to identify 
the scenario described in the framework as shown in Figure 2-3. A negative and significant 
result of OBSs in the sub-period 2001-2006 indicates that an increase in OBSs leads to a 
lower level return, which is inconsistent with the implication of the framework; this result 
suggests that an optimal strategy for banks is to be involved in less OBSs post-2000 owing to 
a large proportion of OBSs being associated with higher risk-taking. However, it is consistent 
with the results of empirical work investigated by Stiroh (2002), Stiroh (2006) and Calmes 
and Theoret (2010), who imply that idiosyncratic risk is diversified due to the employment of 
product diversification, but the overall portfolio risk is higher and cannot be diversified; and 
higher leverage ratio also contributes to this negative effect of OBSs with complex 
characteristics. A negative and significant coefficient of OBSs on bank profitability in 2007 
follows the scenario indicated in the framework (see Figure 2-3), suggesting that, because of 
abnormal higher risk-taking and leverage, an increase in OBSs leads to lower bank returns.   
 
The second column of Table 2-5 displays the results of RegressionⅠ, which investigates the 
effect of NIIs in three sub-periods. Basically, the signs of the results follow those of the OBSs 
in RegressionⅡ. The negative coefficients of NIIs in sub-periods 2001-2006 and 2007 
suggest that non-traditional activities associated with non-transparent and complex 
characteristics increase the volatilities of bank income. This is consistent with the conclusion 
of the standard portfolio theory, suggesting that a positive correlation between traditional 
activities and non-traditional activities restricts the diversified benefits. These results are also 
consistent with the implications of empirical estimations (Stiroh, 2004ab and Stiroh, 2006) 
 60 
which argue that the cross-selling of banking products might create a positive correlation 
between traditional activities and non-traditional activities income, since a stable and long-run 
relationship with clients in terms of traditional activities can be used in financial operations 
with non-traditional activities. The European Commission (2006) also points out that 
customers’ preferences rarely change over time, so banks usually provide a diversified 
financial product to the same clients. Therefore, the diversified gains are reduced. 
 
The fourth column of Table 2-5 shows the results of Regression Ⅲ, which aims to examine 
the effect of LLPr on bank performance during three sub-periods. The negative and significant 
coefficients indicate that bank credit risk has an impact on bank returns in the three 
sub-periods. Generally, this result follows the conclusions of the empirical estimations of 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (1998), Nys (2003), Fonseca and González (2007), Baele et al. 
(2007), Chen (2007), and Calmès and Théoret (2010). They argue that the default risk of 
traditional activities, i.e., loans, still has an impact on bank performance, even when there is a 
significant increase in OBSs in a bank portfolio. In addition, considering credit rationing, an 
increase in the supply of loans raises bank risk-taking beyond the threshold of interest rate, 
this requires banks to hold more LLP against the potential higher risk level. Thus, it has a 
negative impact on bank profitability. 
 
The last column of Table 2-5 shows the results of regression Ⅳ, which aims to examine the 
effect of the composition of a bank portfolio on bank profitability due to the shift in the 
capacity of bank activities including both OBSs and loans in the three sub-periods. Taking the 
period pre-2000 as a basis, although an insignificant coefficient of OBSs is found in pre-2000, 
the magnitude of the negative effect of OBSs increased in 2001-2006 and 2007, and the 
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positive effect in terms of loans slightly reduced over time. The negative result of OBSs and 
positive result of loans on bank profitability in 2001-2006 support the scenario described in 
the third and fourth cases as shown in Figures 2-5 and 2-6
23
 (see A’ in equilibrium), 
suggesting that an increase in the proportion of OBSs and a reduction in the proportion of 
loans in the bank portfolio lead to a lower bank return than pre-2000 in equilibrium. This 
shows an overcapacity problem, especially with OBSs (Milne and Wood, 2003), since banks 
have an incentive to enlarge the capacity of bank activities in order to participate in a potential 
bail-out provided by the government under TBTF; however, risk management is not able to 
efficiently control for the risk-taking of a large proportion of OBSs with complex 
characteristics, so the overall portfolio risk is higher, which has a negative impact on bank 
profitability. The negative result of OBSs and positive result of loans in 2007 support the 
scenario described in the framework as shown by Figures 2-5 and Figure 2-6
24
, suggesting 
regarding bank capacity, either an increase in loans or a reduction in loans, as long as an 
increasing shift of OBSs is more than that of loans, leading to a higher proportion of OBSs 
and lower proportion of loans in a portfolio in equilibrium where the bank expected return is 
reduced due to an abnormal higher risk and leverage resulting from inappropriate bank 
regulation. This negative effect is consistent with the situation of the financial markets in 
2007. Based on these results, the conjecture is that the optimal bank portfolio selection is 
banks should go for more traditional activities than non-traditional activities. 
 
                                                        
23 The negative result of OBSs and positive result of loans in post-2000 follow the scenario of the equilibrium described in 
the framework as shown in Figures 2-5 and 2-6; these figures indicate that, regarding bank capacity, the shift of OBSs is 
more than that of loans (though it cannot be tested through the empirical work, this is reasonable due to competition in 
traditional credit markets, regulation of traditional bank activities and higher profits of non-traditional activities mentioned by 
many previous papers), and this leads to a lower return with a higher proportion of OBSs and lower proportion of loans in 
equilibrium compared with pre-2000. 
24 Figure 2-5 shows that the shift of OBSs is more than that of loans regarding the bank capacity in 2007, leading to a lower 
bank return with a higher proportion of OBSs and lower proportion of loans. Although Figure 2-6 shows a different case, in 
that the shift of loans is down but the shift of OBSs is up in 2007, this leads to the same consequence: a lower return with a 
higher proportion of OBSs and lower proportion of loans in the bank portfolio.  
 62 
Regarding the effect of macro-variables, we find a positive and significant effect of the 
macro-economy on bank performance in all estimations, which is consistent with numerous 
studies (see Bikker and Hu, 2002; Gerlach et al., 2004; Fonseca and González, 2007). They 
argue that the rapid economic development provides an opportunity for the banking sector to 
diversify the credit risk of bank activities, which has a positive impact on bank performance 
in a boom. However, as suggested by Kashyap et al. (2002), householders prefer 
deposit-taking in downturns, since deposit insurance is imposed as a protection against 
potential risk, which might reduce investment in non-traditional activities. This result supports 
a positive relationship between bank performance and economic growth.  
 
Basically, the empirical results of Regression Ⅱ cannot support the scenario in the sub-period 
2001-2006 described in the framework as shown in Figure 2-3. An increase in OBSs leads to 
a lower level of return, since banks are unable to manage the risk of OBSs (inefficient risk 
management) which causes the overall portfolio risk to be increased; and inappropriate 
regulation also contributes to this negative effect; the results of Regression Ⅰ are consistent 
with the argument that a positive correlation between traditional activities and non-traditional 
activities (cross selling) restricts diversified gains; the results of Regression Ⅲ suggest the 
negative effect of higher risk-taking of traditional activities on bank performance, considering 
credit rationing. According to the results of OBSs and loans of Regression Ⅳ in the three 
sub-periods, we argue that an increase in the capacity of bank activities, especially an 
increasing shift in OBSs, has a negative impact on bank profitability, which support the 
scenario described in the frameworks as shown in Figures 2-5 and 2-6. A large proportion of 
OBSs associated with an abnormal higher risk and leverage has a negative impact on bank 
performance; therefore, an overcapacity problem is generated so that the introduction of 
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risk-based capital regulation might be used to control for the composition of bank portfolios.  
Table 2-5 Results of Estimations  
Independent 
variables 
Regression 
(Ⅰ) 
Regression 
(Ⅱ) 
Regression 
(Ⅲ) 
Regression 
(Ⅳ) 
NIIs ---- -0.01 
[-1.48] 
-0.03*** 
[-3.00] 
-0.04* 
[-1.74] 
OBSs -0.07*** 
[-5.384] 
---- -0.005* 
[-1.666] 
---- 
LLPr -0.04*** 
[-4.00] 
-0.08*** 
[-5.94] 
---- -0.08*** 
[-5.70] 
GDP 0.035** 
[2.916] 
0.048*** 
[5.10] 
0.029** 
[2.416] 
0.06*** 
[6.23] 
Interb -0.002 
[-0.133] 
-0.012 
[-0.80] 
-0.007 
[-0.50] 
-0.01 
[-0.91] 
NII1 0.001 
[0.03] 
---- ---- ---- 
NII2 -0.015** 
[-2.143] 
---- ---- ---- 
NII3 -0.04** 
[-2.353] 
---- ---- ---- 
OBS1 ---- -0.011 
[-0.73] 
---- -0.007 
[-0.45] 
OBS2 ---- -0.024** 
[-2.47] 
---- -0.024** 
[-2.28] 
OBS3 ---- -0.034*** 
[-3.28] 
---- -0.033** 
[-2.98] 
LOAN1 ---- ---- ---- 0.432*** 
[5.42] 
LOAN2 ---- ---- ---- 0.365*** 
[5.11] 
LOAN3 ---- ---- ---- 0.359*** 
[4.79] 
LLP1 ---- ---- -0.11*** 
[-7.333] 
---- 
LLP2 ---- ---- -0.08*** 
[-5.714] 
---- 
LLP3 ---- ---- -0.07*** 
[-3.333] 
---- 
Constant -5.66*** 
[-53.904] 
-5.281*** 
[-42.934] 
-5.166*** 
[-74.74] 
-4.67*** 
[-19.94] 
No.of Obs. 3444 3391 3458 3459 
Adjusted 
R-square 
0.697 0.70 0.69 0.69 
Hausman test 
Chi2 
184.98*** 195.48*** 193.50*** 275*** 
Notes: NII1, OBS1, LOAN1 and LLP1 are interaction variables of non-interest income share, 
off-balance-sheet, loan ratio and loan loss provision ratio for the sub-period 1996-2000; NII2, OBS2, LOAN2 
and LLP2 are interaction variables of non-interest income share, off-balance-sheet, loan ratio and loan loss 
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2.6.2 Results of Estimation with Capital Regulation 
As we identified an overcapacity problem in the bank portfolio, we have to estimate whether 
efficient capital regulation can control for this and lead to better bank performance. The 
second and third columns of Table 2-6 present the results of the regression (Eq. 2-13) using 
two different proxies of bank performance (ROA and Risk-adjusted performance
25
), which 
aim to identify an optimal bank portfolio without considering risk-based capital regulation. 
An increase in OBSs and a reduction in loans have a negative impact on bank profitability 
considering ROA as a dependent variable. In essence, this result is consistent with previous 
estimations. In addition, considering risk-adjusted performance as a dependent variable, we 
find a negative and significant coefficient of the interbank rate, suggesting that an increase in 
interbank rate reduces risk-adjusted bank return. Taking the interbank rate as a risk-free rate, 
if it is going up, the SR is going down based on the portfolio theory. 
 
The fourth and fifth columns of Table 2-6 report the results of the estimations including two 
interaction variables (recalling Eq. 2-14), in order to identify the effect of capital requirement 
on bank performance. The significant and negative coefficients of the interaction variable 
between OBSs and the capital requirement dummy are found in two estimations (ROA and 
risk-adjusted performance), which suggest that under a risk-based capital requirement, an 
increase in OBSs leads to a lower level of bank returns. However, insignificant coefficients of 
the interaction term between loans and the capital requirement dummy variables suggest that a 
                                                        
25 Risk-adjusted performance as a measure of SR is defined as the return on asset to the standard deviation of return on asset 
(calculated over the sample period for a bank), following Stiroh and Rumble (2006). 
provision ratio for the sub-period 2001-2006; NII3, OBS3, LOAN3 and LLP3 are interaction variables of 
non-interest income share, off-balance-sheet, loan ratio and loan loss provision ratio for the sub-period 2007;  
***, **, * indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. t-statistics are in[]. 
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risk-based capital requirement has little impact on loans associated with lower risk-taking, 
compared with OBSs. These results follow the implications of the theoretical model, as shown 
in Figure 2-8, which highlights a substitute effect and suggests that banks should choose more 
traditional activities than OBSs as an optimal investment strategy, owing to heavy regulatory 
costs imposed on OBSs. 
 
Regarding year dummy variables in terms of ROA estimations, we can identify a significant 
time specific effect since 2002. An increase in bank profits over time may result from the fast 
development of financial markets, i.e., new financial products, in the developed countries, 
while it reduced in 2007 due to the consequence of the recent financial crisis. Based on 
risk-adjusted performance estimations, most of the year dummies are insignificant. 
 
Basically, the empirical results from these estimations follow the conclusions of the 
theoretical work as shown in Figure 2-8. Given a risk-based capital requirement, banks should 
hold traditional activities more than OBSs in equilibrium, since a considerable regulatory cost 
is granted to OBSs associated with higher risk-taking. This result highlights the substitute 
effect between OBSs and loans in the bank portfolio, given a risk-based capital requirement, 
and provides a solution for the overcapacity problem, especially regarding OBSs. 
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Table 2-6 Results of Robust Estimations 
 
Independent 
variables 
     Estimation (1)       Estimation (2) 
 
 ROA ROA/SDROA ROA ROA/SDROA 
OBSs -0.030*** 
[-2.89] 
-0.100*** 
[-5.37] 
-0.023** 
[2.16] 
-0.09*** 
[-4.84] 
LOANs 0.625*** 
[7.15] 
0.061 
[0.91] 
0.58*** 
[7.22] 
0.129 
[1.14] 
NIIs -0.008* 
[-1.76] 
0.007 
[1.48] 
-0.01* 
[-1.75] 
0.007 
[1.50] 
LLPr -0.072*** 
[-5.16] 
-1.106*** 
[-4.45] 
-0.073*** 
[-5.19] 
-0.106*** 
[-4.46] 
GDP 0.024* 
[1.94] 
0.115*** 
[5.17] 
0.023* 
[1.90] 
0.116*** 
[5.19] 
Interb -0.012 
[-0.81] 
-0.057** 
[-2.07] 
-0.014 
[-0.94] 
-0.059** 
[-2.14] 
OBS*d_cap ---- ---- -0.025** 
[-2.26] 
-0.032* 
[-1.90] 
LOAN*d_cap ---- ---- -0.021 
[-1.58] 
0.147 
[0.75] 
D_1997 -0.015 
[-0.34] 
-0.057 
[-0.74] 
-0.014 
[-0.33] 
-0.058 
[-0.73] 
D_1998 0.016 
[0.34] 
-0.166** 
[-2.03] 
0.016 
[0.35] 
-0.17** 
[-2.07] 
D_1999 -0.064 
[1.38] 
-0.304*** 
[-3.66] 
-0.063 
[-1.35] 
-0.307*** 
[-3.70] 
D_2000 0.057 
[1.11] 
-0.127 
[-1.42] 
0.061 
[1.21] 
-0.126 
[-1.41] 
D_2001 0.064 
[1.38] 
0.029 
[0.36] 
0.065 
[1.41] 
0.027 
[0.34] 
D_2002 0.117** 
[2.23] 
0.065 
[0.74] 
0.117** 
[2.23] 
0.06 
[0.68] 
D_2003 0.251*** 
[4.17] 
0.069 
[0.70] 
0.251*** 
[4.17] 
0.065 
[0.66] 
D_2004 0.242*** 
[3.72] 
-0.175* 
[-1.67] 
0.244*** 
[3.73] 
-0.18* 
[-1.72] 
D_2005 0.331*** 
[5.39] 
-0.02 
[-0.22] 
0.336*** 
[5.47] 
-0.022 
[-0.23] 
D_2006 0.416*** 
[6.47] 
0.038 
[0.41] 
0.423*** 
[6.56] 
0.035 
[0.38] 
D_2007 0.286*** 
[4.29] 
-0.368*** 
[-4.03] 
0.294*** 
[4.41] 
-0.369*** 
[-4.03] 
constant -3.85*** 
[13.74] 
2.66*** 
[14.07] 
-3.81*** 
[-13.57] 
2.56*** 
[10.79] 
No. of groups 358 358 358 358 
No. of  Obs. 3396 3356 3396 3566 
WithinR-square 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.05 
HausmanChi 2 341.95*** 151.27*** 369*** 100*** 
***, **, * indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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2.7 Conclusions 
 
Most of the empirical evidence on the effect of non-traditional activities on bank performance 
is limited to studies based on US banks, and does not present an optimal bank portfolio 
selection including traditional and non-traditional activities. This chapter attempts to 
empirically estimate both the US and the European banks, and further presents an optimal 
bank portfolio considering OBSs and loans as a whole both in the run-up to the financial crisis 
and during the crisis period.  
 
We present two frameworks considering credit rationing: one is that, given a fixed capacity of 
bank activities, a shift of OBSs leads to an increasing proportion of OBSs in the bank 
portfolio with different expected returns in equilibrium in three sub-periods (1996-2000; 
2001-2006 and 2007); the other is that, considering a change in the capacity of bank activities, 
the shift of OBSs and loans curves leads to different proportions of OBSs and loans in the 
bank portfolio with different expected returns in equilibrium in the three sub-periods. In 
addition, we present a theoretical model to show an optimal bank strategy in two cases, one 
considering risk-based capital regulation, and the other not doing so.  
 
Based on the results of the empirical models for the three sub-periods, we conclude that the 
relationship between bank return and OBSs is negative, while there is a positive link between 
bank returns and loans, supporting the scenario described in the framework as shown in 
Figures 2-5 and 2-6. Since in some circumstances, banks are unable to diversify overall 
portfolio risk and effectively manage the risk of non-traditional activities, leading to higher 
risk-taking; and higher leverage resulting from inappropriate bank regulation also contributes 
to the negative effect of OBSs on bank performance. In addition, based on standard portfolio 
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theory, a positive correlation between interest income and non-interest income, owing to the 
cross-selling of financial products, decreases the benefits of bank diversification (Stiroh, 
2004a, 2004b and Stiroh, 2006). Although the economies of scale enable the long-run average 
costs of bank operations to be reduced, overcapacity regarding OBSs, should be considered, 
which may lead to a higher risk level of bank portfolios. In addition, the negative effect of 
credit risk measured by loan loss provisions on bank performance is found in the three 
sub-periods and a significant positive relationship between bank performance and the 
macro-economy is also identified in this study. 
 
The results of the empirical models considering risk-based capital regulation can support the 
implications of the theoretical model, suggesting that banks should choose more traditional 
activities as an optimal bank strategy when facing heavy regulatory costs. Risk-based capital 
regulation forces banks to shift away from risky assets to those with lower risk-taking, which 
highlights the substitute effect between these two activities and might solve the overcapacity 
problem, especially regarding OBSs. Therefore, banks, prior to improving the capacity, 
should consider the risk-taking of both traditional activities and non-traditional activities; on 
the other hand, policy-makers should propose the cooperation of bank regulation from 
government, shareholders and depositors, on non-traditional bank behaviour to control for its 
higher risk-taking, which forces banks to consider the regulatory costs of risky assets and 
choose an optimal bank portfolio in order to maintain a stable financial system.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
THE BANK SIZE IN DETERMINING THE RISK LEVEL OF 
INTERBANK LENDING 
        
 
 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
                                                                                                                                                               
The interbank market is an important market for allocating liquidity between banks. On the 
one hand, a bank with a liquidity problem can borrow through the interbank market; on the 
other hand, a bank with excessive liquidity can lend credit to others. Thus, the interbank 
market eases the liquidity problem, and at the same time reduces the costs of holding liquidity, 
which increases the efficiency and stability of the financial markets.  
 
The interbank market plays a role in risk-sharing between banks with credit linkage; however, 
it is also a source of contagion risk. On the one hand, contagion risk occurs in the event of a 
shortage of aggregate liquidity assets. In the context of the interbank market, an initial failure 
of a borrowing bank may spread to lending banks, especially those with fewer liquidity assets. 
Thus, the value of lending bank assets is reduced and not sufficient to satisfy the liquidity 
requirement; finally, the lending bank has to liquidate its long-run assets and this forces the 
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bank into bankruptcy. This is the contagion effect discussed by Freixas and Rochet (2008, 
p240). Figure 3-1 presents a simple framework of interbank markets with relation to 
contagion risk. Through the trading of the interbank market, an initial borrowing bank default 
will probably generate a contagion effect on a lending bank with less liquidity, which 
increases the risk level of the lending bank. On the other hand, since lending banks cannot 
judge whether borrowers have good or bad credit, particularly in financial markets associated 
with higher volatilities, banks are reluctant to lend for fear that others will be unable to honour 
their obligations, which triggers a drying up of liquidity in the interbank market 
(Goldsmith-Pinkham and Yorulmazer, 2010). 
 
The contagion effect is more significant in a downturn, when lending banks prefer to charge 
higher interest rates in the interbank markets. For example, the average of 3-month interbank 
rates in the European financial markets increased from 3.952 in 2006 to 4.807 in 2007
26
, as 
involvement in the interbank market may trigger a higher level of risk-taking for lending 
banks. The recent financial crisis of 2007-08 also leads us to question the advantage of relying 
on interbank markets to provide liquidity, considering the contagion risk.  
 
The policy of “too big to fail” (TBTF) is considered in the context of interbank lending. 
According to the argument on the structure of interbank markets suggested by Freixas et al. 
(2000), lending banks are money centre banks (usually big banks)
27
, which are connected with 
other banks, large non-financial firms and even governments, such that their failures have a 
negative impact on the whole economy. Thus, the central bank is willing to provide potential 
protection for big banks, which might enable them to become involved in risky activities 
                                                        
26 Data source: Datastream. 
27 Because of advanced technology and information disclosure, management experience and stable relationships with 
customers in large banks, e.g. the Big Four in the UK, they occupy key positions, connected with the rest of the economy.  
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(moral hazard). The size effect, therefore, is significant in determining bank risk level.  
 
In this study, we concentrate on the issue around whether involvement in interbank lending 
increases the risk level of banks: in this, the size effect should particularly be considered. We 
also detect differences in bank activities and risk-taking in the run-up to the recent crisis and 
during the crisis period through empirical analyses using data on banks from European 
countries and the US.  
 
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows: a literature review on the interbank market is 
introduced in Section 2; econometric methodologies are discussed in Section 3; the model 
specification and data analyses are presented in Section 4; Section 5 presents the results and 
the analyses of the empirical estimations, and the last section concludes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Borrowing Bank Default Lending Bank Illiquidity 
Contagion   
Interbank Market 
                Figure 3-1 The Framework of Interbank Market    
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3.2 Literature Review  
3.2.1 Market Structure and TBTF 
Allen and Gale (2000), extended the original model of Bhattacharya and Gale (1987), to show 
two different structures of interbank markets: one is the interbank market with credit chains 
(incomplete market), where a bank has a connection only with its neighbour; and the other is 
the interbank market with diversified lending (complete market), where a bank has symmetric 
links with all others. Lower risk-taking is indicated in the complete market, where the risk of 
interbank lending can be shared by more than one lending bank. Considering the role of the 
central bank in the context of the interbank market, Freixas et al. (2000), based on the original 
model of Freixas et al. (1998), present a disconnected multiple money centres market 
structure (Figure 3-2), where borrowing banks have a connection with the money centre banks 
(A and E). The risk level of interbank trading depends on the position of the failed bank. The 
bankruptcy of the money centre bank leads to serious consequences for the financial system, 
since it is connected with other banks, large non-financial firms and even the government. 
This theoretical model highlights the role of the Central Bank (CB) and indicates that the 
optimal strategy of the CB is to provide additional protection for money centre banks in order 
to minimise the costs of intervention under TBTF. As shown in Figure 3-2, the CB, as the 
lender of last resort (LLR), would lend to a money centre bank having an illiquidity problem. 
In addition, the structure of the interbank market in many countries, such as Germany, 
Belgium and Austria, is characterised as a multiple money centre banks market (Figure 3-3), 
where the money centre banks have a connection between each other. Compared with the 
structure shown in Figure 3-2, the risk level is higher in the structure shown in Figure 3-3, 
where money centre banks are connected and the contagion effect in turn can be spread to 
other money centre banks that are linked together. To some extent, the implication of the 
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multiple money centre bank market structure is consistent with the policy of TBTF, that they 
are protected by CB and hence might be associated with a higher level of risk-taking owing to 
moral hazard.  
 
Rochet, 2000) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 Interconnected Money Centre Bank Market Structure (Freixas, Parigiand  Rochet,  
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Figure 3.6  Figure 3-2 Disconnected Multiple Money Centre Bank Market Structure (Freixas, Parigi and Rochet, 2000) 
ig re 3-3 Interconnected Multiple Money Cen e Bank Market Structure (Freixas, Parigi and 
Rochet, 2000) 
Fig 3-3 
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According to the introduction to market structure and TBTF above, we may argue that under 
the development of interbank market structure, the money centre bank market structure 
highlights the important role of CB in maintaining a stable financial system. Given a multiple 
money centre bank market structure, CB is willing to rescue big banks that are in key 
positions of the economy considering TBTF, which may increase the incentives of big banks 
to be involved in risky activities, suggesting different risk levels in terms of large and small 
banks.  
  
The existing empirical modelling has concentrated on the effect of the interbank market 
structure on risk-taking using matrix analyses
28
. In these studies, balance sheet data or large 
interbank exposures data are used as a proxy to determine the structure of interbank markets. 
Upper and Worms (2002) estimated the Germany interbank market by applying 25 matrices of 
bilateral exposures in terms of maturity and bank categories (saving banks, cooperative banks, 
commercial banks, Landesbanken and the cooperative central bank). They find that the 
German interbank market is two-tier: in the upper tier, the structure of interbank exposures is 
close to a complete interbank market structure (for savings banks and cooperative banks), 
while in the lower tier, the interbank market is associated with an incomplete structure (for 
commercial banks, Landesbanken and the cooperative central bank) and suggest that the 
contagion risk is lower in a complete market structure than in an incomplete market structure. 
Wells (2004) suggests that in the UK, large banks engage in operations between each other 
and the small banks borrow credits from large banks, which is consistent with the implications 
of the multiple money centre bank structure as suggested by Freixas et al. (2000). However, 
                                                        
28 Basically, the idea of matrix analyses is that jix , is credit exposure of bank j VS bank i (bilateral exposures), if the 
product of jix , and the loss rate is bigger than the book value of bank i, suggesting that bank j trigger the failure of bank i. 
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Cocco et al. (2009) suggest that a different structure exists in the Portuguese interbank market, 
where large banks tend to be net borrowers as they have more opportunities to invest; while 
small banks specialise in deposit-taking but have few investments, so they having sufficient 
liquidity can lend to large banks. Degryse and Nguyen (2004) analyse the contagion effect 
using Belgian banks from 1993 to 2002. They stress the importance of interbank market 
structure in determining contagion risk. A change in market structure from a complete market 
to a multiple money centres market allows contagion risk to be reduced, since in some cases, 
the failure of borrowing banks (small banks) linked to a money centre bank cannot lead to the 
failure of the money centre bank protected by CB, which is consistent with the implications of 
the framework suggested by Freixas et al. (2000). 
3.2.2 Bank Size and Monitoring 
 
In the context of a money centre bank market structure, although large banks are often 
engaged in interbank operations as lenders, an increase in interbank assets might not lead to 
higher risk-taking. Rochet and Tirole (1996), using a theoretical model, highlight the 
importance of effective monitoring of the interbank assets of lending banks, which can reduce 
the risk of interbank lending and maintain a stable financial system. Dinger and Hagen (2005), 
comparing large and small banks, introduce a theoretical model to imply that large banks have 
more advantages, such as efficient management and economies of scale, in monitoring 
borrowing banks, and hence can reduce the risk level of interbank lending. In this model, 
there are assumed to be two firms: one with good projects and the other with bad projects. 
The rate of return of a good project is gR  with a probability of g , 0 otherwise; the rate of 
return of a bad project is bR  with a probability of b , 0 otherwise.  
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gR g -1>0> bR b -1, gR < bR and g > b   
 
For the banking sector, there is one large bank as a lending bank and n small banks as 
borrowing banks following the money centre bank market structure. The interest rate of 
deposit ( lbi ) for the large bank is lower than that of the small banks ( sbi ), since large banks 
receive government protection on deposits. The payment for depositors in the large bank 
is lbD =1 due to its risklessness and for small banks, the nominal repayment is D=1+ sbi . 
Moreover, the large bank also provides interbank assets at the interbank rate ibi  according to 
the risk level of borrowing banks: if a borrowing bank usually finances bad projects, it would 
be required to pay a higher rate. The repayment for one unit of interbank asset is d=1+ ibi . 
Small banks can refinance through either deposit-taking or the interbank market. Thus, the 
deposit for small banks is p and the marginal cost of gathering deposits is c(p); alternatively, 
the amount of credits from the interbank market for small banks is 1-p-E; E is the equity, and 
a higher level of equity reduces the amount of credit financed by either deposit-taking or the 
interbank market, and provides additional protection for banks. 
 
Considering the moral hazard problem, small banks are willing to finance the bad project due 
to its higher return rate, even though they can assess the quality of this project. The small 
banks prefer to finance a good project if, and only if, the net return of the good project is not 
lower than that of the bad project: 
 
( ) (1 )(1 ) ( ) (1 )(1 )g g i g b b i bR R E R R E             
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where, 
iR  is the repayment to creditors of small banks. 
The repayment of interbank assets for the large bank is gd  when small banks finance a good 
project, and bd  when financing a bad project: gd < bd  and g gd  > b bd  . 
 
This model discusses the net expected return (NER) of the large bank in four cases: both good 
and bad project success; bad project failure and good project success; good project failure and 
bad project success and both failing. By comparing NERs in these cases, this model finds that 
the large bank prefers to monitor borrowing banks and assure them to finance good projects in 
order to maximise NER, which reduces the default risk level of interbank lending. However, 
the monitoring only occurs if the benefit of screening is not lower than the fixed costs C, thus,  
 
 (1 ) ( )g bE p d C                                                 (3-1) 
 
The left-hand side of Eq.3-1 is the benefits measured by the difference in the expected return 
between two projects. Finally, the large bank is willing to monitor the borrowing banks if the 
amount of interbank lending exceeds the critical value 1
( )g b
CE p
d  
  

, otherwise, the 
large bank is not willing to monitor or is even reluctant to supply interbank loans. 
 
According to the implications of this theoretical model, Dinger and Hagen (2009) empirically 
estimate the effect of interbank borrowing on bank risk using data on Central and Eastern 
European banks from 1995 to 2004. The reduced-form empirical model is shown as: 
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),,,,( 2 MVEQUSIZESIZEINBRISK                                   (3-2) 
 
where, 
RISK is risk-taking measured by loan loss provision, loan loss reverse and net charge-off to 
equity, respectively.  
INB is measured by interbank borrowing to total assets. 
SIZE is log bank assets. 
2SIZE  is size squared. 
EQU is the equity ratio used to measure capitalisation. 
MV is macro-variables, including GDP and inflation. 
 
They suggest that the borrowing banks are associated with lower risk-taking, as the lending 
bank is willing to monitor the borrowing banks’ activities to maximise its expected return. 
Banks with good capitalisation are indicative of lower risk-taking. Large banks are associated 
with a higher level of risk-taking, and a nonlinear (U-shaped) relationship between bank size 
and risk-taking is found. The U-shaped link implies that when the bank size goes beyond a 
certain level, the risk level is increased. Thus, the effect of bank size on risk-taking is 
nonlinear. The level of risk varies accordingly to whether the bank size is under or above this 
critical value. Finally, the authors find a close link between macro-economic growth and bank 
risk-taking: banks are found to have lower risk in upturns. It is worth noting that Dinger and 
Hagen’s (2005) theoretical model does not take TBTF into account in investigating bank 
behaviour; therefore, in this chapter, we would like to modify this model by considering the 
difference between large and small banks (size effect), following the argument of Freixas et al. 
(2000), to investigate the risk-taking of interbank assets. 
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3.2.3 Macroeconomic Shocks 
 
In addition to the explicit credit linkage, macroeconomic shocks also drive contagion risk. 
The theoretical model suggested by Elsinger et al. (2002), combining a network model of 
interbank exposures, estimates the level of credit risk in response to macroeconomic shocks, 
such as interest rate risk and exchange rate volatilities. Given the interbank market structure, 
the model suggests that default risk of the interbank market mainly results from 
macroeconomic shocks. Elsinger et al. (2006b) investigated two types of the reason of bank 
failure: one is fundamental risk-taking, e.g. the exposure to market, and the other is contagion 
risk resulting from other bank failures, using data on Austrian banks. The result shows that the 
majority of bank defaults (97%) are driven by fundamental shocks of banking system, while 
only 2.7% of bank defaults result from a chain reaction of other bank failures in the financial 
system, suggesting that fundamental risk factors are the source of bank default, systemic 
crises and financial instability. Moreover, the probability of bank failure is higher for small 
banks than large banks, which is consistent with the findings of Allen and Gale (2000) and 
Freixas et al. (2000) in the context of interbank markets, implying that large banks participate 
in a potential bail-out provided by CB. 
 
From the literature review, we focus on the implications of the theoretical work (Dinger and 
Hagen, 2005) considering the effect of TBTF (Freixas et al., 2000). Freixas et al. (2000) 
suggest that given a multiple money centre bank market structure, CB as LLR is willing to 
protect large lending banks, in order to maintain a stable financial system. However, this may 
generate a higher level of risk-taking in large banks because of a moral hazard problem. Thus, 
the first assumption we attempt to examine is that large banks are associated with higher 
risk-taking under TBTF in this framework. According to Dinger and Hagen (2005)’s 
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theoretical model, as large banks have advantages in screening, in order to maximise the 
expected return, they prefer to monitor borrowing banks, which reduces the default risk level 
of interbank assets. However, considering the implication of Freixas et al. (2000), we may 
question this conclusion
29
. Given TBTF, large banks may have less incentive to monitor 
borrowers, which may increase the risk level of interbank assets. Thus, the second assumption 
is that an increase in interbank lending is associated with higher risk-taking for large banks. 
Based on Dinger and Hagen (2005), the third assumption is that higher equities or deposits 
can protect banks against the liquidity problem, particularly for small banks which lack 
protection from CB; and banks with good capitalisation are likely to engage in less risky 
operations
30
. Both of these models (Dinger and Hagen, 2005 and Freixas et al., 2000) 
highlight the importance of bank size
31
 in determining bank risk level, indicating the 
difference between large and small banks.    
3.3 Introduction of Methodology 
3.3.1 Threshold model 
This empirical work is based on the theoretical work of Dinger and Hagen (2005) considering 
the effect of TBTF suggested by Freixas et al. (2000) in the context of interbank markets. 
Regarding the first and second assumptions, bank size and interbank assets are our main 
concerns in the estimation; based on the third assumption, higher equities and deposits
32
 
would provide additional protections for banks, so they are also considered. In addition, 
Elsinger et al. (2002, 2006a,b) theoretically and empirically show the effect of fundamental 
                                                        
29 Dinger and Hagen (2009) point out that large banks in developed countries, e.g. the US, have less incentive to monitor 
interbank lending considering TBTF, although they do not present an investigation into this issue. 
30 However, Calem and Rob (1999) suggest that banks with higher capital holding, especially above the minimum capital 
requirement are involved in more risky activities. 
31 Regarding the theoretical work of Dinger and Hagen (2005), bank size is related to the economies of scale, which reduce 
long-run average costs of bank activities, e.g. monitoring borrowers. 
32 We use a loan deposit ratio in this estimation, as this can reflect liquidity risk. An increase in the loan-deposit ratio 
suggests a higher liquidity risk level (Lepetit et al., 2008b). 
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systemic risk on bank performance, so the macro-variables should be used. Therefore, the 
explanatory variables in this work consist of interbank assets (INA), size effect (SIZE), 
deposits (LDR), equity (EQU) and macro-variables (MV) including GDP growth rate and 
interbank rate as a measure of the risk level of interbank markets. Firstly, following Dinger 
and Hagen (2009), we estimate a non-linear regression to identify the significant difference in 
risk-taking between large and small banks, further suggesting whether we can split the whole 
sample in terms of bank size. If we find significant results with different signs of bank size 
and bank size squared, then we can estimate based on the large and small bank sub-samples, 
respectively. Thus, the non-linear empirical model including INA, SIZE, LDR, EQU and MV 
is shown below: 
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
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2
 
                                                                       (3-3) 
The definitions of variables and the preliminary results in terms of this estimation are shown 
in Appendix 4. We are interested in the results of bank size and bank size squared. A negative 
and significant coefficient of bank size and a positive and significant coefficient of bank size 
squared indicate that there is a U-shaped relationship between risk-taking and bank size: this 
follows the result of Dinger and Hagen (2009), suggesting that there might be differences in 
the risk level of bank activities between large and small banks. Thus, we could endogenously 
find this critical value of bank size to divide the whole sample by using a threshold model. 
Hansen (1996) provides an econometric method to estimate the threshold model. The 
applications of a threshold model include sample splitting and separating, and multiple 
equilibriums. Hansen (1999) develops the threshold model with the fixed effect for panel data. 
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The basic estimated threshold model is shown as: 
 
1 2' ( ) ' ( )it i it it it it ity x I k x I k                                       (3-4) 
 
where,  
i is the number of individual sections, and i=1, 2 ….N. 
t is time period, t=1, 2 ….T. 
ity is a dependent variable. 
i  is an individual effect.  
itx  is a m-vector of independent variables. 
1 and 2  are the coefficients for different regimes divided by the threshold parameter . 
itk is a threshold variable. 
  is the threshold value. 
I is an indicator function. 
it  is an error term and follows a zero-mean process, it ~(0, 
2 ). 
Two categories are classified by the threshold value  , and using the ordinary least squares 
method, the slope coefficients   can be estimated. 
 
Khan and Senhadji (2001) develop the threshold model and apply it to an unbalanced panel. 
By using conditional least squares, the threshold value is determined by minimising the sum 
of square residuals. In our study, with an unbalanced data set, loan-deposit ratio and equity 
ratio are identified as two endogenous variables, because in some circumstances banks having 
a higher risk level are concerned about risky assets, so they tend to change their portfolios by 
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reducing the amount of loans or increasing equities; the relevant test of the endogeneity of 
these two variables will be shown in the next section. This allows us to use the method 
developed by Hansen (2000) and Caner and Hansen (2004), who show a threshold model 
considering instrumental variables. Based on their view, the estimated model is given as: 
 
itititititit kIzkIzy   )()(
'
2
'
1                                 (3-5) 
 
where,  
iz  is a m-vector and is correlated with the error term it , thus, it is endogenous. ix  is a 
k-vector (k≥m) and can be instrumental variables for itz . The reduced-form model on the 
conditional expectation of itz  is shown:  
 
ititit uxz  )( ,                                                   (3-6) 
 
Where, 
itz  
is endogenous variables. 
itx  
is a k-vector of exogenous variables. If ix  is correlated with the endogenous variables 
but is uncorrelated with the error term, it can be the instrumental variable for iz .  
  is the coefficient vector. 
itu  is a m*1 vector of the error term, assume that 0)|( itit xuE . 
Substituting Eq. 3-6 into Eq. 3-5, the transformation is shown: 
 
itititititit kIkIy   )()(
'
2
'
1                                (3-7) 
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where,  
itititititit kIukIu   )()(
'
2
'
1      
 
Following the three-step method suggested by Caner and Hansen (2004), the first step is to 
estimate the coefficient   of the reduced-form function by using the least squares method. 
The second step is to identify the threshold parameter ( ) by using the predicted values of 
endogenous variables in the first step. The third step is to estimate the coefficients 1  and 
2  by using the 2SLS method, given the threshold value. It is worth noting that the threshold 
variable is exogenous, which can guarantee the consistent estimators.  
 
In this study, the bank size is the threshold variable as we attempt to estimate the difference in 
risk-taking between large and small banks, and loan-deposit ratio and equity ratio are 
identified as endogenous variables. According to this three-step method suggested by Caner 
and Hansen (2004), in the first step, we predict the endogenous variables (loan-deposit ratio 
and equity ratio) by using the one-year lagged variables of loan-deposit ratio and equity ratio 
as instruments; the relevant test of the validity of the instruments is given in the next section. 
The second step is to estimate the threshold variable (bank size) by using the predicted values 
of the endogenous variables. The third step is to estimate the slope coefficients by using 2SLS 
on two regimes identified by an estimated threshold parameter. Therefore, the basic nonlinear 
model Eq.3-3 can be changed in terms of the threshold model, which aims to estimate the 
differences in the bank risk level and bank activities between large and small bank groups. 
This is shown below: 
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The key issue of the threshold model is to determine the threshold value ( ). Recalling the 
reduced form Eq.3-6, ititit uxz  )( ,  , the predicted values of iz  are shown as below: 
 
)ˆ(ˆ ,  itit xz   
 
Assume that Y, 21
ˆˆ ZandZ  are the matrices of vectors ity , andkIz itit )(ˆ  )(ˆ itit kIz . Given 
any threshold values, we run the regression of Y on 21
ˆˆ ZandZ  by using the least squares 
method in order to generate the sum of the squared residuals )(S . Therefore, the estimator 
of the threshold value   is obtained by minimising the sum of squared errors. 
 
)(minˆ  S                                                       (3-9) 
    
Figure 3-4 explicitly describes the threshold value (4.150256) at the point where the LR ratio 
strikes 0
33
. Following the implication illustrated by Caner and Hansen (2004) and Hansen 
(2000), the asymptotic confidence interval for the threshold value is robust to 
heteroskedasticity, set  
                                                        
33 The result of the threshold model is obtained using the code of Matlab provided by Hansen (2000) and Caner and Hansen 
(2004). I should thanks for their sharing here. 
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}ˆ)(:{intervalconfidence 2 lueCriticalvaLR   .  
 
This is an asymptotically valid 90% confidence region, and the likelihood ratio of the 
threshold value approaches C2  ( CLR 2)(   ), where C is the 90% of the distribution 
function of a random variable  34; 12   in the case of homoskedasticity; otherwise we 
have to estimate 2 in the case of heteroskedasticity. The points where 
valueCriticalLR )(  are the points in the confidence region, and the critical value is 
presented in green (the lowest flat line) as displayed in Figure 3-4.  
 
      
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
                                                        
34 The distribution function of   is
2
))2/exp(1()( xxp  , which has an inverse: 
)11log(2 lueCriticalva , following Hansen (2000).  
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3.3.2 Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) 
 
Wooldridge (2002, p83) suggests that Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) should be used, given 
that there is a correlation between unobservable errors and explanatory variables, so 
instrumental variables (IV) should be included in the estimations to eliminate endogeneity. 
Thus, the third step of the threshold model with instrument variables presented by Caner and 
Hansen (2004) is to estimate the slopes by using 2SLS.   
 
Recalling Eq. 3-5, itititititit kIzkIzy   )()(
'
2
'
1  
 
where,  
itz  is a m-vector and ),( 21 iii zzz  . Assume that the explanatory variable ii xz 2  is 
exogenous  and iz1  is correlated with the error term it , thus, it is endogenous. 
Set 21
ˆˆ XandX  as the matrices of vectors )(),( ''   itiiti kIxandkIx , and 21
ˆˆ ZandZ  are 
the matrices of vectors )(),( '1
'
1   itiiti kIzandkIz . Therefore, the vectors of the estimators 
21
ˆˆ  and  of 2SLS are shown below:  
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In order to identify the endogeneity of variables, the Hausman specification test (Wooldridge, 
2002, p118) has to be employed. The original form of the Hausman statistic (HS) is shown as 
follow: 
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                  (3-10) 
 
where, 
SLS2ˆ  represents the vector of coefficients in terms of 2SLS estimation. 
OLSˆ  represents the vector of coefficients in terms of OLS estimation. 
SLSraV 2
ˆˆ   represents the variance-covariance matrix of 2SLS coefficients. 
OLSraV ˆˆ  represents the variance-covariance matrix of OLS coefficients. 
The Hausman statistic is distributed asymptotically as Chi-square. 
 
The null hypothesis is that the tested variables are exogenous and not correlated with the error 
term, the 2SLS and OLS estimators should differ only by sampling error, and in other words, 
OLS is preferred. The alterative hypothesis is that the difference between the 2SLS and OLS 
estimators is statistically significant, then, 2SLS can be employed. The Hausman test result is 
shown in Table 3-1.   
     
         Table 3-1 Results of the Hausman Specific Test 
 (b) 
2SLS 
(B) 
OLS 
(b-B) 
Difference 
SQRT (diag (V_b-V_B) 
TA -0.025 -0.0017 -0.024 0.0438 
Equity -0.008 0.0036 -0.011 0.0027 
Loandep 0.012 0.0005 0.011 0.0018 
Interassets 0.193 -0.543 0.736 0.149 
GDP -0.089 -0.084 -0.004 . 
Inter rate -0.014 -0.011 -0.003 . 
Test:   H0: difference in coefficients not systematic 
       Chi2(6)=(b-B)’[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)=44.65 
               Prob>Chi2=0.000 
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The result shows that the value of the Chi-square test statistic is large (44.65), rejecting the 
null hypothesis of OLS at the 1% significant level given that p-value is 0. The Hausman test 
suggests that the difference between the OLS estimators and 2SLS estimators is systemically 
significant, thus, 2SLS is preferred in this study. 
 
We also have to check whether the instruments are appropriate in the 2SLS estimation by 
using the correlation test. Therefore, the reduced-form equation in the first stage of 2SLS 
should be used. Recalling the reduced form Eq. 3-6, 
 
                       ititit
uxz  )( ,                         
 
where, 
itz  
is a m-vector of endogenous variables.
 
itx  is a k-vector of exogenous variables (k≥m) and can be IVs. 
  is a vector of coefficients. 
 
The null hypothesis of the test is that 0ˆ:0 H  suggesting that IV is not valid. The 
alternative hypothesis is that 0ˆ:1 H . If the coefficient of IV is significantly different 
from 0, which indicates that the instruments are correlated with the endogenous variables. 
Therefore, a valid IV is identified.  
 
In this study, we use one-year lagged values of endogenous variables as IVs, since bank 
behaviour is continuous and banks rebalance their assets and liabilities using previous 
performance. The one-year lagged values of the equity ratio and loan-deposit ratio are 
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predetermined at t-1; as a result, these variables are not correlated with the current error term. 
Thus, they can be employed as IVs to estimate the endogenous variables. The correlation test 
is used to test the validity of IVs, and the result is shown in Table 3-2. 
                  
                   
             Table 3-2 Results of the Correlation Test 
IVs t-statistics P>|t| 
Equity ratio(-1) 109.66 0.000 
Loandep ratio (-1) 161.73 0.000 
 
 
As suggested by t-statistics, all coefficients of IVs are significantly different from 0 at the 1% 
significant level in the reduced form equations. The P-value shows that we can reject the null 
hypothesis of insignificance. Thus, one-year lagged values of the equity ratio and loan-deposit 
ratio as IVs are valid in the 2SLS estimations.  
3.3.3 Diagnostic Test for Heteroskedasticity 
 
We then attempt to detect whether heteroskedasticity exists or not. We use a modified Wald 
test for groupwise heteroskedasticity in a fixed effect model (Hausman statistics suggest that 
the fixed effect model is preferred, see Tables 3-5 and 3-6). Based on Greene (2000, p598), 
this programme in Stata tests the null hypothesis that there is no heteroskedasticity. The 
results of this test are indicated in Tables 3-5 and 3-6, and are more than the critical value at 
the 1% significant level, given that p-value is 0, suggesting that errors in the fixed effect 
model are heteroskedastic impacting the consistency of estimators. Thus, we should find ways 
to correct standard errors in the estimations. Normally, the solution is to make standard errors 
robust to heteroskedasticity. We use a programme in Stata
35
 to construct “robust” standard 
errors given the presence of endogeneity, so t-statistics reported in Tables 3-5 and 3-6 are 
                                                        
35 Schaffer, M.E. (2010). Stata module to perform extended IV/2SLS, GMM and AC/HAC, LIML. See http://idears. 
repec.org/c/boc/bocode/s456501.html 
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corrected for heteroskedasticity.    
3.4 Data and Variables 
3.4.1 Data 
 
Macro-level data are chosen from IMF and Datastream, and bank-level data are chosen from 
Bureau Van Dijk Bankscope. Because of data availability in Bankscope, the study period is 
restricted from 1996 to 2008. We use the banks with data disclosure of interbank assets and 
loan loss provision during the study period, as these two variables are the main concern in this 
study
36
. The sample countries follow Chapter 2. Therefore, 357 banks are chosen from 
Bankscope, of which 103 are from the US, 28 are from the UK, 76 are from Germany; 71 are 
from France, 47 are from Denmark, 14 are from Belgium and 18 are from Austria. 
Unbalanced sample data with different numbers of time observations for each bank are used 
in this study. All data are measured in million US dollar
37
 and ratios are presented as 
percentages. 
3.4.2 Variables 
This study mainly aims to test the three assumptions mentioned above: first, large banks are 
more likely to be associated with higher risk under TBTF given their key position in the 
economy; second, considering TBTF, large banks have less incentive to monitor borrowers, so 
an increase in interbank assets generates a higher level of bank risk; third, an increase in 
equities or deposits provides additional protection, particularly for small banks. In addition, in 
order to capture the time specific effect, such as the development of financial systems and 
improvement in the capacity of bank activities over time, year dummy variables are used in 
this estimation. Therefore, recalling Eq.3-8, considering time dummy variables, the estimated 
                                                        
36 Actually, we use the banks with at least three subsequent years of time series data for bank-level variables in order to make 
the results to be reliable and stable. 
37 All values are automatically exchanged to US dollar by Bankscope according to the exchange rate on each closing day. 
 92 
function is shown as below: 
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                                                                                (3-11) 
 
where, 
LLP is the ratio of loan loss provision to total assets and is presented as a percentage. As a 
proxy of credit risk, LLP has been used in previous banking estimations. For example, Keeton 
and Morris (1987, 1988) and Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1998) investigate the link 
between bank risk-taking and macro-economic shocks using loan loss provision as a measure 
of credit risk; Fisher et al. (2000) find that a higher loan loss provision indicates an increase in 
bank risk-taking. In the context of the interbank market, Dinger and Hagen (2009) use loan 
loss provision as an indicator of the riskiness of bank behaviour to evaluate the effect of 
interbank borrowing on the credit risk level. Data are chosen from Bankscope. 
 
TA is the bank size and is defined as the log-transformation of total bank assets. TA is a 
threshold through which we can estimate the differences in bank activities and risk-taking 
between large and small banks based on the implications of Dinger and Hagen (2005), 
considering the effect of TBTF suggested by Freixas et al. (2000). We expect a positive 
coefficient for large banks under TBTF. Data are chosen from Bankscope. 
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Loandep is a ratio defined as total bank loans to total deposits and is presented as a percentage. 
The loan-deposit ratio is considered as an endogenous variable, since banks can change their 
portfolios according to the risk level. In this work, I use the loan-deposit ratio to reflect 
liquidity risk: an increase in the loan-deposit ratio suggests higher liquidity risk-taking 
(Lepetit et al., 2008b), which might force banks to become involved in interbank markets. 
Moreover, a large loan base might require higher loan loss provision as a buffer against 
potential risk-taking due to adverse selection. Thus, the sign is expected to be positive. Data 
are chosen from Bankscope. 
 
Equity is defined as the equity to total bank assets and is presented as a percentage, which 
reflects the effect of capital regulation on bank risk. A higher equity ratio indicates that 
shareholders have more incentive to monitor bank activities, which in turn reduces the level of 
risk-taking (Dinger and Hagen, 2005). Thus, the expected sign is to be negative. Data are 
chosen from Bankscope. 
 
InterL is defined by interbank assets
38
 to total bank assets and is presented as a percentage. 
Dinger and Hagen (2005) indicate that large banks are willing to monitor borrowing banks, 
which may reduce the risk level of interbank assets; however, considering the moral hazard 
problem in large banks under TBTF (Freixas et al., 2000), we may argue that large banks have 
less incentive to screening banks as they participate in potential bail-outs. Thus, the sign is 
expected to be positive for large banks. Data are chosen from Bankscope. 
 
This model also investigates the effect of the macro-economy on bank risk-taking in the 
                                                        
38 According to Bankscope’s definition, the interbank asset is defined as money lent to other banks but excluding the 
reserves to central bank. 
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context of interbank markets based on Elsinger et al. (2002, 2006a, b). GDP is the GDP 
growth rate. It is calculated by dividing the value in the year t minus the value in the year t-1 
by the value in the year t-1. Data are chosen from international financial statistics (IMF). 
Good macro-economic performance decreases the default probability of borrowers, which in 
turn reduces the risk level of interbank lending. Thus, the expected sign is to be negative.  
 
InterR is the interbank rate (3-month)
39
 and reflects the scenario of the money market. 
Lending banks require higher interest rates for fear that borrowers will be unable to repay in a 
downturn. A higher interbank rate indicates a higher level of potential risk-taking in interbank 
markets, which in turn increases the marginal costs of lending (Panetta et al., 2004). Thus, the 
expected sign is to be positive. Data are chosen from Datastream. 
 
D_Year is year dummy variables to capture the time specific effect of changes in bank 
structure and financial system, such as the development of technology and improvement in 
the capacity of bank activities over time, taking 2002 as a base. 
  is a threshold value in terms of bank size. 
  is the year dummy variables from 1997 to 2008. 
i=1,…357 is the number of banks 
j=1,…7 is the number of individual countries. 
t=1997,…2008 is the year.  
The description of variables is shown in Table 3-3. 
                                                        
39 Due to data availability, we use federal funds rates as a replacement for the US. Data source: Datastream. 
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Table 3-4 shows the statistics based on each country during the study period. Regarding 
median values, a higher level of LLP is presented in Germany, Austria and Denmark, which 
might be more concerned about bank risk-taking. A higher level of interbank asset holding is 
shown in the UK, which may result from a considerable and active UK interbank market 
associated with large amounts of interbank trading; and the US economy displays fast growth 
compared with European countries, indicated by the higher value of the GDP growth rate. 
Table 3-5 shows the matrices of correlation among bank-level variables. 
Table 3-3 A Description of Variables  
Variables symbols Descriptions Sources 
Dependent 
variable 
LLP The ratio of loan loss provisions to  
total assets and presented as percentages 
Bankscope; 
Author’s own 
calculation 
Bank-level 
variables 
TA Log transformed and as a threshold variable Bankscope; 
Author’s own 
calculation 
 InterL The ratio of interbank assets to total assets  
and presented as percentages 
Bankscope; 
Author’s own 
calculation 
 LoanDep The ratio of total loans to total deposits and presented as 
percentages, which is suspected as an endogenous 
variable. 
Bankscope ; 
Author’s own 
calculation 
 Equity The ratio of equity to total assets and presented as 
percentages, which is suspected as an endogenous 
variable. 
Bankscope; 
Author’s own 
calculation 
Macro-level 
variables 
GDP GDP growth rate is calculated by dividing the value in 
year t minus the value in year t-1 by the value in the 
year t-1. 
IMF; 
Author’s own 
calculation 
 InterR Interbank rate (3-month); Federal funds rate for the US Datastream 
Seasonal effects D_Year It is equal to 1 in a certain year, 0 otherwise. Author’s own 
calculation 
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Table 3-4 The Statistics for Sample Countries  
The U.S. Minimum Median Mean  Maximum 
LLP -1.338 0.218 0.441 8.082 
INTERL 0.000 1.600 46.00 59.00 
TA 2.279 3.830 3.967 6.120 
Equity  1.560 8.640 9.665 42.220 
Loandep  0.080 84.94 91.17 137.770 
GDP 3.168 5.666 5.291 8.150 
INTERR 1.000 4.687 3.768 6.437 
The U.K.     
LLP -4.444 0.009 0.183 4.625 
INTERL 0.000 28.20 34.50 94.80 
TA 1.423 3.080 3.034 4.731 
Equity  0.000 9.370 12.56 95.780 
Loandep  0.000 83.360 84.722 135.24 
GDP 4.247 5.545 5.348 6.608 
INTERR 3.812 5.968 5.502 7.312 
GERMANY      
LLP -1.570 0.458 0.605 8.456 
INTERL 0.000 10.40 13.80 89.90 
TA 0.397 2.578 2.653 4.780 
Equity  0.460 5.260 6.878 66.700 
Loandep  0.000 61.200 57.52 91.060 
GDP 0.961 2.176 2.315 4.367 
INTERR 2.145 3.521 3.481 5.039 
FRANCE     
LLP -2.547 0.200 0.377 5.980 
INTERL 0.000 19.20 23.80 87.00 
TA 1.454 3.127 3.163 5.100 
Equity  -0.230 6.860 9.381 97.44 
Loandep  0.000 190.410 156.69 266.890 
GDP 2.736 3.872 3.846 5.366 
INTERR 2.145 3.521 3.512 5.039 
DENMARK     
LLP -6.015 0.427 0.466 4.750 
INTERL 0.000 8.100 11.10 84.10 
TA 0.001 2.469 2.515 4.700 
Equity  0.000 13.220 14.06 80.950 
Loandep  0.000 66.550 77.17 130.650 
GDP 2.036 4.284 4.184 6.633 
INTERR 2.202 3.85 3.858 5.910 
BELGIUM     
LLP -14.046 0.040 0.033 2.051 
INTERL 0.800 13.50 22.90 96.70 
TA 1.650 3.024 3.138 4.522 
Equity  0.000          5.680 9.027 59.070 
Loandep  0.000 32.000 34.66 78.510 
GDP 1.740 4.310 3.975 5.779 
INTERR 2.174 3.54 3.543 5.108 
AUSTRIA     
LLP -0.507 0.404 0.541 5.458 
INTERL 2.500 14.20 19.50 88.80 
TA 1.668 2.704 2.711 3.790 
Equity  3.390 6.010 7.231 37.240 
Loandep  3.370 61.460 55.82 92.110 
GDP 1.848 3.734 3.77 5.263 
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Table 3-5 The Matrices of Correlation among Bank-level Variables 
 LLP InterL TA Equity Loandep 
LLP 1.000     
InterL 0.106 1.000    
TA -0.045 0.126 1.000   
Equity 0.008 0.038 -0.160 1.000  
Loandep 0.073 -0.595 0.054 -0.153 1.000 
Note: LLP: the ratio of loan loss provision to total assets; INTERL: the ratio of interbank 
lending assets to total assets; TA: a log-transformation of bank assets; Equity: the ratio of equity 
to total assets; Loandep: the ratio of loans to total deposits. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3-4 Cont.    
INTERR 2.145 3.521 3.509 5.039 
Overall sample     
LLP -14.046 0.262 0.434 8.456 
INTERL 0.000 9.000 15.07 96.70 
LASSET 0.001 3.063 3.168 6.120 
Equity  -0.230 7.680 9.672 97.440 
Loandep  0.000 79.17 83.30 266.89 
GDP 0.969 4.310 4.100 8.150 
INTERR 1.00 4.086 3.782 7.312 
Notes: LLP: the ratio of loan loss provision to total assets; GDP: GDP growth rate; INTERL: 
the ratio of interbank lending assets to total assets; TA: a log-transformation of bank assets; 
Equity: the ratio of equity to total assets; Loandep: the ratio of loans to total deposits; INTERR: 
interbank rate (3-month) and federal funds rate for the US; the ratio is presented by 
percentages. 
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3.5 Results and Analyses of Estimations  
3.5.1 Basic Model 
The empirical results, according to Eq.3-11, are presented in Table 3-6, which suggest 
significant differences between these two cases depending on the threshold parameter of bank 
size (4.150256). One such difference is the relationship between the bank risk level and 
interbank assets. We find a positive and significant coefficient in the group with large sized 
banks. This implies that interbank lending only matters for large banks, given a multiple 
money centre bank market structure, where large banks as money centre banks connected 
with other banks, non-financial institutions and governments are usually lending banks. A 
positive effect of interbank lending on risk-taking follows the assumption that large lending 
banks have less incentive to monitor borrowing banks, which leads to a higher level risk of 
interbank assets considering the effect of TBTF suggested by Freixas et al. (2000). The other 
possibility based on the theoretical work of Dinger and Hagen (2005) is that if the monitoring 
costs are higher than the difference in the repayment between “good” and “bad” borrowers, 
lending banks are not willing to monitor borrowers, which may increase the risk level of 
interbank assets.   
 
As regards the effect of bank size, a positive and significant coefficient of bank size is found 
in the group where bank size is over the threshold, whereas a negative coefficient is found in 
the sample where bank size is less than the threshold. These indicate a U-shaped relationship 
between bank size and bank risk, suggesting that bank risk decreases and then increases as 
bank size goes beyond a certain level (4.150256). This result supports the assumption that 
given a multiple money centre bank market, large banks are associated with higher risk-taking 
by participating in a potential bail-out from CB, which is the consequence of moral hazard 
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from TBTF, as suggested by Freixas et al. (2000) and Tirole and Rochet (1996), and this may 
imply that bank regulation does not work for big banks. In addition, this positive result for 
bank size is consistent with the positive result of interbank lending for big banks, since TBTF 
reduces the lending bank’s incentives to screen borrowers and even encourages them to 
become involved in risky assets. This U-shaped link also follows the results of the basic 
regression (see Appendix 4) which implies a nonlinear relationship between bank size and 
bank risk-taking.  
 
The coefficients of the loan-deposit ratio are positive and significant in both of the empirical 
models, which support the assumption that banks which have more deposits and fewer 
investments are assumed to be more stable and less risky, as suggested by Dinger and Hagen 
(2005). Moreover, Lepetit et al. (2008b) point out that a higher loan-deposit ratio implies that 
banks with higher liquidity risk-taking might need to refinance through the interbank markets. 
This result also follows the empirical findings of Fisher et al. (2000) and Demirguc-Kunt and 
Huizinga (1998), that a large loan base increases risk level and deteriorates loan quality, as 
banks may lend to borrowers with bad credit by charging higher interest rates (adverse 
selection). Thus, an increase in the amount of loans triggers a higher level of loan loss 
provision as a buffer against potential risk.  
 
In terms of the equity ratio, a negative and significant coefficient is found in the small bank 
group, which supports the assumption that small banks with fewer equities are more likely to 
be associated with higher risk-taking (Dinger and Hagen, 2005). This is also consistent with 
the empirical findings of Dinger and Hagen (2009) and Clarke et al. (2003), which indicates 
that shareholders have more incentive to monitor bank activities on behalf of their interests 
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because of a lack of protection from CB for small banks; thus an increase in the equity ratio in 
small banks leads to lower risk-taking. 
 
GDP growth is significant and negative in both cases, which indicates the cyclical impact of 
macro-economic growth on bank risk-taking. This result follows the suggestions of Wells 
(2004), Elsinger et al. (2006a, b), Upper (2007) and Dinger and Hagen (2009), that the risk 
level of interbank assets is highlighted particularly in a recession; thus banks increase loan 
loss provision as a buffer against shocks from the macro-economy. According to 
Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1998), economic development can improve the efficiency of 
bank management, i.e., more information disclosure, to reduce bank risk-taking, therefore, in 
this respect, the better the macroeconomic growth, the lower the loan loss provision is 
required.  
 
As regards the year dummy variables, generally, the level of risk-taking by large banks 
increased from 2006 to 2008, which is consistent with the scenario of the financial markets. 
Since large banks are potentially protected by the government when facing challenges, 
considering the “Greenspan put” and “Bernanke put” for example, where the US Federal 
Reserve lowered the short-term interest rate, and purchased bad debt and securities from 
banks in order to maintain public confidence towards the financial market and 
macro-economy. However, this is coupled with the consequence of moral hazard from TBTF. 
The risk level of small banks reduced over time, since small banks might specialise in 
traditional activities associated with lower risk-taking, but they have less opportunity to be 
involved in complex financial activities compared with large banks. Although product 
diversification can theoretically provide risk diversification, it is associated with higher 
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risk-taking due to inappropriate regulation and inefficient risk management, considering the 
recent financial crisis. 
 
The significant dummy variables (after 2005) suggest the time specific effect on bank 
risk-taking: this leads us to divide the sample period into two sub-periods 1996-2005 and 
2006-2008 (the formal test will be shown in the next section), since we are interested in the 
differences in the effect of bank activities in the run-up to the financial crisis and the financial 
crisis period itself. Therefore, we present extended empirical models with the threshold in 
terms of two sub-periods for large and small banks.  
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Table 3-6 Results of Basic Model  
Dependent variable: Loan loss provision 
ratio 
4.150256TA  4.150256TA  
Interbank lending 1.147** 
[1.96] 
0.177 
[0.96] 
Bank size 0.606***  
[2.86] 
-0.229*** 
[-3.01] 
Loandep ratio 0.034*** 
[3.46] 
0.012*** 
[3.55] 
Equity ratio 0.007 
[0.30] 
-0.013*** 
[-5.57] 
GDP growth rate -0.082** 
[-2.36] 
-0.029** 
[-2.07] 
Interbank rate 0.392 
[0.69] 
0.177 
[0.96] 
D_1997 0.368* 
[1.71] 
0.072 
[1.04] 
D_1998 0.217 
[1.26] 
0.093 
[1.32] 
D_1999 0.239 
[1.27] 
-0.127 
[-0.25] 
D_2000 0.678*** 
[3.21] 
0.095* 
[1.68] 
D_2001 0.023 
[0.20] 
0.011 
[0.26] 
D_2003 -0.199 
[-1.54] 
-0.139*** 
[-2.92] 
D_2004 -0.099 
[-0.61] 
-0.196*** 
[-3.21] 
D_2005 0.34 
[1.73] 
-0.274*** 
[-4.46] 
D_2006 0.492** 
[2.34] 
-0.304*** 
[-4.34] 
D_2007 0.666*** 
[3.25] 
-0.382*** 
[-3.40] 
D_2008 0.788*** 
[3.42] 
-0.082 
[-0.89] 
No. of individual banks 60 326 
Total observations 516 3753 
Hausman test Chi2 (17) 37.13*** 37.60*** 
Heteroskedasticity Chi2 (65)/(338) 3.7e+32*** 8.6e+5*** 
R-square 0.34 0.06 
Notes: TA: log-transformation of total bank assets, which is a threshold variable. It is 
used to divide the sample in two classes. 4.150256 is a threshold value of log bank total 
assets, so the original bank size in terms of this threshold is $14133.7 million. t-statistic 
is denoted in [] and corrected for heteroskedasticity. ***, **, * indicates statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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3.5.2 Extended Model with Interaction Variables 
 
In order to present the evidence of splitting the estimated period into two sub-periods, we use 
the Chow test (1960). The null hypothesis is that the parameters are consistent over the two 
sub-periods; the alternative hypothesis assumes that the parameters are inconsistent, in other 
words, there is a break within the period. The F-statistic of the Chow test is set: 
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where,  
K is the number of independent variables. 
N is the number of total observations. 
SSE is the sum of squared residual.  
1SSE  and 2SSE are the sum of squared residual in sub-period 1 (1996-2005) and 2 
(2006-2008), respectively. 
For large banks, the F-value is 4.70, which is distributed as F(7, 528) with critical value 2.03. 
The F-statistic is large enough to reject the null hypothesis at the 5% significant level, hence 
this result cannot reject the break within the study period: 1996-2005 and 2006-2008. For 
small banks, the F-value is 9.12, which is more than the critical value (2.02) with the degree 
of freedom (7, 4079); thus, we also can divide the period: 1996-2005 and 2006-2008. To 
investigate the effect in these two sub-periods, recalling Eq.3-11, the extended model using 
interaction variables is shown as follows: 
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where, 
  is the year from 1997 to 2008, taking 2002 as a basis. 
  is the number of independent variables including bank size, loan-deposit ratio, equity ratio, 
interbank lending, GDP growth rate and interbank rate. 
i=1,…357 is the number of banks. 
j=1,…7 is the number of individual countries. 
Interaction_Vari is interaction variables in terms of six independent variables by considering 
two sub-periods (1996-2005 and 2006-2008). It is equal to the original values of independent 
variables multiplied by 1 in the later sub-period, 0 otherwise. 
 
Table 3-7 shows the results of the two bank groups in terms of the two sub-periods. Panel A 
reveals the effect of independent variables up to 2005, and the results in the later period are 
shown in Panel B
40
. Regarding interbank lending, the result in Panel A is consistent with that 
in the basic model, while Panel B shows the positive and significant coefficients of interbank 
lending in both groups. A significant result in the small bank group supports the conjecture 
suggested by Rochet and Tirole (1996), who argue that small banks are specialized in 
                                                        
40 The magnitude of the effect of independent variables in the later period should be calculated by the sum of the coefficients 
of the independent variables in Panel A and Panel B. 
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deposit-taking but have few opportunities to invest. As a result, through the interbank markets 
they lend to large banks, which are involved in more complex financial products demanding a 
higher level of liquidity, particularly in the later sub-period (during the financial crisis). Thus, 
in this framework, CB prefers to directly rescue problematic borrowing banks (large banks) 
under the policy of TBTF, which induces higher risk-taking by large banks; moreover, the 
coefficient of big banks is bigger than the small bank group (8.827 for large banks and 0.741 
for small banks), suggesting that big banks are associated with higher risk-taking, so they hold 
more loan loss provision against potential higher risk. A positive coefficient of bank size in 
the large bank group also can support this argument. Both of these positive and significant 
results of interbank lending in the large and small bank groups may suggest a mix of two 
different interbank market structures
41
 indicated by Rochet and Tirole (1996) and Freixas et 
al. (2000) in the later sub-period when numerous banks (large and small) need to refinance 
through the interbank markets. In addition, the magnitudes of the effect of interbank assets on 
risk-taking during the crisis period (8.827 for large banks and 0.741 for small banks) are 
greater than those in the earlier sub-period (4.304 for large banks and 0.173 for small banks). 
This result is consistent with the suggestions of Halsall et al. (2008), Wetherilt et al. (2009), 
and Acharya and Merrouche (2009), who argue that the instability of the financial system has 
a negative impact on the interbank market by increasing the default risk level of interbank 
assets, since problematic banks are unable to repay lending.  
 
Regarding the equity ratio, Panels A and B show that negative and significant coefficients of 
equity ratio are found in small banks, which is consistent with the result of the basic model. 
                                                        
41Rochet and Tirole (1996) display an interbank market structure, where small banks are lenders as they are associated with 
higher liquidity assets due to specialising in deposit-taking. As reviewed before, Freixas et al. (2000) show a money centre 
banks market structure, where large banks usually are lenders. Thus, both large and small banks tend to be borrowers in a 
mixed interbank market structure during the crisis period. 
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This highlights the importance of monitoring from shareholders to reduce the risk-taking of 
small banks owing to the lack of protection from CB. An insignificant result in terms of large 
banks might suggest that shareholders have less incentive to monitor bank activities due to a 
potential bail-out provided by CB; thus, we may argue that TBTF generates a moral hazard 
problem that is not only related to bank managers pursuing higher interests, but also related to 
shareholders or even depositors having less incentive to screen banks. This might be a 
possible reason for the recent crisis, in that neither regulators nor shareholders paid much 
attention to the risk-taking of large banks and allowed them to become involved in risky 
activities. 
 
As concerns the macro-level variables, a close link between bank risk-taking and the 
macro-economy is identified based on Panel A and Panel B. A positive and significant 
coefficient of interbank rate is indicated in two groups during the crisis period. According to 
Furfine (2001), interbank assets are large and uncollateralised, which imposes a higher risk 
level on lending banks. Thus, lending banks have to price interbank loans carefully against 
potential risk-taking. In addition, the magnitude of the effect of the interbank rate is higher in 
the later sub-period, which is consistent with the scenario of the financial crisis in 2007-08. 
This result can support the findings of Nys (2003), Panetta et al. (2004) and Banal-Estonol 
and Ottaviani (2007), who argue that the interbank rate as a measure of market risk is used to 
reflect the situation of the financial markets and the attitude of the lending banks towards 
risk-taking. Banks are reluctant to lend in the interbank market during a downturn for fear that 
borrowers will be unable to honour their obligations; as a consequence, lending banks charge 
a higher interbank rate, which implies that the prediction of bank performance in the future is 
to be pessimistic, and this in turn demands an increase in the amount of loan loss provision as 
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a buffer against potential risk-taking.  
 
In summary, these results support the assumption of the significant effect of TBTF on large 
banks. Given a multiple money centre bank market structure, CB as LLR provides bail-out for 
the large bank associated with a liquidity problem, because of its key position in the economy, 
which increases the banks’ incentives to be involved in risky activities as a consequence of 
TBTF. This may encourage all banks to enlarge their size in order to participate in bail-outs. 
The empirical results also supports the second assumption that an increase in deposits or 
equities implies that banks are more stable and less risky, particularly for small banks, 
suggesting that shareholders pay attention to small banks’ risk level because of a lack of 
protection from CB; while for large banks, shareholders have less incentive in controlling for 
bank risk-taking because of the potential bail-out provided by CB. The results also support the 
third assumption that an increase in interbank lending is associated with higher risk for large 
banks, considering the effect of TBTF. 
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Table 3-7 Results of Extended Model  
Dependent variable: Loan loss provision ratio 4.150256TA  4.150256TA  
Panel A Bank size 0.937** 
[2.46] 
-0.364*** 
[-3.55] 
 Interbank lending 4.304** 
[2.29] 
0.173 
[1.03] 
 Loandep ratio 0.033*** 
[3.61] 
0.011*** 
[3.13] 
 Equity ratio -0.005  
[-0.15] 
-0.016** 
[-2.22] 
 GDP growth rate -0.093** 
[-1.96] 
-0.023 
[-1.48] 
 Interbank rate -0.05 
[-0.88] 
-0.02 
[-1.10] 
Panel B Interaction_size 0.162*** 
[3.68] 
0.036 
[0.18] 
 Interaction_interlending 4.523** 
[2.45] 
0.568*** 
[3.46] 
 Interaction_loandep 0.04** 
[2.71] 
-0.0004 
[0.16] 
 Interaction_equity 0.011 
[0.45] 
-0.023** 
[-1.96] 
 Interaction_GDP -1.54** 
[-2.53] 
-0.036 
[-0.89] 
 Interaction_rate 1.50** 
[2.17] 
0.096*** 
[3.04] 
Panel C D_1997 -0.206 
[-0.91] 
0.05 
[0.65] 
 D_1998 -0.252 
[-1.32] 
0.069 
[0.89] 
 D_1999 -0.238 
[-1.20] 
-0.028 
[-0.49] 
 D_2000 -0.015 
[-0.06] 
0.052 
[0.79] 
 D_2001 -0.106 
[-0.85] 
0.009 
[0.19] 
 D_2003 -0.085 
[-0.59] 
-0.128** 
[-2.57] 
 D_2004 -0.075 
[-0.42] 
-0.203*** 
[-3.17] 
 D_2005 0.117 
[0.61] 
-0.282*** 
[-4.50] 
 D_2006 1.71* 
[1.94] 
-0.58 
[-1.60] 
 D_2007 1.838** 
[2.04] 
-0.682** 
[-2.02] 
 D_2008 1.75* 
[1.89] 
-0.444 
[-1.34] 
 No. of individual banks 60 326 
 Total observations 516 3753 
 Hausman test Chi2  40.36*** 61.06*** 
 Heteroskedasticity Chi2 
(65)/(338) 
2.6e+30*** 1.1e+6*** 
 R-square 0.35 0.07 
Notes: TA : log-transformation of total bank assets, which is a threshold variable. It is used to 
divide the sample into two classes. 4.150256 is a threshold value of log bank total assets, so the 
original bank size in terms of this threshold is $14133.7 million. . Interaction_Vari: the values 
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3.6 Conclusions 
 
Using data on individual banks of developed countries from 1996 to 2008, this chapter has 
estimated the role of the size effect in determining the bank risk level in the context of 
interbank markets, particularly for estimating the differences in banks’ activities between the 
run-up to the recent financial crisis and during the financial crisis period. Basically, the size 
effect plays an important role in determining bank risk-taking, suggesting that hazardous bank 
activities under TBTF, and the magnitude of the effect of bank activities on bank risk-taking is 
larger during the crisis period compared with that in the run-up to the crisis.  
 
This chapter firstly identifies a U-shaped relationship between bank size and bank risk by 
using the non-linear regression, then using a threshold model in terms of bank size, it 
identifies the first assumption that a large bank is associated with higher risk-taking due to 
TBTF, since the result of bank size in the large bank group is positive and significant, but 
negative and significant for small banks. The empirical result also supports the second 
assumption that an increase in equities highlights the importance of monitoring and reduces 
bank risk level, particularly for small banks; however, the results cannot support this argument 
for large banks, since shareholders have less incentive to monitor bank activities under TBTF. 
Therefore, we find that the moral hazard problem results not only from bank managers but 
also from shareholders or even depositors, so the lack of cooperative regulation including 
government, shareholders and depositors might be one reason of the recent financial crisis. 
This study also supports the third assumption that interbank assets are associated with higher 
of independent variables in the later sub-period are multiplied by 1, 0 otherwise. t-statistic is 
denoted in [] and corrected for heteroskedasticity. ***, **, * indicates statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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risk, since large banks are not willing to monitor borrowing banks; moreover, the result of 
interbank lending is positive and significant in both bank groups during the crisis period when 
numerous banks (large and small) need to refinance through the interbank market. Large 
banks are associated with higher risk-taking compared with small banks, so they hold more 
loan loss provision against potential higher risk. In addition, we find a close link between 
bank risk-taking and the economic growth rate. A positive and significant result of the 
interbank rate is found in both bank groups during the crisis when banks have to charge a 
higher rate as a risk premium. In summary, these results are consistent with the implication of 
TBTF (Freixas et al., 2000) in the context of the interbank market.   
 
Although TBTF can maintain a stable financial system and build public confidence in the 
banking sector, it leads to a moral hazard problem in that all banks make an effort to enlarge 
in size and benefit from regulatory forbearance. This contributes to the fact that banks prefer 
holding risky assets with higher profits, while the higher risk-taking of these assets is 
expected to be absorbed by CB. In addition, considering the recent financial crisis, although 
the costs of big bank failure are high, funding for rescuing big banks is considerable. Thus, we 
believe that policymakers should measure the probable gains and losses prior to proposing 
policies relating to large banks.  
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CHAPTER 4 
THE EFFECT OF CHANGES IN BANK BEHAVIOUR ON THE 
DETERMINANTS OF INTEREST MARGINS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Interest margin is defined as the difference between interest income and expenses divided by 
total earning assets, and varies within and across countries (see Table 4-3). For example, the 
mean value across banks is 3.781% in the US over twice that in Switzerland (1.633%); the 
interest margin within countries, for example, the UK, ranges from a negative (-1.06%) to a 
positive value (13.7%). Many researchers are interested in the determinants of bank interest 
margins, applying the theoretical work proposed by Ho and Saunders (1981), which mainly 
analyses the effect of interest rate risk on interest margins considering a single banking 
function: intermediation. However, since the 1990s, bank strategy has moved away from 
traditional activities to non-traditional activities (product diversification), such as 
collateralised debt obligation (CDO) and credit default swap (CDS), associated with 
non-interest income. Such changes in bank behaviour may have an impact on interest income,  
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and further on interest margins
42
. In addition, most previous studies of interest margins have 
concentrated on the European financial market as a whole or the US before 2001, without 
considering fundamental differences in financial systems and market structures across 
countries, so the lessons drawn from the studies cannot be applicable in different countries. 
Therefore, we attempt to make a country-by-country study of the determinants of interest 
margins
43
, given the significant changes in bank activities up to the recent financial crisis and 
bearing in mind the data on banks in the European and North American financial markets. 
 
This chapter is organised as follows: Section 2 discusses previous studies into the 
determinants of bank interest margins. A series of theoretical works show the development of 
factors impacting on interest margins, in particular the multi-product model of Valverde and 
Fernandez (2007), and empirical estimations according to the theoretical models are also 
described. Section 3 shows the model specification, examining the determinants of interest 
margins. Section 4 presents the data and variables, and the results of the empirical analysis are 
reported in Section 5, with the last section concluding.  
 
4.2 Literature Review on the Determinants of Interest Margins 
 
As a standard model on the issue of the determinants of bank interest margins, Ho and 
Saunders (HS) (1981) explicitly illustrate the effect of volatilities of interest rates on interest 
margins. 
 
In the HS model, there are three main objects: basic wealth (W), credit inventory (C) and 
                                                        
42 Interest expenses also increase due to higher competition in traditional activity markets, so interest margins reduce. This is 
one reason why banks are likely to be involved in non-traditional activities. 
43 This heterogeneous assumption will be tested later. 
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money market position (M). The total value of the bank’s portfolio (P) is defined: 
 
 
    
   
 
 
where, 
Wi  is the expected rate on bank wealth.  
Ci  is the expected rate on the credit inventory.  
i  is the expected rate on the money market position. 
Wr
~ and Cr
~ have an impact on the expected rates and are random variables. 
The prices of loans and deposits are reported, respectively: 
 
0L LP P    (4-5) 
0D DP P    (4-6) 
 
where, 
0P  is the basic prices of loans and deposits and assume that they are equal. 
L  and D  are the service fees for loans and deposits, respectively. The interest rate of loans 
rises, since an increase in the fee of service L  leads to a lower price of loans. Thus, a 
negative relationship between the interest rate and loan price is suggested. Similarly, for 
deposits, a negative link between the interest rate and deposit price is found. The interest 
MCWP 
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 (4-1)     
WW rWWiW
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~
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0(1 )M i M   (4-4) 
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spread is defined as the sum of L and D . Therefore, the expected utility conditional on the 
optimal fee of loans and deposits is given: 
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                                                                (4-7)   
where,  
*
D  and 
*
L  are the optimal service fees for deposits and loans, respectively, that maximise 
the expected utility of the bank’s portfolio.  
D
  and 
L
 are the probabilities of new deposits and new loans made based on their 
respective prices. As a result, the expressions of these two probabilities are given: 
 
DD     (4-8) 
LL     (4-9) 
 
Maximising the expected utility conditional on the optimal fees of loans and deposits by 
taking partial derivative with respect to D  and L , respectively, the results are shown 
below: 
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Combining the results from Eq.4-10 and Eq.4-11, the interest spread is displayed: 
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where, 
S is interest spread. 
 /  is a measure of bank risk neutral spread. 
r is the coefficient of risk aversion. 
2
C  is the variance of interest rate. 
T is the size of transactions. 
The key result suggests that the attitude towards risk, the size of transactions, the market 
structure and the volatilities of interest rates are the main factors that determine interest 
margins. According to Eq.4-12, Ho and Saunders (1981) undertook an empirical work using 
data on 53 US banks from 1976 to 1979 (quarterly data) considering imperfections of 
financial institution, which are not explicitly indicated in the theoretical model but have an 
impact on margins. These imperfections include implicit interest payments (IR), the 
opportunity cost of holding required reserves (OR) and the default risk on loans (DP). After 
controlling for these factors, the estimated interest margin would be a “pure” margin, which is 
the same for all sample banks (but with a time variant). Moreover, the authors argue that 
market structure, the size of bank transactions and bank attitude towards risk might change 
insignificantly over 3 years at quarterly frequencies, so they do not take these into account.  
 
Therefore, the empirical model for cross-section estimations
44
 is shown as: 
 
                                                        
44 HS (1981) used a two-step method to examine the determinants of interest margins; controlling for IR, OR and DP in the 
first step aims to obtain a pure margin, which can be used in the second step to investigate the effect of volatilities of interest 
rate on margins. 
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where, 
IM is interest margins measured by the ratio of the difference between interest income and 
interest expenses to earning assets.  
C is a constant, which are all positive and significant in cross-section estimations over time. C 
is assumed as a “pure” interest margin after controlling for IR, OR and DP, which is the same 
for all banks but time variant (homogeneous assumption). 
IR is defined as the difference between non-interest expense and non-interest revenue divided 
by earning assets. The coefficients are positive and significant for all estimations. 
OR is defined as non-interest bearing reserve assets divided by earning assets and then 
multiplied by average Treasury bill rate. The coefficients are positive and significant in the 
third quarter of 1977, and the first and second quarters of 1978. 
DP is defined as net loan charge-offs divided by earning assets. The coefficient is positive and 
significant in the second quarter of 1978. 
The significant and positive coefficients of IR, OR and DP follow the expectations of the 
authors, who argue that these additional costs require higher interest margins to compensate.  
2  is a measure of volatilities of interest rate, which is defined as variances of weekly data 
on Treasury bill rates of 3 month, 1 year, 2 year, 3 year and 5 year maturities. Ho and 
Saunders (1981) find that only the coefficient of volatilities of interest rates over 1 year 
maturity is positive and significant, and this significant result follows the implication of the 
theoretical work suggesting that interest rate risk is one of the determinants of interest 
margins.  
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The HS model (Ho and Saunders, 1981) concentrates on interest rate risk to illustrate the 
determinants of bank interest margins considering traditional intermediation; moreover, Ho 
and Saunders’ (1981) empirical work, given the homogeneous assumption45 only tests the 
effect of volatilities of interest rate on “pure” margins after controlling for institutional 
imperfections. Saunders and Schumacher (2000) also empirically test the determinants of 
interest margins using data on six European countries and the US from 1988 to 1995 based on 
the HS model (1981). The authors take volatilities of interest rate and market structure into 
consideration after controlling for institutional imperfections. They use a two-step method to 
estimate the determinants of interest margins. The cross-section model in the first step is 
shown as follows: 
 
),,,( 11 DPORIRCIM                                                     (4-14) 
 
where,  
C is a constant, which is a pure interest margin after controlling for institutional imperfections 
that is used in the estimation of the second step. 
1OR  is defined as non-interest earning assets to total assets. 
1DP  is defined as capital requirement to total assets, which is a measure for credit risk 
exposure (instead of DP measure in the HS estimation), as banks have to meet minimum 
capital requirement against potential credit risk. 
The positive and significant coefficients of IR, 1OR  and 1DP  follow the results of the HS 
estimation. 
 
                                                        
45 HS assume that the sample banks have similar attitudes towards risk, size of transactions, market power and interest rate 
volatilities, so that banks obtain the same pure interest margins after controlling for institutional imperfections. 
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The second estimation is shown by using the coefficient of C as a pure interest margin: 
 
)_,,( 2 dummycC                                              (4-15) 
 
where, 
  is a constant used to measure the average effect of market structure on margins. 
2  is a measure of volatilities of interest rate. Short-term risk is defined as a standard 
deviation of weekly securities rates (3-month) and long-term risk is defined as a standard 
deviation of weekly securities rates (1-year). 
c_dummy is a country dummy, taking Germany as a base, which is used to capture changes in 
market structure across countries.  
The significant and positive coefficients of the long-term risk and short-term risk are 
consistent with the HS model. The large coefficient of the US dummy suggests that the US 
financial market is not competitive, perhaps because of restrictions on universal banking 
operations; while the French market is likely to be more competitive, considering the negative 
coefficient of the France dummy.  
 
According to the HS model, using data on 286 US commercial banks, Angbazo (1997) also 
studies the determinants of interest margins considering control variables under the CAMEL  
rating system
46
 from 1989 to 1993; therefore, the empirical model is shown as follows: 
 
),,,,,,,,( 11
2 BRANCHMGMTDPORIRLRDRaIM                      (4-16) 
 
                                                        
46 CAMEL includes capital adequacy, asset quality, management efficiency, earnings performance and liquidity. Earnings 
performance is a measure of interest margins in the estimation. 
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where, 
IM is a measure of interest margins reflecting earnings performance of banks and is defined as 
interest income to average earning assets. 
a is a constant. 
IR and 1OR  follow the previous work, controlling for institutional imperfections. The 
positive and significant coefficients are consistent with the implications of the HS model. 
2  is a measure of volatilities of interest rates defined as the ratio of net short-term positions 
to book values of total equity capital. Angbazo (1997) suggests that the net short position is 
the difference between total assets subject to re-pricing and total liabilities subject to 
re-pricing within one year. The negative and significant results suggest that an increase in net 
short positions subject to re-pricing reduces the exposure of interest rate risk so that banks 
demand a lower interest margin. Since Angbazo (1997) and HS (1981) use different measures 
of interest rate risk as reviewed above, in this study, a higher level of net short positions (a 
measure of interest rate volatilities) indicates lower interest rate risk and in turn reduces 
interest margins. Thus, it still follows the implications of the HS model. 
DR is a measure of asset quality (default risk), which is defined as the ratio of net charge-offs 
to total loans. 
LR is a measure of liquidity (liquidity risk), which is defined as liquidity assets to total assets. 
1DP  is a measure of capital adequacy, which is defined as core capital divided by total assets. 
MGMT is a measure of bank management, which is defined as earning assets to total assets.  
DR, LR, 1DP  and MGMT are control variables under the CAMEL rating system. The 
significant and positive coefficient of DR suggests that risky loans require higher interest 
margins as a default risk premium; a negative and significant coefficient of LR suggests that 
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banks with higher liquidity assets require lower liquidity risk premium. A positive and 
significant coefficient of 1DP  follows previous studies, suggesting that additional regulatory 
costs demand higher interest margins. A negative and significant coefficient of MGMT 
suggests that efficient bank management is associated with lower interest margins. 
BRANCH is a dummy variable, and is equal to 1 if the bank is headquartered in a state where 
there are restrictions on branch expansion, 0 otherwise. Angbazo (1997) does not find a 
significant result for BRANCH.  
 
In the robust estimation of this work, it is worth noting that Angbazo (1997) discusses the 
effect of off-balance-sheet items (OBSs) on interest margins. The empirical results show that 
most of the OBSs, such as loan commitments and options, are positively linked with interest 
margins, suggesting that an increase in OBSs requires a higher level of interest income to 
offset contingent risks. Angbazo (1997) also argues that banks with OBSs can benefit more 
than those with restricted traditional intermediation.    
  
Given the employment of non-traditional activities by banks over the past 20 years, Valverde 
and Fernandez (VF) (2007), based on the HS model (1981) and Allen’s (1988) theoretical 
model, developed a multi-product theoretical work to discuss formally the effect of product 
diversification on interest margins. In their model, assume that a bank portfolio includes bank 
loans, non-traditional activities (NTAs) related to fee income, and deposits. Recalling Eq.4-5 
and 4-6: the price of NTAs is defined as: 
 
               NoN PP                                        (4-17) 
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where,  
0P  is the basic prices of NTAs, loans and deposits, assuming that they are equal. 
N  is service fees of NTAs. 
The VF model is a dynamic model as it considers information at the beginning and the end of 
the period to maximise bank utility. Recalling Eq.4-7, the expected utility conditional on the 
optimal fees of loans, deposits and NTAs is therefore modified and shown as follows: 
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where, 
N , D  and L are the probabilities of new NTAs, new deposits and new loans made based 
on their prices, respectively. 
D
 is introduced above (see Eq. 4-8). 
Recalling Eq.4-9, considering NTAs, 
L
 is modified by 
NNLL                                                  (4-19) 
and, 
LLNN                                                  (4-20) 
N  and L  are the cross-elasticities of the demand of non-traditional activities and loans, 
respectively. 
 
Following the approach of the HS model, the results of maximising the expected utility 
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conditional on optimal fees of loans, deposits and NTAs by taking partial derivatives with 
respect to N , D  and L , respectively, are shown as follow: 
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Combining the results above, the function of interest margins is shown as: 
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where,  
L  and D  are the service fees for loans and deposits, respectively. The sum of these is the 
interest margin. 
 /  is market power: a higher level of market power indicates that banks with monopoly 
power can increase profits by requiring higher rates. 
r is the coefficient of risk aversion. 
T is the size of bank transactions. 
2  is volatilities of interest rate. 
The difference between the results of the HS model (1981) and VF model (2007) is indicated 
by the last term, which shows that non-traditional activities reduce interest income given that 
 123 
22 ( 1) 0NN C
L
b r T



   , as banks concentrate on non-traditional activities associated with fee 
income, which squeeze out traditional activities, e.g., loans with interest income. This model 
explicitly considers the development of bank behaviour over the past 20 years and formally 
shows the effect of changes in bank behaviour on interest margins. 
 
According to the VF model, at the same time the authors empirically examine the 
determinants of interest margins considering bank risk-taking, the size of bank transactions, 
NTAs and macroeconomic growth. They use data on European financial institutions from 
1994-2001. Therefore, the estimation is shown as follows: 
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                                                                      (4-25) 
where, 
IM is interest margin, which is defined as the difference between the ratio of interest income 
to loans and ratio of interest expense to deposits. 
IM(-1) is one-year lagged interest margins, since this model is a dynamic model considering 
information at the beginning and end of the period to maximise the bank’s utility. A positive 
and significant coefficient supports the importance of previous information in determining 
bank interest margins. 
MP is the Herfindal-Hirschman index as a measure of market power and is calculated from 
bank total assets in the national market, which is obtained from ECB reports of the EU 
banking structure. The authors cannot find a significant coefficient of MP, following the 
results of Cetorelli and Gambera (2002). 
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DR is defined as default loans to total loans, which is a measure of default risk, and a positive 
and significant coefficient follows the result of Angbazo (1997), suggesting higher interest 
margins as a default risk premium. 
2 is defined as the difference between interbank market rate (3-month) and deposit rates, 
which is a proxy of interest rate risk. A positive and significant coefficient follows the 
implications of the HS and VF models and is also consistent with previous empirical 
estimations. 
LR is defined as liquidity assets to total assets, and is a proxy of liquidity risk. A positive and 
significant coefficient follows the result of Angbazo (1997) and Lepetit et al. (2008b), 
suggesting higher interest margins set as a liquidity risk premium. 
DP is a measure of capital regulation defined as capital and bank reserve to total assets. This 
follows the previous empirical works, suggesting that higher interest margins can offset the 
regulatory costs of bank lending. 
MGMT is a proxy of management efficiency, defined by operating costs to gross income. A 
positive and significant coefficient indicates that banks with higher operating costs demand 
higher interest margins. 
LOAN is defined as loans to total assets. The negative and significant coefficient follows the 
argument of Valverde and Fernandez (2007), who suggest that specialisation in lending shows 
an efficient operation, which may reduce interest margins. 
DEPO is defined as deposits to total liabilities. The positive and significant coefficient 
suggests that specialisation in deposits can reduce interest expenses (a decline in deposit rates), 
and further increase the difference between interest income and interest expenses (interest 
margins). The authors point out that banks can benefit from a stable customer relationship.  
OBSs use the ratio of other earning assets to total assets to measure bank diversification. The 
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authors find that banks with a higher level of diversification reduce interest margins. Due to 
the higher fee income of non-traditional activities, this may squeeze out traditional activities 
and compensate the losses of traditional activities resulting from competitive markets. 
GDP is a measure of macroeconomic growth and is defined as the GDP growth rate. The 
negative and significant coefficient supports the argument of Allen and Gale, (1994, 1996) 
and Berlin and Mester (1999), who point out the hypothesis of cross-sectional risk sharing: 
“intermediaries transfer risk from certain agents to others” by charging higher interest rates 
in a downturn. In the context of interest margins, other authors also investigate the effect of 
macro-variables on interest margins: using data on EU countries from 1986 to 1999, Abreu 
and Mendes (2001) show that there is a positive relationship between macroeconomic 
development and interest margins: in this respect, the better economic development, the 
higher the interest margins, reflecting bank profitability. Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) 
present an empirical study on the relationship between interest margins and bank specific 
variables with economic growth using data on 7900 banks in multiple-countries from 1988 to 
1995. They also find a positive relationship between economic growth (GDP) and interest 
margins. 
BMDummy is a dummy variable representing banks in a banking-orientated or 
market-orientated financial system. It is equal to 1 for a bank-based market, 0 otherwise. 
Valverde and Fernandez (2007) find a negative and significant coefficient, suggesting that 
large interest margins are indicated in a banking-orientated system, since in this framework, 
banks highly depend on lending and deposit-taking (traditional intermediation) using a debt 
contract between banks and borrowers, while banks depend on capital market activities, i.e., 
pension funds, in a market-orientated financial system (Mullineux and Murinde, 2003, p13), 
where the authors cannot find a significant result on interest margins.  
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Regarding explanations for the effect of bank diversification on interest margins, another 
strand of the existing empirical work has illustrated cross-selling between traditional and 
non-traditional activities. Lepetit et al. (2008b), using data on 602 banks in Europe over 
1996-2002 investigated the link between margins (or loan pricing) and the expansion of bank 
activities. They also find a negative impact of product diversification on margins following 
previous studies; however, they present an explanation that is different from the VF model. In 
order to absorb new customers for selling non-traditional products, banks use traditional 
activities, i.e., loans, by setting lower interest rates, and this in turn reduces interest income. It 
highlights cross-selling as banks can benefit from a long-run and stable customer relationship. 
This could be another possible interpretation for the negative effect of bank diversification on 
interest margins. 
4.3 Model Specification 
 
The model used to investigate empirically the determinants of interest margins is based on the 
VF model (2007). In this model, banks are assumed to be involved in both traditional 
activities, i.e., loans and deposits, and non-traditional activities, i.e., OBSs. The conclusion of 
the VF model (2007) suggests that not only interest rate risk but also an employment of 
non-traditional activities (product diversification) has an impact on interest margins, which is 
a main concern in this work. In addition, we have to consider the effect of bank specification, 
i.e., loans and deposits, on interest margins. Rogers and Sinkey (1999) and Siems and Clark 
(1997) argue that specialisation in bank activities can reduce operational costs and further 
require lower interest margins; however, VF (2007) argue that a decline in interest expenses 
resulting from activity specialisation, i.e., deposit-taking, may expand the spread between 
interest income and interest expenses and lead to higher interest margins. 
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In addition, the VF model (2007) is a dynamic theoretical model considering information at 
the beginning and end of the period to generate a conditional expectation of bank activities. 
Therefore, we may use the previous interest margin in this estimation. We also argue that 
using previous information on interest margins can reflect an adjusted cost of bank behaviour.  
 
Besides bank diversification and specification, following HS (1981), Saunders and 
Schumacher (2000) and Angbazo (1997), we try to estimate the determinants of interest 
margins controlling for institutional imperfections: implicit interest payment (IR), where 
banks compete on deposit interest payment by either providing depositor subsidies or 
reducing service charges, which is additional operational costs requiring higher interest 
margins; non-interest bearing reserve (OR), where banks have to hold required reserve 
associated with opportunity costs, which also impact interest margins; and capital requirement 
(CR), where banks have to meet minimum capital requirement proposed by the Basel 
agreements to hold equity capital against potential risk-taking. In some cases, banks may 
endogenously choose more capital holding according to the risk level, even though this is 
coupled with additional costs. Consequently, this requires more interest margins to 
compensate.  
 
In the context of interest margins, following Valverde and Fernandez (2003, 2007), Abreu and 
Mendes (2001) and Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1999), we use macroeconomic factors that 
have an impact on interest margins in the estimation. A lower GDP growth may increase bank 
risk-taking, which requires higher interest margins as a risk premium. In addition, based on 
the VF model, we consider the effect of market structure, so concentration ratio is used in this 
study. A higher concentration ratio indicates a less competitive market, which leads to higher 
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interest rates and interest margins. 
 
Moreover, both the VF and HS models suggest that the coefficients of risk-aversion influence 
margins. In our empirical study, banks are assumed to be risk-averse, which is also an 
assumption in VF (2007), Saunders and Schumacher (2000) and Angbazo (1997). Regarding 
the justification for this assumption, Angbazo (1997) suggests that in the HS model, banks are 
assumed to be involved in arbitrage, considering the coefficient of risk aversion, so that an 
interest margin exists. Moreover, the regulation towards issues, such as moral hazard and 
adverse selection would restrict bank risk-taking. The cost of bankruptcy is also a concern for 
banks, encouraging banks to be risk-averse. In addition, as this is a country-by-country study 
based on a heterogeneous assumption, we consider the time specific effect related to the 
change in financial system and regulation over time for each country, so year dummy 
variables are used in the estimation.  
 
From the discussion above, the explanatory variables in this work could be arranged into four 
categories: Bank risk-taking (RISK), Institutional imperfections (INIM), Bank diversification 
and specification (BDS) and Macro-variables (MV). The reduced-form empirical model is 
shown as: 
 
NIM=( NIM(-1), RISK, INIM, BDS, MV, T_DUMMY)                         (4-26) 
 
where, 
NIM (-1) is the one-year lagged value of interest margins. 
RISK is the volatility of interest risk. 
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INIM includes implicit interest payment (IR), non-interest bearing reserve (OR) and capital 
requirement (CR). 
BDS includes loans and deposits (specification or traditional activities), and other earning 
assets (product diversification). 
MV includes the GDP growth rate and concentration ratio 5 (C5).  
T_Dummy is year dummy variables to capture the change in market structure over time for 
each country. 
 
Recalling Eq.4-26, the empirical model used in the estimation is therefore presented as 
follows: 
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                                                                      (4-27)     
where, 
 
i is the number of individual banks. 
j is the number of individual countries. 
t is the years.  
ijtNIM is net interest margins.  
1ijtNIM represents one-year lagged net interest margins and is an indicator of adjustment 
costs. 
ijtimplipay  represents the implicit payment. 
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ijtoppoc  represents the opportunity cost. 
ijttassetcapit )/(  represents the capital ratio.  
ijttassetloan )/(  represents the loan ratio. 
ijttliabilitydeposit )/(  represents the deposit ratio. 
ijttearningoearning )/(  represents the other earnings ratio. 
jtkinterstris  represents the interest rate volatilities (1-year). 
jtGDP  represents the GDP growth rate. 
C5 represents concentration ratio 5. 
D_year represents year dummy variables. This is equal to 1 in a certain year, 0 otherwise.   
ijt  represents an error term. 
 
4.4 Data and Variables 
4.4.1 Data Description 
 
The sample countries are selected European countries including Canada, France, Germany, 
Switzerland and the UK, and the US
47
 and the study period is from 1999 to 2008
48
. We use 
the banks with data disclosure of net interest margins and other earning assets during the 
study period, since these are the main concern in this study
49
. Annual bank-level data are 
                                                        
47 France, Germany and the UK are representatives in the EU sharing the Single Market Programme, while Switzerland is a 
representative for outside the EU in Europe; Canada and the US are representatives for North America. VF (2007) point out 
“there are still differences in regulation and financial framework even among EU countries”, which makes a 
country-by-country study reasonable or as a robustness check for pooling all countries in the context of interest margins study. 
Therefore, we provide a country-by-country study including European and North American countries in order to fill this gap; 
the heterogeneous assumption is tested in the next section.  
48 Most previous studies have considered the situation before 2001, while we chose a sample period from 1999 up to the 
recent global financial crisis in 2007-08, because the Gramm-Leach Bliley Act was proposed in 1999 in the US, which 
removed barriers between commercial banks and investment banks. Thus, we can consider the effect of changes in bank 
behaviour on interest margins in the US, and this can be compared with the European countries as they have been involved in 
non-interest activities since the 1980s. 
49 Actually, we use the banks with at least three subsequent years of time series data for all bank-level variables in order to 
make the results to be reliable and stable.  
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chosen from the Bureau VanDijk Bankscope database. Macro-level data are chosen from 
Datastream, International Financial Statistics of International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
OECD Statistics. Thus, in total 514 banks are chosen, of which 27 are from Canada, 93 from 
France, 142 from Germany, 69 from Switzerland, 41 from the UK and 142 from the US. The 
sample used in this study is unbalanced panel data. 
 
4.4.2 Definitions and Measurements of Variables 
 
Net interest margins (NIM) is a dependent variable and directly obtained from the 
Bankscope database. It is defined as the difference between total interest income and total 
interest expenses divided by total earning assets. A higher interest margin is indicative of 
higher bank costs from either operations or risk-taking that need to be offset.  
 
NIM (-1) is defined as one-year lagged net interest margins. As the VF model (2007) 
mentioned above is a dynamic model, we consider the one-year lagged value of interest 
margins to examine the determinants of interest margins. This can be used to reflect an 
adjusted cost of interest margins, which has an impact on bank decisions.  
 
*
1)1( NIMNIMNIM                                                 (4-28)     
 
where,  
*NIM  depends on other control variables in the regression. 
1  is the coefficient of NIM (-1), which reflects the adjusted costs of NIM. 
 
1 , *NIMNIM  , which is a full adjustment of NIM. 
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0 , 1 NIMNIM , which indicates that there is no adjustment of NIM.  
10  , *1)1( NIMNIMNIM    , which is a partial adjustment of NIM. 
 
Therefore, the expectation of the coefficient of NIM (-1) is between 0 and 1, which implies 
that there is a trade-off between adjusted costs and benefits. 
 
(1) There are three control variables in the category of institutional imperfection (INIM), 
which has been found to affect bank interest margins (Ho and Saunders, 1981; Saunders 
and Schumacher, 2000; Angbazo, 1997). 
Implicit payment is a proxy of fee payments (duty exemption) to depositors as banks have to 
compete on the deposit market. A large NIM is generated to cover this implicit payment as 
extra interest expenses. Thus, the expected sign of the implicit payment is positive. Following 
Saunders and Schumacher (2000) and Angbazo (1997), it is defined as the difference between 
total non-interest expenses and other operating income divided by total earning assets
50
. Data 
are chosen from the Bankscope database. 
 
Opportunity cost is a measurement of the costs of holding non-interest bearing reserves. 
Although holding non-interest bearing reserves can be used against potential risk-taking, an 
increase in holding reserves requires a higher level of NIM to cover the opportunity costs of 
holding reserves. Thus, the expectation of the sign is positive. Following Saunders and 
Schumacher (2000) and Ho and Saunders (1981), it is defined as non-interest bearing over 
total earning assets. Data are chosen from the Bankscope database. 
 
                                                        
50 Based on the Bankscope database, non-interest expense is defined as any operating costs of an administrative nature, and 
other operating income is defined as any income related to bank’s core business. The implicit payment as extra interest 
expenses can be seen as the difference between them.  
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Capital ratio is obtained from the Bankscope database. It can be used to reduce credit risk. 
However, the higher the capital ratio, the more regulatory cost of holding capital is generated, 
and this in turn increases NIM to cover this cost (Saunders and Schumacher, 2000). Thus, the 
expectation of the sign is positive. In addition to the capital requirement, banks can 
endogenously choose the amount of capital holding as a buffer against credit risk (Valverde 
and Fernandez, 2007). Thus, the capital ratio might be considered as an endogenous variable 
in estimations.  
   
(2) There are three variables in the category of bank diversification and specification (BDS). 
Loan ratio is a proxy of proportional loans to total assets (loan size). Valverde and Fernandez 
(2007), Boot (2000) and Berlin and Mester (1999) suggest that banks specialised in lending 
may improve operational efficiency so that they can reduce loan rates, and this in turn lowers 
bank interest margins. Thus, the expectation of the sign is negative. The loan ratio is defined 
as loans divided by total bank assets. Data are obtained from the Bankscope database. 
 
Deposit ratio is a proxy of proportional deposits to total liabilities (deposit size). Valverde 
and Fernandez (2007) point out that a large deposit ratio may increase the spread between 
interest income and interest expenses (a decline in interest expenses), since banks specialising 
in deposits benefit from a good and long-term relationship with depositors resulting in lower 
deposit rates. Thus, the sign is expected to be positive. The deposit ratio is defined as total 
customer deposits over total liabilities. Data are obtained from the Bankscope database. 
Other earning asset ratio is a measure of bank diversification. Based on the Bankscope 
database, other earning assets consist of the trading of federal funds and securities, and 
interest bearing deposits other than loans, reflecting the diversification of bank activities. 
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Recalling Eq.4-25, the VF model (2007) implies that the introduction of non-traditional 
activities associated with non-interest income may squeeze out traditional activities towards 
interest income, and further reduce interest margins, as banks are inclined to operate more 
market-based services, due to higher competition in traditional activity markets. Regarding 
the negative effect of product diversification, Lepetit et al. (2008b) point out a conjecture that 
banks underprice loans to increase other activities, which highlights cross-selling among 
traditional and non-traditional activities, so that banks can benefit from long-term and stable 
customer relationships. Thus, the expected sign of the other earning asset ratio is negative. It 
is defined as other earning assets divided by total earning assets. Data are obtained from the 
Bankscope database. 
 
(3) We consider the effect of volatilities of interest rate on interest margins based on the HS 
model (1981) and VF model (2007) in the category of RISK. 
Interest rate risk: as suggested by Fernández and Valverde (2007), this is defined as the 
difference between interbank rates (one-year) and deposit interest rates
51
. According to the 
implications of the theoretical work, interest rate risk is expected to affect interest margins 
positively. Data are obtained from Datastream.   
 
(4) Macro-variables include the GDP growth rate, following Valverde and Fernandez (2007), 
Abreu and Mendes (2001), Berlin and Mester (1999) and Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga 
(1999), and concentration ratio 5 (C5), which is a measure of market structure. 
GDP is the GDP growth rate. The value of the GDP growth rate in the year t is calculated by 
                                                        
51 Saunders and Schumacher (2000) consider both short-term (three-month) interest rate risk and long-term (one-year) 
interest rate risk in the estimation but present two separate tests, due to the multicollinearity problem. We also tested the 
effect of long-term interest rate risk and short-term interest rate risk on NIM for each country, and we cannot find significant 
differences between these two estimations. Since we treat interest rate risk as a medium-term (one year) risk in this study, 
one-year data is used. 
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dividing the value in the year t minus the value in the year t-1 by the value in the year t-1. 
Data are chosen from International Financial Statistics. In the context of interest margins, 
Allen and Gale (1994, 1996), Berlin and Mester (1999), and Allen and Santomero (2001) 
illustrate two possibilities of the effect of macroeconomic variables on interest margins: the 
first is the hypothesis that in cross-sectional risk-sharing, “intermediaries transfer risk from 
certain agents to others” by charging a higher interest rate in a downturn so that people who 
are risk-averse bear less risk-taking than people who like risk-taking; while during an upturn, 
a higher GDP growth rate is indicative of lower credit risk, thus banks would like to charge 
lower interest rates. Based on this argument, the expected sign of GDP is negative. Another 
possibility is the “intertemporal rate smoothing hypothesis”, which suggests that banks charge 
a higher interest rate in an upturn, while banks require a lower rate using their liquidity base 
in a downturn; hence GDP is expected to be positively related to interest margins. 
 
Concentration ratio 5 (C5) is defined as the sum of the market shares in terms of total bank 
assets, of the five largest banks in domestic financial markets. The data for European 
countries excluding Switzerland come from ECB statistics and the data of Switzerland and 
North American are based on OECD statistics
52
. With higher C5, lower competition level is 
found in financial markets; hence banks have more power to charge higher loan rates in order 
to obtain higher interest margins.  
 
Time_D is year dummy variables to capture the specific effect of changes in financial system 
and regulation over time for each country. It is equal to 1 in a certain year, 0 otherwise. A 
description of the variables is given in Table 4-1. 
                                                        
52 We calculate concentration ratio 5 based on the definition provided by ECB. The data of total bank assets of the domestic 
market is available at http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx? 
 136 
Table 4-1 A Description of Variables 
Variables Symbols Descriptions Sources 
Dependent 
variable 
NIM It is defined as the difference between total 
interest income and total interest expenses 
divided by total earning assets. 
Bankscope  
 
Bank specific 
variables 
NIM(-1) One-year lagged NIM Author’s calculation 
 Implicitpay It is defined as the difference between total 
non-interest expenses and other operating 
incomes divided by total earning assets. 
Bankscope  
Author’s calculation 
 Oppor.cost It is defined as non-interest bearing to total 
earning assets. 
Bankscope  
Author’s calculation 
 Cap. ratio It is defined as total regulatory capital to total 
assets 
Bankscope  
 
 Loan ratio It is defined as the ratio of total loans to total 
bank assets. 
Bankscope  
Author’s calculation 
 Dep.ratio It is defined as the deposits to total liabilities. Bankscope  
Author’s calculation 
 Other ratio It is defined as other earning assets to total 
bank assets. 
Bankscope  
Author’s calculation 
Macro-level 
variables 
Inter. risk It is defined as the difference between the 
interbank rate (1-year) and deposit rates.  
Datastream 
Author’s calculation 
 GDP It is calculated by dividing the value in the year 
t minus the value in the year t-1 by the value in 
the year t-1. 
IMF 
Author’s calculation 
 C5 It is defined as the sum of the market shares in 
terms of total bank assets, of five largest banks in 
domestic financial markets. 
ECB; OECD 
statistics; Author’s 
calculation 
Seasonal effect Time_D Year dummy variables to capturing the time 
trend. 
   ---- 
 
 
Table 4-2 provides a summary of the expectations of the signs of the explanatory variables 
and gives possible rationales for these expectations. 
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Table 4-2 Expected Signs of Empirical Explanatory Variables 
Independent variables Predicted signal Rationale  References: 
NIM(-1) Positive It belongs to (0,1) due to a trade-off 
between benefits and costs 
VF theoretical model (2007) 
Implicitly payment Positive Non-interest expense     Impli pay 
   NIM  
Empirical results of VF (2007) and HS 
(1981) 
Opportunity cost Positive Non-interest bearing       Oppor    
   NIM  
Empirical results of VF (2007) and HS 
(1981) 
Capital ratio Positive Capit ratio     cost of NIM      
NIM  
Empirical results of VF (2007) and HS 
(1981) 
Lending ratio Negative  Operational costs     NIM   Empirical results of VF (2007) 
Deposit ratio  Positive Interest expense      NIM  Empirical results of VF (2007) 
Other earning asset Negative  Diversification   non-interest income    
NIM  
VF theoretical model (2007) 
Interest rate risk Positive  Volatility      Risk premium   
  NIM  
VF theoretical model (2007) and HS 
theoretical model (1981) 
GDP Negative or Positive Cross-sectional risk sharing   NIM 
Intertemporal rate smoothing   NIM  
Empirical results of VF (2007), Berlin 
and Mester (1999), and Allen and 
Santomero (2001) 
Concentration ratio 5 Positive C5     competition    lending rates  
  Interest margins 
 
VF theoretical model (2007) and HS 
theoretical model (1981) 
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4.4.3 Statistics of Empirical Variables 
 
Table 4-3 gives a summary of the statistics for the variables in terms of individual 
countries. We are interested in the value of NIM. Valverde and Fernandez (2007) and 
Mullineux and Murinde (2003, p13) suggest that banks in the US, the UK and 
Switzerland are operated in a market-based financial system, where banks mainly 
depend on capital market activities, i.e., pension funds. Canadian, French and German 
financial markets are indicative of a bank-based market, where banks rely highly on 
intermediary activities. Thus, regarding the mean value of NIM, higher interest 
margins are indicated in France, Canada and Germany, but are lower in the UK and 
Switzerland. The US banks are associated with large interest margins: faster economic 
growth might contribute to this result.  
 
Table 4-3 Statistics of Variables for Sample Countries 
Canada minimum mean maximum 
NIM -4.080 2.217 13.350 
Implicit paym -4.003 0.606 4.247 
Oppor.cost 0.015 0.436 4.422 
Capital ratio 0.002 0.055 0.237 
Loan ratio 0.042 0.593 0.978 
Deposit ratio 0.076 0.708 0.951 
Other earning 0.423 0.910 0.994 
GDP 2.964 5.769 9.947 
France    
NIM -8.520 2.477 11.310 
Implicit paym -25.684 0.985 16.817 
Oppor.cost 0.000 0.244 11.824 
Capital ratio -0.135 0.096 0.923 
Loan ratio 0.000 0.587 0.988 
Deposit ratio 0.000 0.731 0.992 
Other earning 0.000 0.368 1 
GDP  2.779  3.945 5.366 
Germany     
NIM 0.000 2.471 8.730 
Implicit paym -7.991 1.438 35.905 
Oppor.cost 0.000 2.670 77.918 
Capital ratio 0.009 0.058 0.620 
Loan ratio 0.000 0.565 0.994 
Deposit ratio 0.068 0.857 0.981 
Other earning 0.000 0.408 1 
GDP 0.010 0.142 0.351 
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Table 4-3 Cont.    
Switzerland    
NIM 0.000 1.633 9.100 
Implicit paym -25.884 -0.469 10.663 
Oppor.cost -0.010 0.116 3.798 
Capital ratio 0.019 0.117 0.601 
Loan ratio 0.000 0.574 0.972 
Deposit ratio 0.065 0.714 0.970 
Other earning 0.004 0.381 1 
GDP 0.799 3.222 6.222 
The UK    
NIM -1.060 2.033 13.700 
Implicit paym -57.463 -0.248 6.193 
Oppor.cost 0.004 0.494 5.460 
Capital ratio 0.005 0.115 0.940 
Loan ratio 0.004 0.445 0.962 
Deposit ratio 0.001 0.684 0.995 
Other earning 0.000 0.534 0.994 
GDP 3.148 5.093 5.968 
The US    
NIM -0.240 3.781 16.640 
Implicit paym -22.142 1.661 54.166 
Oppor.cost 0.000 0.085 8.193 
Capital ratio -0.028 0.088 1 
Loan ratio 0.000 0.667 0.983 
Deposit ratio 0.000 0.674 0.929 
Other earning 0.000 0.271 1 
GDP 2.584 5.109 6.511 
Notes: NIM: net interest margins; Implicit paym: implicit payment; Oppor.cost: 
opportunity cost; Other earning: other earning asset ratio.  
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Table 4-4 shows the results of mean test for each bank-level variable between sample 
countries. All the values of F-statistic are more than the critical value at the 1% 
significant level and p-values are 0, which suggest that we should reject the null 
hypothesis: means are the same across countries being compared. Therefore, in this 
study, we may provide a country-by-country estimation in order to capture the 
differences in bank activities across countries. 
 
 
 
Table 4-5 presents the concentration ratio from 1999 to 2008 across countries. Less 
competitive markets are indicated in Canada and Switzerland, suggesting that several 
large banks dominate the financial markets. Owing to national consolidation, the 
concentration ratio in the US increased over time in order to take advantage of the 
economies of scale. Table 4-6 shows the matrices of correlation among bank-level 
variables. 
 
Table 4-4 Mean Test for Each Bank-level Variable between Sample Countries  
 NIM Implicit 
paym 
Oppor. 
cost 
Capital 
ratio 
Loan 
ratio 
Deposit 
ratio 
Other 
earning 
F-Statistic  
(5) 
p-value 
214.05*** 
 
0.00 
62.32*** 
 
0.00 
133*** 
 
0.00 
288*** 
 
0.00 
26.20*** 
 
0.00 
73.64*** 
 
0.00 
33.04*** 
 
0.00 
Notes: F-statistic is used for a multiple comparison of means, and the results are obtained by using the code 
“oneway-ANOVA” in Stata. The null hypothesis: means are the same across the groups (more than two) 
being compared. *** indicates significance at the 1% level for the test. NIM: net interest margins; Implicit 
paym: implicit payment; Oppor.cost: opportunity cost; Other earning: other earning asset ratio. 
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    Table 4-5 Concentration Ratio 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Canada 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
CR5 0.6204 0.6213 0.6269 0.6251 0.6139 0.6001 0.6081 0.6238 0.6228 0.6543 
France           
CR5 0.3833 0.3857 0.3693 0.3733 0.3102 0.3128 0.3313 0.3179 0.3346 0.3673 
Germany           
CR5 0.1902 0.2022 0.2024 0.2010 0.210 0.2144 0.210 0.2133 0.2124 0.2202 
Switzerland            
CR5 0.6712 0.6677 0.6605 0.6579 0.6449 0.6498 0.6451 0.6352 0.6293 0.6689 
The UK           
CR5 0.2751 0.2817 0.2857 0.2961 0.3275 0.3450 0.3625 0.3594 0.4070 0.3649 
The US           
CR5 0.2714 0.3192 0.3263 0.3400 0.3445 0.3828 0.3595 0.3537 0.3581 0.3906 
Notes: Data for European countries excluding Switzerland come from ECB statistics; the data of Switzerland and North American are 
based on OECD statistics and we calculated concentration ratio 5 for these countries following the definition provided by ECB in order to 
make them to be consistent. The data of total bank assets of the domestic market is available at http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx? 
Table 4-6 The Matrices of Correlation among Bank-level Variables  
 NIM Implicit 
paym 
Oppor.cost Capital 
ratio 
Loan ratio Deposit 
ratio 
Other 
earning 
NIM 1.000       
Implicit paym 0.204 1.000      
Oppor.cost 0.010 0.013 1.000     
Capital ratio 0.229 -0.15 0.103 1.000    
Loan ratio 0.198 0.079 0.011 0.154 1.000   
Deposit ratio -0.002 0.172 0.010 -0.132 0.220 1.000  
Other earning 0.024 -0.035 -0.029 -0.173 -0.225 -0.360 1.000 
Notes: NIM: net interest margins; Implicit paym: implicit payment; Oppor.cost: opportunity cost; Other earning: other earning 
asset ratio. 
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4.5 Results and Analyses of Estimations 
4.5.1 Diagnostic Tests for Endogeneity and Heteroskedasicity 
 
As banks may endogenously determine the composition of a bank portfolio and adjust 
capital structure according to the risk-taking level, loan ratio, other earning assets 
ratio and capital ratio are suspected endogenous variables in this estimation. 
 
Wooldridge (2002) suggests that the method of two-stage least squares (2SLS)
53
 can 
be used to eliminate endogeneity. First, we have to test the endogeneity of the 
suspected variables (capital ratio, loan ratio and other earning assets ratio) using the 
Hausman specification test introduced in Chapter 3. The null hypothesis of Hausman 
specification test is that the tested variables are exogenous and not correlated with the 
error term; the 2SLS and OLS estimators should differ only by sampling error; in 
other words, OLS is preferred. The alternative hypothesis is that the difference 
between the 2SLS and the OLS estimators
54
 is statistically significant; then 2SLS can 
be employed. 
 
Second, we should present the test of the validity of IV. The null hypothesis of this 
test is that 0:0 H , where   is the coefficient of IV in the reduced-form 
equation: the endogenous variables are regressed on all independent variables 
including both exogenous variables and IV. If the coefficient of IV is equal to zero, 
this suggests that IV is not valid. If the coefficient of IV is significantly different from 
zero, this suggests that IV is correlated with the endogenous variables and this in turn 
can identify the validity of IV. 
                                                        
53 The methodologies of the 2SLS, Hausman specification test and the test of the validity of IVs were introduced 
in Chapter 3. 
54 Recalling Eq.3-10 in Chapter 3, the Hausman specific test statistic has been 
given:
1
2 2 2
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ( ) '[ ( ) ( )] ( )SLS OLS SLS OLS SLS OLSHS Var Var     
     
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Tables 4-7, 4-8 and 4-9 show the results of the Hausman specification test and 
correlation test regarding capital ratio, loan ratio and other earning asset ratio, 
respectively. We run the Hausman specification test for the endogeneity of 
independent variables and check whether it is correct to use one-year lagged 
endogenous variables as IVs in the 2SLS estimations. The test results of Table 4-7 
provide the evidence of the endogeneity of the capital ratio for all countries, since the 
value of Chi-square is more than the critical value; we reject the null hypothesis of 
OLS estimation at the 1% significant level given that p-value is 0. The Hausman 
specification test indicates that there are significant differences between the 2SLS and 
OLS estimators; therefore, the 2SLS model is preferred for all sample countries. In 
addition, the results of the correlation tests are significant at the 1% significant level 
in terms of reduced-form equations, which suggest that one-year lagged capital ratio is 
a valid IV. Similarly, we find the endogeneity of the loan ratio in Canada, France, and 
the UK, and the endogeneity of other earning assets is indicated in France, Germany, 
Switzerland and the US as shown in Tables 4-8 and 4-9. These results implicitly 
reflect differences in banking operations across countries, which require a robustness 
test to identify whether all countries can be pooled as a whole. We will present this 
test in the next section. The results of the correlation test suggest that one-year lagged 
values of these endogenous variables can be used as a valid IV in the estimations. 
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Table 4-7 Results of Two Tests (Capital)  
 Test 1 Endogeneity Test 2 Correlation 
Countries Hausman specification test Instrumental Variable 
 
Canada 42.95*** 
(0.00) 
0.933*** 
[27.013] 
France 293.54*** 
(0.00) 
0.907*** 
[63.343] 
Germany 403.74*** 
(0.00) 
0.913*** 
[184.238] 
Switzerland 157.44*** 
(0.00) 
0.628*** 
[28.352] 
The UK 136.61*** 
(0.00) 
0.734*** 
[23.546] 
The US 246.96*** 
(0.00) 
0.557*** 
[38.120] 
Notes: *** denotes significant at the 1% significance level; () indicates p-value of 
Hausman specification test; [] denotes t-statistics. 
Table 4-8 Results of Two Tests (Loan)  
 Test 1 Endogeneity Test 2 Correlation 
Countries Hausman specification test Instrumental Variable 
 
Canada 21.59*** 
(0.01) 
0.383*** 
[9.82] 
France 216*** 
(0.00) 
0.811*** 
[40.06] 
Germany 7.0 
(0.51) 
--- 
Switzerland 2.59 
(0.97) 
--- 
The UK 142*** 
(0.00) 
0.382*** 
[12.30] 
The US 13.3 
(0.11) 
--- 
Notes: ***, **,* denote significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance level; () indicates 
p-value of Hausman specification test; [] denotes t-statistics. 
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We then try to identify whether heteroskedasticity exists. We use a modified Wald test 
for groupwise heteroskedasticity in Stata in terms of a fixed effect model (Hausman 
statistics suggest that the fixed-effect model is preferred, see Table 4-10). Based on 
Greene (2000, p598), this programme tests the null hypothesis that there is no 
heteroskedasticity. The results of this test are indicated in Table 4-10, which suggest 
that the errors in the fixed effect model are heteroskedastic. The solution for errors 
with heteroskedasticity was introduced in Chapter 3. Using a programme in Stata, 
t-statistics reported in Table 4-10 are corrected for heteroskedasticity.    
4.5.2 Results and Analyses of Evaluations for Individual Countries 
Table 4-10 shows the results of the estimations for six individual countries. The 
Chi-square value of the Hausman test suggests that we can reject the random effect 
model at the 1% significant level, so the fixed effect model is preferred in this study. 
According to the Valverde and Fernandez’ (2007) dynamic theoretical model, using 
one-year lagged values of interest margins reflects the previous information in 
determining current bank behaviour, which can be used to maximise banks’ utility. 
Table 4-9 Results of Two Tests (Other earning asset)  
 Test 1 Endogeneity Test 2 Correlation 
Countries Hausman specification test Instrumental Variable 
 
Canada 7.75 
(0.96) 
--- 
France 115*** 
(0.00) 
0.109*** 
[9.84] 
Germany 77.80*** 
(0.00) 
0.001* 
[1.88] 
Switzerland 75.01*** 
(0.00) 
0.01** 
[2.65] 
The UK 5.84 
(0.66) 
--- 
The US 34.74*** 
(0.01) 
0.02*** 
[5.41] 
Notes: ***, **, * denote significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance level; () indicates 
p-value of the Hausman specification test; [] denotes t-statistics. 
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The coefficients of the one-year lagged values of NIM are positive and significant for 
all sample countries, indicating the importance of previous information, and the 
coefficients are between 0 and 1, suggesting a partial adjustment of interest margins, 
so there is a trade-off between adjusted costs and returns. 
 
Regarding three variables in the category of institutional imperfection (INIM), the 
coefficients of the implicit payment (fee proxy) are positive and significant in the 
estimations for Canada and France. Banks have to compete on deposit markets, so 
they would like to pay implicit interest to eliminate charging service fees. Saunders 
and Schumacher (2000) also show a relative higher fee payment in France from 1988 
until 1995 compared with other European countries and the US. Thus, higher implicit 
payment to depositors demands higher interest margins to offset it. The coefficients of 
the opportunity cost are positive and significant in the tests on Switzerland, France the 
UK and the US. The non-interest-bearing reserve requirement increases the economic 
costs of holding reserves. Thus, banks raise NIM to compensate for this. We find that 
the coefficients of the capital ratio are positive and significant in all estimations. A 
positive coefficient indicates that, although holding more capital can be used against 
potential risk-taking, it is costly because of taxes and regulation on bank lending, 
which in turn increases NIM to offset these. The positive and significant coefficients 
of these variables controlling for institutional imperfections are consistent with the 
findings of Angbazo (1997), Saunders and Schumacher (2000), and Fernandez and 
Valverde (2007).  
 
Regarding the explanatory variables in bank specification and diversification (BDS), 
the coefficient of the loan ratio is negative and significant in the tests on France, 
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Switzerland and the UK: the result is consistent with the findings of Petersen and 
Rajan (1995), Berlin and Mester (1999), Rogers and Sinkey (1999, 2000), Boot (2000) 
and Valverde and Fernandez (2007). They claim that a higher level of loans reduces 
the value of NIM, as banks with lending specialisation can provide efficient 
information and reduce the operating costs, leading to a lower loan rate. Thus an 
increase in lending would decrease interest margins. The coefficients of the deposit 
ratio are positive and significant in the tests of France, Germany, Switzerland and the 
UK. Banks specialising in deposits can benefit from a stable customers relationship, 
which decreases interest expenses (a decline in deposit rates) and hence augments the 
spread between interest income and interest expenses (interest margins). We are more 
concerned with the effect of bank diversification on interest margins. A negative and 
significant coefficient is found in the tests for Switzerland, Canada, the UK and the 
US, which is consistent with the implications of the theoretical work of Fernandez and 
Valverde (2007). Other earning assets are a substitute for loans to obtain higher fee 
income given a fixed amount of total funds for banks to operate. The development of 
financial market allows banks to be involved in product diversification. This 
significant change in bank behaviour has a negative impact on traditional activities 
towards interest income. In addition, this result can be explained by the conjecture 
that banks decrease loan rates in order to increase the amount of non-traditional 
products (cross-selling)
55
, as banks can benefit from long-term and stable customer 
relationships (Lepetit et al., 2008b). The insignificant coefficients of product 
diversification in Germany and France might suggest that German and French banks 
operated in a bank-based market, where banks highly depend on traditional 
intermediation (Valverde and Fernandez, 2007; Mullineux and Murinde, 2003, p13). 
                                                        
55 The effect of cross-selling between traditional and non-traditional activities was found in Chapter 2.  
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In terms of RISK, a positive and significant coefficient of interest rate volatilities is 
found in the tests for France, Switzerland, Germany, the UK and the US, which 
supports the implications of the dealership model suggested by Ho and Saunders 
(1981) and Fernandez and Valverde (2007), who point out that the interest margin is 
determined by interest rate volatilities. Even though the banking market is highly 
competitive, an increase in interest rate volatilities generates a higher level of NIM as 
the price for providing loan and deposit services, as long as banks are risk-averse and 
associated with uncertain transaction size. Since previous studies in this context 
concentrate on either European countries as a whole or the US, in this study we tested 
the effect of interest rate risk on margins based on Canada, but we cannot find a 
significant coefficient of interest rate volatilities. One possible explanation is that, 
considering credit rationing, interest margins could be less responsive to the change in 
interest rate (Angbazo, 1997).  
 
Regarding GDP as a measure of the macro-economy, a negative and significant 
parameter of the GDP growth rate can be identified in the tests on the US, Switzerland 
and Germany. According to the views of Allen and Gale (1994, 1996), Berlin and 
Mester (1999), and Allen and Santomero (2001), a negative result is consistent with 
the hypothesis of cross-sectional risk-sharing in the context of interest margins, 
suggesting that banks can transfer risk from some agents to others by charging a 
higher interest rate in a downturn, so that the people bearing more risk are those who 
are least risk-averse. Thus, banks demand higher interest margins in a recession. 
Positive and significant coefficients of concentration ratio 5 are found in Germany, 
Switzerland and the US, suggesting that banks can increase lending rates in less 
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competitive markets, and this in turn raises interest margins. This result follows the 
findings of Lepetit et al. (2008b), while Valverde and Fernandez (2007) cannot find a 
significant effect of market structure on interest margins. 
 
We use the year dummy variables to capture the time specific effect on interest 
margins for each country. A decline in interest margins before the recent crisis might 
be explained by the conjecture that banks underprice loans to raise non-traditional 
activities (Lepetit et al., 2008b). They argue that in order to absorb new customers, 
banks decrease the price of traditional activities, i.e., loans, so that they can sell 
non-traditional financial products to the same customer (cross-selling). Since 2005, 
sample countries suffered a decline in interest margins, particularly in 2007-08 
(during the crisis), when the US and Canada suffered a more than 50% decline. This 
can be interpreted by Valverde and Fernandez (2007), who suggest that large 
involvement in product diversification could squeeze out traditional activities to 
obtain higher non-interest income, further affect interest income, although it might be 
coupled with higher risk-taking. Therefore, a negative effect of product diversification 
on interest margins can be found. 
 
The previous studies in this context are based on pooled countries, and do not 
consider the differences in banking structure and regulation that might account for the 
inconsistent results on bank interest margins. In this chapter, we provide a 
country-by-country study to fill this gap, considering the effect of changes in bank 
behaviour up to the global financial crisis in 2008. However, to identify this 
heterogeneous assumption, we need to use a robustness test. First, we run the 
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regression with interaction variables
56
 in terms of individual countries and then try to 
use the Wald test to check the coefficients of 50 interaction variables. The results of 
the estimation with interaction variables and Wald test are shown in Appendix 5. The 
null hypothesis of the Wald test is that the coefficients of the tested regressors are 
jointly equal to 0, suggesting that removing them from the model will not 
substantially reduce the fit of this model; the alternative hypothesis is that the 
coefficients are not jointly equal to 0. The Chi-square value of the Wald test is 9.28, 
given that p-value is 0, which suggests that we can reject the null hypothesis at the 1% 
significant level. Thus, we cannot pool all individual countries. This result shows 
significant differences in bank operations and financial systems among the sample 
countries. The response to shocks varies across countries, suggesting that a global 
standard regulation might not be able to take the country specific effect into account: 
in contrast, a single regime based on one region, i.e., ECB
57
, might be more applicable 
for banking regulation and supervision.  
 
                                                        
56 Interaction variable is defined as the specific independent variable multiplied by 1 for a certain country, 0 
otherwise; this estimation includes 5 individual countries (the US is a base group) and 10 independent variables, 
thus 50 interaction variables are used in the estimation. 
57 Since the sample in this study is based on countries from the EU, outside the EU but in Europe and North 
America, the result of the Wald test indicates differences among these countries, which is reasonable; but this does 
not challenge the regional integration for banking regulation, i.e., ECB, which needs an investigation exclusively 
using more ECB members as a sample.    
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Table 4-10 Results of Estimations for Individual Countries 
Dependent variable: NIM    Canada 
 
   France 
 
   Germany  Switzerland   The UK    The US 
NIM (-1) 0.467*** 
[3.32] 
0.382*** 
[4.33] 
0.337*** 
[7.49] 
0.383*** 
[3.78] 
0.480*** 
[5.97] 
0.348*** 
[4.54] 
INIM       
Implicit payment 0.590*** 
[4.33] 
0.045** 
[2.47] 
0.0001 
[0.14] 
0.006 
[0.53] 
0.008 
[0.74] 
0.03 
[1.17] 
Opport.cost 0.031 
[0.19] 
0.49** 
[2.36] 
-0.001 
[-0.55] 
0.462* 
[1.80] 
0.225* 
[1.87] 
0.688** 
[2.14] 
Capit/asset  0.115** 
[2.13] 
6.38** 
[2.26] 
0.039*** 
[3.09] 
5.938** 
[2.04] 
0.03** 
[2.43] 
0.091* 
[1.91] 
BDS       
Lending 0.157 
[0.17] 
-0.582* 
[-1.88] 
0.69 
[1.05] 
-1.89** 
[-2.52] 
-0.545* 
[-1.76] 
0.01 
[0.02] 
Deposits 0.751 
[0.77] 
1.59** 
[2.06] 
0.995*** 
[3.17] 
2.632** 
[2.29] 
0.907* 
[1.95] 
0.414 
[1.06] 
Other earning asset -1.956** 
[-1.98] 
 
-0.214 
[-0.70] 
-0.011 
[-0.02] 
-2.48*** 
[-3.47] 
-1.42*** 
[-4.56] 
-1.903*** 
[-5.71] 
RISK       
Interest rate risk -0.04 
[-0.14] 
0.502** 
[2.41] 
0.188** 
[2.33] 
2.42* 
[1.88] 
0.19* 
[1.64] 
0.265** 
[2.30] 
MV       
GDP -0.007 
[-0.18] 
0.092 
[0.84] 
-0.122*** 
[-4.13] 
-0.61* 
[-1.81] 
0.88 
[0.54] 
-0.755*** 
[-4.02] 
C5 2.87 
[0.25] 
-2.47 
[-0.63] 
1.79*** 
[10.35] 
3.01*** 
[4.67] 
-2.04 
[-0.67] 
2.21* 
[1.82] 
Dummy_Year       
D_2004 -0.344** 
[-2.36] 
-0.244** 
[-2.18] 
0.086** 
[2.60] 
0.002 
[0.01] 
-0.078 
[-0.89] 
0.133 
[0.78] 
D_2005 -0.243* 
[-1.69] 
-0.201** 
[-1.98] 
-0.136*** 
[-3.63] 
0.027 
[0.20] 
-0.316* 
[-1.91] 
0.022 
[0.13] 
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Table 4-10 Cont.       
D_2006 -0.19 
[-1.10] 
-0.249 
[-1.56] 
0.057 
[0.93] 
-0.895*** 
[-4.20] 
0.038 
[0.42] 
-0.10 
[-0.66] 
D_2007 -0.182 
[-1.20] 
-0.367** 
[-1.96] 
0.007 
[0.10] 
-1.076*** 
[-3.80] 
-0.06 
[-0.66] 
-0.253** 
[-2.49] 
D_2008 -0.553*** 
[-3.80] 
-0.462*** 
[-4.37] 
-0.274*** 
[-7.42] 
-0.348*** 
[-3.68] 
-0.05 
[-0.18] 
-0.569*** 
[-5.07] 
Total Observations 208 805 1253 621 359 1177 
R-Square 0.60 0.38 0.48 0.47 0.48 0.73 
Heteroskedasticity Chi2 56981.94*** 25366.01*** 14722.52*** 32376.31*** 20471.68*** 1.2e+05*** 
Hausman test Chi2 56.65*** 273.069*** 388.677*** 171.533*** 145.087*** 209.587*** 
Notes: NIM: net interest margins=(total interest income-total interest expense)/total earning asset; NIM (-1): one lag of NIM; Implicit payment=(total non- 
interest expense-total non-interest income)/total earning asset; Opport.cost=(non-interest bearing/total earning asset)*treasury bill rate 3 month; Interest 
risk= difference between interbank rate (1-year) and interest rate of deposits; Lending=loan/total asset; Deposits=total customer deposits/total liability; 
Other earning asset ratio=other earning asset/total earning asset; Capit ratio: capital ratio; GDP: GDP growth rate. C5: concentration ratio 5.Year Dummy 
Variables: if in a specific year, the value is equal to 1, 0 otherwise. ***, ** and * denotes significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% significant level, respectively. t 
statistics are denoted in [] and corrected for heteroskedasticity. 
 
 
 
 
 
153 
 
4.6 Conclusions 
 
This chapter investigated the effect of changes in bank behaviour on interest margins based on 
the Valverde and Fernandez’s (2007) model. Controlling for institutional imperfections, 
interest margins were reduced by the introduction of non-traditional activities associated with 
higher fee income, which squeezes out traditional activities, hence reducing bank interest 
income. Negative coefficients of year dummy variables, particularly during the recent 
financial crisis, can also offer evidence that those banks with higher product diversification 
are indicative of lower interest margins. This negative result of product diversification can 
also support the argument of Lepetit et al. (2008b), who suggest that in order to absorb new 
customers, banks lower the interest rate of traditional activities, i.e., loans, so that they can 
sell non-traditional financial products to the customers (cross-selling); hence, interest income 
resulting from loans is reduced. As regards traditional activities, banks which specialised in 
lending reduce lending interest rates, this in turn lowers interest margins; and banks which 
specialised in deposit-taking can benefit from a stable customer relationship; this in turn 
reduces interest expenses and increases interest margins. In addition, this study finds a 
positive and significant effect of interest rate risk on interest margins, following the HS and 
VF models. Although banks in developed countries have been experiencing significant 
changes in bank behaviour, they still suffer traditional interest rate risk, which has an impact 
on interest margins. Regarding macro-variables, higher interest margins are found in less 
competitive markets (higher C5), as banks have more power to require higher interest rates.  
 
This chapter contributes to providing a country-by-country study in the context of interest 
margins considering the differences in bank structures and financial systems among countries, 
and this heterogeneous assumption is identified by the robustness test. The effect of changes 
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in bank behaviour (product diversification) on interest margins is likely to be significant in a 
market-based financial market, such as Switzerland, the US and the UK. However, this is 
insignificant in a bank-based financial market, such as France and Germany, where banks are 
inclined to operate traditional intermediation. This result follows the implications of the VF 
theoretical model (2007). The results of the robustness test find differences in financial system 
and regulation, which suggest that a global standard regulation might not be able to take into 
account different responses to shocks across countries; in contrast, a regional single regime, 
i.e., ECB, might be more efficient.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
155 
 
CHAPTER 5 
THE LESSONS FROM BANK FAILURE RUNNING UP TO A 
FINANCIAL CRISIS 
 
 
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Recently, many economists (see Barrell et al., 2010; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008) have paid 
more attention to banking crises because of the great losses from the recent crisis. They have 
used country-level data to investigate the reasons for banking crises and suggest that bank 
regulation, e.g., capital requirement, and macroeconomic variables, e.g., GDP, house prices, 
the stock index and current account balance, play an important role in determining banking 
crises. They have also summarised the banking crises across the main developed countries. 
During the past two decades, crises have occured at least once for most industrial countries, 
particularly the US and the UK, which have already experienced two and four crises, 
respectively. However, few studies have concentrated on individual bank failure in the context 
of the banking crisis in 2007-08, when initially major bank failures (e.g. Northern Rock, Bear 
Stearns, Lehman Brothers and Merrill Lynch) spread to other financial institutions as a 
banking panic: this in turn led to a serious banking crisis in the developed countries of Europe 
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and the US. Both bank managers and policy-makers are now taking an interest in the issue of 
why some banks fail while others do not, in order to protect individual banks from bankruptcy 
and maintain a stable financial system. Therefore, identifying the reasons for bank failure is 
the first step towards understanding the mechanism of banking crises in the developed 
countries. We have investigated the effects of non-traditional activities, interbank lending, and 
risk-taking on bank performance in the previous chapters. In this chapter, we attempt to 
combine these bank-level variables with macro-level variables as candidates to examine the 
causes of bank failure up to the recent financial crisis. 
 
First, we are more concerned with the effect of changes in bank behaviour, such as the 
introduction of non-traditional banking activities (product diversification), on bank 
performance, particularly in the recent banking crisis. Although earlier empirical evidence 
(see Borio-Filosa, 1994; Litan, 1994; Saunders and Walter, 1994; Stiroh, 2004; Stiroh and 
Rumble, 2006; Baele et al., 2007; Calmes and Theoret, 2010) reviewed in Chapter 2 on the 
extent of bank diversification may vary, they find that the diversification associated with a 
risky product line, i.e., the complicated bundling of obligations, has a significant negative 
effect on bank performance.  
 
Second, the shortage of liquidity assets is another concern. Dewatripont and Tirole (1994, p64) 
suggest that an illiquidity problem is actually a solvency problem. Banks with sufficient liquid 
assets are likely to be safe, especially in a downturn, when liquidity assets can be used against 
a bank run. Banks with a liquidity shortage can borrow from the interbank market, where 
lenders may make a prudent estimation of the potential risk level of problematic banks. 
Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2009) find that interbank lending in both the US and Europe 
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was static by October, 2008, owing to a pessimistic attitude towards bank performance.  
 
Third, bank performance is pro-cyclical with the macro-economy, this has been suggested in 
many earlier studies (see Gonzalez-Hermosillo, 1999; Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998, 
2000; Ergungor and Thomson, 2005; Davis and Karim, 2008; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008). 
They argue that the banking crisis preceded economic recession, and therefore, can be 
predicted by economic indicators, such as housing prices. During the last decade, the real 
estate market has had a substantial impact on bank performance, particularly the complicated 
financial products related to sub-prime loans in the US, such as mortgage based securities 
(MBS) and collateralised debt obligation (CDO): the return on these assets depends on 
housing prices. When the price started to decrease, the US financial crisis also started.  
 
Fourth, the recent financial crisis highlighted the importance of regulation of the banking 
sector. However, inappropriate regulation may distort banking activities and force banks to 
engage in risky trading (see Koehn and Santomero, 1980; Kim and Santomero, 1988; Rochet, 
1992; Blum and Hellwig, 1995). They imply that, given capital regulation, banks tend to be 
involved in more risky assets associated with higher profits to offset regulatory costs, which 
may increase the probability of bank failure. Thus, based on the discussion above, we may 
argue that bank diversification, liquidity, capital regulation and macro-shocks determine the 
probability of bank failure.  
 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: a literature review is introduced in Section 2; 
the econometric methodology and model specification are discussed in Section 3; and the 
empirical results are presented in Section 4. The conclusions are summarised in the last 
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section.  
5.2 Literature Review 
5.2.1 Theoretical Model of Bank Failure 
 
Gonzalez-Hermosillo (GH) (1999) presents a framework of bank distress, explicitly 
suggesting the effects of profitability, capital adequacy and liquidity on the probability of 
bank failure. In this model, assume that a bank is associated with assets, including currency 
and risky earning assets and liabilities, including deposits and capital. The function of the 
probability of bank failure is shown: 
 
),,( cydFFz                                                              (5-1) 
  
where, 
zF  is the probability of bank failure. 
d is deposit flows. 
y is net asset income.  
c is capital requirement according to a minimum capital requirement.  
 
The net income on assets (bank profitability) function is shown below: 
 
)),(,)(*( mm iiyy                                                            (5-2) 
 
where, 
mi)(*   is a function of market risk. 
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  denotes macro-variables, such as economic growth and housing prices. 
)(*   is determined by bank risk management, a higher *  indicates highly cyclical bank 
portfolio; if * =0 indicates that banks can hedge market risk. 
mi  is market return, which is exogenous. 
),( mi  is a function of credit risk, which depends on macroeconomic shocks and market 
returns. 
 
The deposit flow function is as shown below: 
 
))),,,(*|(,( max  eZ FfFudd                                               (5-3)
 
 
where,  
u is the need of deposits for depositors, which is exogenous. 
zF  is the expected probability of bank failure given the effective deposit guarantees * . 
),,(* max eFf  is a function of the maximum level of deposits that can be protected by a 
government, which depends on the maximum level of deposits ( max ) that can be covered by 
deposit insurance funds (f, exogenous), and the expected probability ( eF  ) that there is a large 
number of bank failures in the financial system. 
 is used to generate an expectation function. 
 
The structure of the GH model has two tiers: first, it explicitly presents the fact that 
profitability, liquidity and capital requirement have an impact on the probability of bank 
failure. Second, according to the function of bank income (Eq.5-2), it points out the 
160 
 
importance of fundamental risk-taking (credit risk and market risk) and the macro-economy in 
determining bank profitability, considering moral hazard. In this respect, the risk level might 
be increased, given a competitive market, where a bank engages in activities with higher 
risk-taking in order to make higher profits following “herding” behaviour, as they participate 
in potential protection from the government. Another case is that banks may suffer higher 
default risk as borrowers cannot (due to the macro-economic situation) or are not willing (but 
are able) to repay, which distorts banks’ performance. In addition, according to the function of 
deposits (Eq.5-3), this model highlights the importance of liquidity management regarding 
deposit flows. If depositors cannot judge whether banks are “good” or “bad”, or do not have 
confidence that the government holds sufficient funding for deposit insurance, this may 
generate a bank run, considering asymmetric information. Therefore, based on this model, we 
find that bank profitability, liquidity, capital holding, bank risk-taking and macro-economic 
shocks affect the probability of bank failure. However, given the development of bank 
behaviour over the past 20 years, we are more concerned with the effect of the diversification 
of bank activities on the probability of bank failure, particularly taking the recent financial 
crisis into consideration, as reviewed in Chapter 2. In addition, as this study aims to 
investigate individual bank failure, the difference between money centre banks
58
 and small 
banks may influence bank performance. The effect of TBTF on large bank risk-taking has 
been found using the threshold model in Chapter 3 in the context of the interbank market, so 
in this chapter we would like to include bank size, taking TBTF into consideration, to see its 
effect on the probability of bank failure. Thus, we modify the GH model (1999) with 
additional variables controlling for the diversification of bank activities and size effect. We 
would expect to find the effect of these two additional variables on bank failure up to the 
                                                        
58 These are usually large banks, and are connected with other banks, large non-financial firms and even governments, so 
their failure has a negative impact on the whole economy. 
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financial crisis 2007-08.  
5.2.2 Indicator Description and Empirical Evidence  
5.2.2.1 Capital Ratio Requirement  
 
The modified GH model supports that bank diversification, capital adequacy, liquidity and 
macroeconomic shocks, as proposed in the first section of this chapter, are possible reasons 
for bank failure: we attempt to describe these indicators using empirical evidence in order to 
show their importance in determining bank failure. Regarding bank diversification, in Chapter 
2, we introduced a theoretical and empirical review of the effect of bank diversification on 
bank profitability and presented a related empirical study, which shows a negative effect of 
non-traditional activities on bank profits.   
  
Regarding capital requirement, in 1988, Basel Accord I set a solvency regulation to require a 
minimum capital requirement, and then Basel Accord II set a risk-based capital requirement 
as Pillar 1. This can be seen as an important indicator to predict bank failure. Goldstein and 
Turner (1996) imply that the capital requirement has a twofold function, not only as a buffer 
against potential bank risk but also to serve better governance. For example, shareholders pay 
more attention to the risk level of bank activities on behalf of their interests, so bank managers 
will not put banks at risk. Many countries, in particular developed countries, such as the US, 
have adopted the Basel Agreement, and even tend to hold higher capital ratios than the 
requirement. However, the efficiency of capital regulation has been questioned by many 
economists. Kim and Santomero (1988) and Rochet (1992) present an insight into the effect 
of capital regulation on the probability of bank failure using a portfolio model. The 
implications of these theoretical studies suggest that, in the context of the minimum capital 
requirement, banks prefer to employ assets associated with a higher level of risk-taking, 
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which in turn increases the probability of bank failure. Keeley and Furlong (1990), 
considering the limited liability of banks, used a mean-variance model to investigate the effect 
of capital regulation on the probability of bank failure. The negative effect of capital 
regulation on bank performance is also found, which is consistent with the Kim and 
Santomero’s model (1988). Hellman et al. (2000) developed a theoretical model and argue 
that if the cost of capital holding increases, the bank charter value is reduced, which indicates 
a negative effect of capital regulation on bank performance.  
 
Empirical studies on the effect of capital regulation have been explored. Using data on US 
banks, given a strict capital requirement, Grenadier and Hall (1996) suggest that banks have 
more incentive to shift activities with higher level risk towards safe activities. Nevertheless, 
Hovkimian and Kane (2000) find inefficient capital regulation when examining US banks 
from 1985 to 1994. The capital requirement has no impact on reducing large banks’ incentives 
to take higher risk, as they can obtain subsidies of deposit insurance. Barth et al. (2001, 2004), 
using bank-level data on 107 countries from 1999 to 2004, suggest that the capital 
requirement cannot reduce the amount of non-performing loans, and find that private sector 
monitoring of banks is more effective than government supervision at improving bank 
performance. 
5.2.2.2 Liquidity Ratio 
 
As regards liquidity risk, according to Dewatripont and Tirole (1994, pp63-64), liquid assets 
play an important role in monitoring banking performance. For example, a solvent bank may 
face a problem of illiquidity. It has to borrow from other institutions through the interbank 
markets, which may generate a market’s question about the solvency of the bank. Therefore, a 
liquidity shortage always tends to be a solvency problem. Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache 
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(1998), Gonzalez-Hermosillo (1999), Logan (2000) and Heffernan (2003) empirically suggest 
that sufficient liquidity can protect banks against unexpected withdrawals, particularly in a 
downturn, and further lower the probability of bank failure. 
5.2.2.3 Macroeconomic Indicators 
 
As concerns macroeconomic shocks, Dewatripont and Tirole (1994, pp185-160) suggest that 
although the idiosyncratic shock and macroeconomic shock are not distinguished in Basel 
Accord I, the latter is highlighted in determining bank performance and the solvent ratio 
depends on the macroeconomic shock in the absence of an adjustment to the net worth of 
banks. With a higher level of macroeconomic shocks, intervention from regulation is imposed 
too often on the banking management; however, with a lower level of macro-level shocks, 
less regulation is imposed on bank operations, which results in many potential dangers for 
banks. Therefore, macroeconomic shocks have a significant impact on banking decisions, 
further influencing bank performance. 
 
Empirical studies (see Hardy and Pazarbasioglu, 1999; Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998, 
1999; Kaminsky, 1999; Goldstein et al., 2000; Hagen and Ho, 2007) on the effect of 
macroeconomic shocks point out that economic indicators play an important role in 
determining the probability of bank failure. They believe that the economy affects the bank 
sector through two channels: the bank asset side and bank liability side. On the one hand, 
bank assets are distorted by a worse economy, which indicates that non-performing loans 
increase; on the other hand, there are many flows from bank liabilities in a recession, when 
depositors expect a large number of bank failures. 
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5.2.2.4 Existing Evidence on the Study of Banking Crises/Failures 
 
One of the prevalent studies on banking crises is Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998), 
who investigated the causes of banking crises
59
 by applying a large dataset of developing and 
developed countries from 1980 to 1994 to a multivariate logit model. The results indicate that 
macroeconomic variables and law enforcement significantly affect bank performance. Lower 
GDP growth increases the risk level of the banking sector without a lag effect. A higher 
interest rate tends to increase the probability of banking crises, while little evidence is found 
for the effect of exchange rates on banking crises. In addition, the problem of moral hazard 
associated with deposit insurance is highlighted in countries with a lower quality of law 
enforcement, which increases the probability of banking crises. This suggests that an implicit 
protection of depositors is preferred to resolve the moral hazard problem. However, this study 
leaves open questions related to the effect of other factors on banking crises, such as the 
competition of financial markets, liquidity assets and capital ratio.  
 
Another paper by Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1999) indicates that factors, including 
interest rate, GDP, M2, credit per capita, terms of trade change and depreciation, should be 
considered to monitor banking crises using two different tools, in terms of 36 banking crises 
from 65 countries. The application of an early warning system (EWS) using estimated crisis 
probability and constructing a rating system, respectively, have proved to be a useful 
preliminary screen to monitor banking crises. However, this estimation still concentrates on 
macroeconomic indicators. 
   
Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2009) suggest that the application of a universal banking 
                                                        
59 This is defined according to at least four conditions being held: 1. Non-performing loan ratio is more than 10%; 2. rescue 
cost is at least 2% of GDP; 3. Nationalisation of banks is considerable; and 4. Government provides emergent measures, such 
as general deposit guarantees in response to the crisis (Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998). 
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model enhances a higher level of risk-taking (measured by the z-score
60
). Using data on 1334 
banks from 101 countries leading up to the financial crisis in 2007-2008, they find that an 
excessive reliance on non-interest income and non-deposit funding can be proved to be 
dangerous: bank diversification is associated with a complex and risky product line, which 
leads to the agency problem in the bank; on the funding side, non-deposit funding adjusts the 
interest rate quickly according to the risk level of bank projects, which generates higher 
funding costs and, further, causes bankruptcy. The authors also examine the effect of banking 
strategy on the financial crisis in 2007-08, and suggest that a bank with more traditional 
activities is safer than one with higher diversification with a risky and complex product line. 
Similarly, Saunders and Walter (1994, pp204-205) show potential gains from a universal 
banking model using a simulation approach based on US data on financial institutions, 
insurance companies and security borders and dealers from 1984 to 1988. However, large 
involvement in non-traditional banking activities increases the level of risk-taking and 
operational costs, which leads to a decline in bank profitability.  
 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) studied the US banking crisis in 2007-08 compared with 18 
post-war banking crises. They suggest that the equity and housing prices in the US 
significantly affected the recent banking crisis, and GDP and current account were badly 
distorted in the run-up to the banking crisis. In addition, the characteristics of this financial 
crisis are similar to previous banking crises in the developed countries. By using a dataset of 
14 developed countries from OECD on banking crises, Barrell et al. (2010) find that the 
un-weighted capital adequacy ratio and the liquidity ratio have an impact on the probability of 
banking crises through a logit model. The higher level of capital ratio and liquidity ratio 
                                                        
60 This is defined as the sum of return-on-asset and equity ratio divided by the standard deviation of return-on-asset for an 
individual bank. 
166 
 
reduces the likelihood of crises. The results from out-of-sample 2007 are proved to be reliable 
for averting banking crises, which implies the importance of capital ratio and liquidity ratio in 
determining financial crises.  
 
Regarding individual bank failure, some earlier studies contribute to this stream. According to 
the GH model (1999), the author also provides an empirical study using data on 4,000 banks 
from the US and Colombia to investigate the factors involved in banking system distress. The 
results indicate that both bank-specific variables, such as liquidity asset, bank risk-taking and 
bank profitability, and macroeconomic variables, such as GDP, affect the probability of bank 
failure. Using an international dataset from 1988 to 2002, Heffernan (2003) also suggests that 
bank- and macro-level variables tend to be the determinants of bank failure, using a logit 
model. The results show that a higher level of bank income, liquidity assets and bank size 
reduce the probability of bank failure, and higher inflation rates, lower real interest rates and 
lower exchange rates lead to bank failure. 
           
According to the empirical review, most studies concentrate on the indicators of banking 
crises; these factors based on the emerging financial markets and advanced financial markets 
are quite different. It is rare to find a single factor leading to a bank crisis; instead, a 
combination of various factors can explain bankruptcy. However, little evidence can be found 
to identify the reasons for individual bank failure, particularly in the context of the recent 
financial crisis, taking into consideration the huge rescue funding for insolvent banks, for 
example, the US Treasury injected $250 billion into nine major banks in 2008 (Gorton and 
Metrick, 2012) paid for by taxpayers. Understanding individual bank failure is the first step to 
protecting the whole banking system and further saving social costs of rescuing problematic 
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banks. Therefore, in this chapter, based on the modified GH model by considering changes in 
bank behaviour and the size effect, we employ both bank-specific variables and 
macroeconomic indicators to identify empirically the causes of bank failure in the developed 
countries of Europe and North America. Furthermore, we construct a study in order to 
distinguish the factors of bank failure that occurred both in the lead-up to the recent episode 
of financial crisis and the unfolding of this episode. Table 5-1 provides a summary of 
empirical studies on the determinants of banking crises/failures. 
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Table 5-1 A Summary Review on the Studies of Banking Crisis/ Failure  
Authors Year Study 
period 
Sample 
country 
Methodology Explanatory variables Main findings 
Barker and 
Holdsworth 
1994 1986-1991 The US banks Logit model (1) Loans of real estate 
(2) Proxies of banking sector 
situation 
(1) A large amount of real estate loans 
increases the probability of bank failure. 
(2) A worse banking system increases the 
probability of bank failure. 
Demirguc-Kunt and 
Detragiache 
1998 1980-1994 45-65 
countries 
depending on 
each 
regression 
Logit model (1) GDP growth rate 
(2) Changes in the terms of 
trade 
(3) Exchange rate 
(4) Real interest rate 
(5) Inflation rate 
(6) Surplus/GDP 
(7) M2/foreign exchange 
reserves 
(8) Liquidity ratio 
(9) Real domestic credit 
growth 
(10) GDP per capital 
(1) Lower GDP, higher interest rate and 
inflation rate tend to increase the 
probability of banking crises.  
(2) Explicit deposit insurance increases the 
probability of banking crises.     
 
Demirguc-Kunt and 
Detragiache 
1999 1980-1995 65 countries Logit model (1) GDP growth 
(2) Terms of trade change 
(3) Exchange rate 
(4) Real interest rate 
(5) Inflation rate 
(6) Fiscal surplus/GDP 
(7) M2/Reserve 
(8) Credit growth 
(9) GDP per capital 
(1) A higher level of GDP growth and GDP 
per capital reduces the probability of 
banking crises. 
(2) A higher level of real interest rate and 
inflation increases the probability of   
banking crises. 
(3) A higher level of M2 and credit growth 
increases the probability of banking 
crises. 
Gonzalez-Hermosillo 1999 1980-1995 The US 
Mexico and 
Colombia 
Logit model; 
Cox 
proportional 
hazard model 
(1) Non-performing loan ratio 
(2) Equity ratio 
(3) Proxies of market risk 
(4) Proxies of liquidity risk 
(5) Proxies of moral hazard  
(6) Proxies of macro-economy 
(1) Higher non-performing loans and lower 
level equity ratio increase the 
probability of bank failure and decrease 
the survival time of banks. 
(2) Liquidity risk and market risk play an 
important role in determining banking 
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(7) Bank specific variables: 
income ratio; profit 
margins; loan ratio; salary 
ratio; bank size; expenses 
to fixed assets 
crises and the survival time of banks. 
(3) A weak bank system accelerates the 
bank failure. 
Hutchinson and 
Mc-Dill 
1999 1975-1997 132 countries Probit model (1) Proxy of central bank 
independence 
(2) Deposit insurance 
(3) Proxy of liberalization 
(4) GDP growth rate 
(5) Exchange rate depreciation 
(6) Real credit growth 
(7) Real interest rate 
(8) Inflation  
(9) Change in the stock 
markets 
(1) A lower level of the output price and the 
equity price leads to an increase in the 
probability of banking crises. 
(2) A higher level of central bank 
independence, explicit deposit 
insurance, financial liberalization and 
moral hazard accounts for banking 
crises. 
Logan  2000 1991-1994 The UK Logit model (1) Loan growth 
(2) Net interest income  
(3) Proxy of liquidity risk 
(4) Bank profits 
(5) Leverage ratio 
(1) A large leverage reduces the probability 
of bank failure. 
(2) A higher level of credit risk and 
liquidity risk increases the probability of 
bank failure. 
 
Heffernan 2003 1988- 
1992 
6 developed 
countries: 
Australia, 
Finland, 
France, 
Norway, 
Sweden and 
the US 
Logit model (1) Net income/TA 
(2) Liquidity ratio 
(3) Loan loss provision 
(4) Bank size 
(5) Asset growth rate 
(6) Inflation 
(7) Real exchange rate 
(8) Real interest rate 
(1) An increase in net income reduces the 
probability of bank failure. 
(2) A higher level of liquidity ratio and loan 
quality reduces the probability of bank 
failure. 
(3) A higher level of inflation rate and real 
exchange rate increases the probability 
of bank failure. 
Davis and Karim 2008 1979-2003 105 countries Logit model; 
Signal 
extraction 
approach 
(1) Real GDP growth 
(2) Change in terms of trade 
(3) Nominal depreciation 
(4) Real interest rate 
(1) The Logit model is better than the 
Signal extraction approach in terms of a 
global dataset. 
(2) Macro-level variable: a higher level of 
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(5) Inflation 
(6) Fiscal surplus/GDP 
(7) M2/foreign exchange 
reserves 
(8) Credit to private 
sector/GDP 
(9) Liquidity ratio 
(10)Real domestic credit growth 
(11)Real GDP per capital 
(12)Deposit insurance 
 
 
GDP growth rate and GDP per capital 
decreases the probability of banking 
crises; while a lower level of real 
interest rate and inflation rate decreases 
the probability of banking crises. 
(3) Financial variables: a higher level of 
M2, private credit ratio and credit 
growth increases the probability of 
banking crises. 
(4) Fiscal policy: a higher level of fiscal 
balance reduces the probability of 
banking crises. 
(5) Institution: a higher level of deposit 
insurance reduces the probability of 
banking crises. 
Barrell, Davis, 
Karim and Liadze 
2010 1980-2007 OECD 
countries 
Logit model (1) Real GDP growth 
(2) Real interest rate 
(3) Inflation 
(4) Fiscal surplus/GDP 
(5) M2/foreign exchange 
reserves 
(6) Real domestic credit 
growth 
(7) Liquidity ratio 
(8) Un-weighted capital 
adequacy ratio 
(9) Real property price growth 
(1) Capital requirement, liquidity assets and 
housing price index play an important 
role in determining the probability of 
banking crises, which tends to exclude 
the traditional indicators of 
macro-economy, such as GDP, inflation, 
exchange rates. 
(2) A higher level of liquidity ratio and 
capital ratio mitigates the probability of 
banking crises. 
(3) Reducing the house price growth leads 
to a lower probability of banking crises. 
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5.3 Introduction of the Limited Dependent Model and Variables 
5.3.1 The Logit Model 
 
The indicator models (signal extraction) do not perform better compared with a multivariate 
logit (probit) model. The signal extraction approach
61
, first, is based on the effect of an 
individual factor on the probability of banking crises; second, the way to generate a common 
threshold across countries averages away the heterogeneity of sample countries; and third, a 
common threshold in some cases is correct, while in some circumstances it is not appropriate: 
for example, a change in a country’s market structure may lead to a different distribution of an 
indicator, which generates another optimal threshold. Thus, this approach is preferable for 
estimating banking crises for individual countries. However, a multivariate logit (probit) 
model can investigate the effect of a combination of various factors on the probability of bank 
failure, and it can capture the heterogeneity of sample banks
62
 when estimating a large 
number of bank failures across countries (Davis and Karim, 2008). Therefore, specifically, a 
multivariate logit model is used in this chapter for identifying the reasons for bank failure.
63
 
                                                        
61
 This is a non-parametric methodology. The idea behind it is that if a single variable exceeds the threshold of 
this indicator, it is thought to be as an abnormal behaviour; this can be used to predict banking crises. Basically, 
it concentrates on a particular behaviour related to crises (Davis and Karim, 2008). The best threshold of a single 
indicator for each country depends on minimising the noise-to-signal ratio defined as type 1 error/(1-type 2 
error); and then all the best thresholds are averaged as a general threshold across countries.  
62
 As suggested by Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998), using a fixed logit model leads to a correlation 
between the country-specific dummy and the financial crisis dummy, which requires the estimation to eliminate 
the countries without experiencing banking crises. This generates a biased sample, since a large number of 
countries are excluded. My study also has this problem that a correlation between the bank-specific dummy and 
the bank failure dummy (in other words, dependent variable ity  does not change over time, including no 
information for estimating coefficients, see Wooldridge, 2010, p622) excludes a large number of individual 
living banks, leading to a biased sample when using a fixed logit model. However, the transformation of a logit 
model with random effects can capture unobserved individual heterogeneity (“random logit model allows us to 
compute partial effects for different individuals as described by the heterogeneity…, all we can really do is 
estimate the partial effects for different values of heterogeneity” see Wooldridge, 2010, pp614-619). Moreover, 
Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998,1999) also used a logit model with random effects to estimate banking 
crises. Therefore, we believe that the estimation with a full sample by using a logit model with random effects is 
reasonable. 
63
 Davis and Karim (2008) and Riportella et al. (2010) point out that the probit model is equally valid in the 
context of estimating bank failure. Thus, we also estimated the causes of bank failure using a multivariate probit 
model. The results do not suggest any significant differences compared with the logit model. Thus, we only 
present the estimation based on a multivariate logit model.  
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The probability of bank failure dummy variables depends on estimated variables using a 
logistic cumulative distribution. Thus, 
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where, 
ity  is a bank failure dummy variable for bank i at time t. 
j=0 or 1: y=1donotes bank failure and y=0 denotes living bank. 
)F( itX is the logistic cumulative distribution function. 
itX  is a vector of explanatory variables. 
 is a vector of coefficients and can be estimated by a maximum likelihood function. 
The possible values of y (0 or 1) contribute to the joint likelihood function, thus, a log- 
likelihood function is shown: 
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where, 
LnL is a natural log likelihood function. 
i=1….N, is the number of individual banks. 
T=1999,…, 2008, is the year. 
The right-hand-side depends on the logistic cumulative distribution function, thus, the 
coefficient   does not suggest a change of the probability of bank failure in response to a 
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unit change of independent variables. To find the marginal effect of independent variables on 
the probability of bank failure P(y=1|X), the mathematic calculus is shown: 
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In the logit case, the cumulative distribution is an increasing function, thus, 
jdx
XdF )( '
 is 
positive, which suggests that the sign of the marginal effect depends on the j . In this study, 
we report the coefficients of the marginal effect of the explanatory variables.  
 
5.3.2 Overall Model Performance  
 
According to Amemiya (1981), three criteria are indicated to evaluate overall model 
performance: Model Chi-square (Model 2 ), Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) and the 
prediction accuracy. First, Model Chi-square is to test whether the joint coefficients of 
independent variables are equal to zero. The null hypothesis is that the coefficients are jointly 
equal to zero. If the Chi-square statistic is more than the critical value, given the degree of 
freedom, we can reject the null hypothesis. Second, the AIC is defined as the sum of the 
log-likelihood of the model and the number of estimated variables. The smaller the value of 
AIC, the better the overall model performance is presented. Third, calculating the predicted 
accuracy depends on the estimated probability of bank failure. We present the total percentage 
of observations that are correctly classified. The Percentage of Correct Predictions (PCP) is 
generated by comparing the predicted probability with the observed probability of bank 
failure. Thus, PCP reflects the goodness-of-fit of models. 
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5.3.3 Data Selection  
 
The criteria are employed to generate the sample. First, we restrict the sample period from 
1999 to 2008 to investigate the reasons for bank failure, since we are interested in the factors 
involved in bankruptcy after 2000, particularly for the recent banking crisis, owing to the 
large amount of complicated financial products used post-2000
64
, which has a significant 
impact on bank performance. Second, living banks must be alive during the entire period 
(1999-2009), and if any banks were bankrupt at any time during the period (2000-2009) they 
are indicated as failed banks
65
. The sample used in this study is unbalanced panel data, which 
might miss some observations for individual banks. Table 5-2 reports the observed number of 
banks in each country, including both living banks and failed banks.  
 
        Table 5-2 The Numbers of Banks in Sample Countries  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
64 The sample countries follow the previous chapter: France, Germany and the UK are representatives for the EU; 
Switzerland as a European country is a representative for outside the EU; Canada and the US are representatives for North 
America. The Gramm-Leach Bliley Act was proposed in 1999, which removed barriers in the US financial markets between 
commercial banks and investment banks, so the amount of non-traditional activities significantly increased from1999 
onwards. Thus we can consider these sample countries as a whole, especially regarding non-traditional activities. For the 
statistics of the size of the derivative market, please see http://www.bis.org/statistics/derstats.htm. 
65 The failed bank in this chapter is defined as bankruptcy, in liquidation or in dissolved situation based on the definition 
provided by Bankscope. The list of failed banks in each country is shown in Appendix 6.  
Country No. of living bank No. of failure bank Total 
France 70 27 97 
Germany 65 27 92 
Canada  27 17 44 
Switzerland  49 16 65 
The UK 39 40 79 
The US 64 36 100 
Total 314 163 477 
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5.3.4 The Choice of Explanatory Variables 
 
The GH model (1999) shows the role of important factors, including bank profitability, capital 
adequacy and bank risk-taking in determining bank failure, and bank risk-taking is 
conditioned by macro-variables. Therefore, it attempts to integrate bank- and macro-level 
variables to examine bank distress. However, the GH model does not consider the effect of 
bank diversification, which is a significant change in bank behaviour that has an impact on 
bank performance, so it is not applicable in the context of the recent financial crisis, which 
was mainly affected by the employment of non-traditional activities. In addition, considering 
the policy of TBTF, the effect of bank size under TBTF has been reviewed in the previous 
chapter in the context of the interbank markets, suggesting that large banks are associated 
with a higher risk level. Thus, in this chapter, we modify the GH model considering product 
diversification and bank size effect to investigate the factors affecting the probability of bank 
failure. Therefore, the explanatory variables in this study can be arranged into four categories: 
Bank risk-taking (RISK), Macro-variables and Regulation (MV&RG), Bank specific 
variables (BS) and Bank diversification (BD).  
 
 
 
(1) Variables of Fundamental Risk-taking (RISK) 
Recalling Eqs.5-1 and 5-2 suggested by the GH model (1999), RISK consists of liquidity risk, 
default risk and interest rate risk. InterR is a proxy of real interest rate risk, which is defined 
as the difference between the interbank rate (one-year)
66
 and the change of the Consumer 
Price Index (CPI) according to the GH model. They are chosen from Datastream and 
international financial statistics (IMF). Generally, a higher level interbank rate increases bank 
sensitivity to macroeconomic shocks. In addition, Nys (2003), Panetta, Schivardi and Shum 
                                                        
66 Treasury bill rate (one-year) is used for the US due to data availability. 
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(2004) and Banal-Estonol and Ottaviani (2007) point out that the interbank market rate can be 
a measure of the marginal costs of interbank lending. An increase in interbank rates leads to a 
higher level of lending costs and reflects market attitude towards problematic banks. Thus, the 
sign of interest rate risk is expected to be positive. 
 
CredR (z-score) is a proxy of default risk, which is defined as the sum of return-on-assets and 
equity ratio divided by the standard deviation of return-on-assets for an individual bank 
(calculated over the sample period for each bank)
67
. Data are chosen from Bankscope. 
According to the studies of Erel (2005), Focarelli and Panetta (2002) and Sapienza (2002), the 
loan loss provision ratio is a backward-looking measure of credit risk, which can be used to 
support other measurements, such as the non-performing loan ratio. However, using a 
historical loss rate as a measure is not appropriate in downturns, where the loss rate might be 
overestimated and hence cannot precisely reflect the economic situation (Beatty and Liao, 
2009). Moreover, using the loan loss provision ratio as a measure of credit risk may lead to a 
biased result, particularly in a recession, where banks are more sensitive to the losses. 
Therefore, z-score has been broadly applied in recent banking studies (see Lepetit et al., 
2008a; Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2009; Michalak and Uhde, 2009; Strobel, 2011). Since 
this study concentrates on bank failure in the context of the recent financial crisis, we use a 
z-score as a proxy of credit risk. Z-score is expected to be negatively related to the probability 
of bank failure. This is because an increase in bank profits and equity ratio or a decline in the 
standard deviation of bank profits indicates a lower default risk, which would reduce the 
probability of bank failure. 
 
                                                        
67 The z-score used here is a cross-sectional measurement; However, Lepetit and Strobel (2013) provide time-varying z-score 
measures, which could be subjected to my future research.  
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LiqiR is a proxy of liquidity risk, which is defined as the ratio of liquidity assets to total bank 
assets. Data are chosen from Bankscope. The liquidity assets include trading securities, at fair 
value through income, cash and due from bank, and loan and advances to banks. The greater 
the liquidity assets, the greater probability that banks can survive in the event of unexpected 
withdrawals. Nevertheless, inefficient bank management of liquidity assets may increase 
operational costs, which has a negative impact on bank performance. Thus, the liquidity ratio 
is expected to be either negative or positive. 
 
(2) Bank diversification (BD) 
In this chapter, we modify the GH model, considering the effect of changes in bank behaviour 
on the probability of bank failure. NII is a measure of the shift towards non-traditional bank 
activities, which is defined as non-interest income to total operating income, according to 
Calmes and Theoret (2010), Stiroh (2006), Stiroh and Rumble (2006) and Stiroh (2004). They 
suggest that a higher level of bank diversification (product diversification) increases the level 
of risk-taking and reduces the profitability of banks. My empirical results in Chapter 2 
suggested that the diversification of bank activities has a negative impact on bank profitability. 
Data are chosen from Bankscope 
 
(3) Bank specific variables (BS) 
Based on the GH model (1999), ROA (return on assets) is a measure of bank profitability, 
which is defined as profit-before-tax to total assets. Data are chosen from Bankscope. The GH 
model suggests that the probability of bank failure depends on bank profitability and the sign 
of ROA is expected to be negative, which is straightforward. 
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As this study aims to investigate individual bank failure, the difference between large and 
small banks should be included, considering TBTF. The bank size effect has been found for 
large banks in the context of interbank lending, as shown in Chapter 3. Size is defined as a 
log-transformation of bank assets. Data are chosen from Bankscope. To some extent, the 
policy of TBTF appeared in all countries, according to Heffernan (2005, p395), particularly in 
the US, for example, the case of Continental Illinois in 1984
68
. Stiroh and Rumble (2006) 
suggest that regulators and governments have been concerned about the cost of bankruptcy. If 
a bank fails, the loss value of assets, the cost of searching for new management and the cost 
for shareholders and customers are considerable, especially for large sized banks. The purpose 
of bail-out for big banks is to protect the banking system against higher volatility resulting 
from individual large bank failure. Therefore, we expect that the bank size has a significant 
impact on the probability of bank failure. 
 
(4) Macro-variables and Regulation (MVRE) 
Based on the implications of the GH model, the probability of bank failure depends on 
macro-economic shocks. Since this study mainly focuses on bank failure up to the recent 
financial crisis related to the housing market. Thus, besides the GDP growth rate, we take the 
housing market index into consideration. REPI is the real estate price index, which is a 
measure of the house prices for all countries other than the US, where the purchase price 
index of existing home with mortgage is used because of data availability. Data are chosen 
from Datastream. As suggested by Barrell et al. (2010) and Beltratti and Morana (2009), a 
rapid increase in housing prices indicates a higher potential risk of mortgages related to the 
house market bubble. Once the bubble bursts, this may lead to numerous defaults on bank 
                                                        
68 Continental Illinois was renamed Continental Bank, and was nationalization in 1984. The US government gradually 
released control of Continental Bank, until 1991, when the process was completed. 
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mortgages, which in turn significantly increases the probability of bank failure. Particularly in 
the recent financial crisis of 2007-08, housing prices played an important role in determining 
the scenario of bank failure. Therefore, this offers an intuition that we can split the entire 
period and investigate the specific effect of the housing market on bank failure in terms of the 
lead-up to the crisis and the crisis period. 
  
GDP is the GDP growth rate, which is defined as GDP in the year t minus GDP in t-1 divided 
by the value of GDP in t-1. Data are chosen from international financial statistics (IMF). As a 
traditional indicator of the economy, GDP is used in many studies (see Demirguc-Kunt and 
Detragiache, 1998, 1999; Hutchinson and Mc-Dill, 1999; Davis and Karim, 2008; Liadze et 
al., 2010). The better the macroeconomic performance, the lower the probability of bank 
failure. Thus, the sign of the GDP growth rate is expected to be negative. 
 
Regarding capital regulation, the GH model explicitly suggests that capital adequacy has a 
significant impact on bank failure. CapiR is a measure of the capitalisation of banks, which is 
defined as total regulatory capital to total bank assets. A higher level of capital ratio can 
increase banks’ incentive to engage in prudent activities, which in turn reduces the probability 
of bank failure. However, some economists (see Hovkimian and Kane, 2000; Barth et al, 2001, 
2004) imply the inefficiency of capital regulation in controlling for bank risk-taking. A higher 
level of regulatory capital may increase the amount of non-performing loans and this, in turn, 
increases the probability of bank failure, since in order to offset regulatory costs, banks are 
inclined to operate activities associated with a higher level of risk-taking to obtain higher 
profits. Thus, the sign is to be either positive or negative. 
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(5) Country-specific effect 
As this study includes countries from the EU, outside the EU but in Europe, and North 
America, considering the fundamental differences in banking systems and market structures, 
we try to capture the country-specific effect using interaction variables and country dummies. 
C_Dummy is country dummy variables to capture the country specific effect. The value is 
equal to 1 for a certain country, 0 otherwise, taking Canada as a base . 
C_Vari is interaction variables in terms of individual countries. Considering the country- 
specific effect of bank-level explanatory variables on the probability of bank failure, 
interaction variables are used in this study. This is defined as the original values of the 
explanatory variables multiplied by 1 for a certain country, 0 otherwise. Table 5-3 shows a 
summary description of all variables 
 
Table 5-4 reports the statistics of the bank specific explanatory variables for both living banks 
and failed banks in terms of each country. Generally, taking the mean values into 
consideration, failed banks are associated with a higher level of credit risk and a lower level 
of ROA and capital ratio compared with living banks, which is consistent with the GH model. 
We also note that failed banks are accompanied by a higher level of liquid assets, suggesting a 
higher level of operational costs due to inefficient liquidity management. However, we cannot 
identify any significant difference between living banks and failed banks in terms of bank size. 
Table 5-5 shows the matrices of correlation among bank-level variables. 
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Table 5-3 A Description of Variables 
Variables Symbols Descriptions Sources 
Dependent variable y It is equal to 1 that indicates a bank 
failure; and zero indicates a living bank 
during sample time. 
    ---- 
    
RISK InterR It is defined as the difference between 
the interbank rate (1-year) and the 
change of CPI. 
Datastream; 
International financial 
statistics; Author’s 
calculation 
 CredR It is called z-score, and is defined as 
the sum of return-on-asset and equity 
ratio divided by the standard deviation 
of return-on-asset of each individual 
bank. 
 
Bankscope;  
Author’s calculation 
 LiqiR It is defined as the ratio of liquidity 
assets to total bank assets. 
Bankscope; 
Author’s calculation 
BD NII It is defined as the ratio of non-interest 
income to total operating income. 
 
Bankscope;  
Author’s calculation 
BS ROA It is defined as the ratio of 
profit-before-tax to total assets. 
 
Bankscope; 
Author’s calculation 
 Size It is defined as a log-transformation of 
bank assets. 
Bankscope; 
Author’s calculation 
 
MV&RE REPI Real estate price index for sample 
countries; the purchase price index of 
existing home with mortgage for the 
US 
 
Datastream 
 GDP It is defined as GDP in this year minus 
GDP in the last year divided by the 
value of GDP in the last year. 
International financial 
statistics; 
Author’s calculation 
 CapiR It is defined as the total regulatory 
capital to total bank assets. 
 
Bankscope 
Country specific 
effect 
C_Dummy Country-specific dummy variables. 
 
Author’s calculation 
 C_Vari Country-specific interaction variables 
in terms of bank specific explanatory 
variables. 
Author’s calculation 
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Table 5-4 Statistics of Bank Specific Variables in Sample Countries 
 Failed banks  Living banks  
France Mean Max Min Mean Max Min 
CredR 0.196 1.629 -0.141 0.270 2.235 -0.065 
LiqiR 34.60 100.0 0.000 22.10 100.0 0.000 
NII 55.50 90.00 -133.3 66.50 125.0 -160.8 
ROA 1.022 10.00 -8.930 2.346 47.00 -13.10 
SIZE 3.382 5.450 1.204 3.386 5.824 0.903 
CapiR 11.15 95.68 0.080 14.72 98.90 -4.130 
 Failed banks  Living banks  
Germany Mean Max Min Mean Max Min 
CredR 0.106 1.657 -0.076 0.138 1.518 0.019 
LiqiR 25.60 95.50 2.20 17.50 98.60 0.000 
NII 4.400 133.3 -32.5 31.10 239.2 -106.2 
ROA -1.15 7.550 -12.73 0.462 8.570 -30.77 
SIZE 2.989 4.480 1.146 2.700 4.372 1.113 
CapiR 8.300 94.23 0.160 10.16 97.84 0.230 
 Failed banks  Living banks  
Canada Mean Max Min Mean Max Min 
CredR 0.228 1.161 0.026 0.242 1.785 -0.096 
LiqiR 16.10 61.70 0.000 12.80 51.50 0.000 
NII 19.40 61.30 0.000 31.00 180.0 -57.00 
ROA 1.179 36.62 -0.41 1.568 25.73 -6.46 
SIZE 2.385 4.936 1.342 3.176 5.385 1.146 
CapiR 12.32 36.04 1.000 13.78 94.86 0.28 
             Failed banks  Living banks  
Switzerland Mean Max Min Mean Max Min 
CredR 0.169 1.545 -0.165 0.363 1.80 -1.321 
LiqiR 44.70 99.20 4.200 39.60 99.10 0.000 
NII -78.20 111.2 -338.8 56.80 175.0 -130.0 
ROA 0.119 12.28 -24.00 2.299 75.98 -56.39 
SIZE 3.720 5.691 1.875 2.568 5.804 0.698 
CapiR 10.45 93.26 -4.630 20.66 94.00 -27.12 
 Failed banks  Living banks  
The UK Mean Max Min Mean Max Min 
CredR 0.213 1.932 0.007 0.664 2.068 -0.168 
LiqiR 17.30 94.60 0.000 29.80 100.0 -181.1 
NII 32.50 125.0 -350.0 86.80 246.7 -180.0 
ROA 0.725 36.78 -41.42 2.020 48.00 -67.94 
SIZE 2.644 5.661 2.389 2.776 5.680 0.301 
CapiR 12.64 98.49 0.360 39.97 100.0 -7.160 
 Failed banks  Living banks  
The US Mean Max Min Mean Max Min 
CredR 0.255 3.452 -28.32 0.388 5.204 -0.306 
LiqiR 19.60 100.0 0.000 9.200 100.0 0.000 
NII 42.20 133.3 -55.50 20.10 101.4 -366.6 
ROA -3.421 118.0 -180.0 8.966 320.0 -54.48 
SIZE 2.936 5.539 0.000 2.264 4.499 0.301 
CapiR 19.43 100.0 4.440 15.47 100.0 -1.500 
Notes: CredR: Credit risk; LiqiR: Liquidity risk; NII: the ratio of non-interest income to 
total operating income; ROA: Return on assets; SIZE: a log-transformation of bank assets; 
CapiR: Total regulatory capital ratio. 
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Table 5-5 The Matrices of Correlation among Bank-level Variables 
 CredR LiqiR SIZE NII ROA CapiR 
CredR 1.000      
LiqiR 0.105 1.000     
SIZE -0.123 0.005 1.000    
NII 0.019 0.020 0.026 1.000   
ROA 0.596 0.051 -0.034 0.010 1.000  
CapiR 0.381 0.198 -0.318 0.036 0.096 1.000 
Note: CredR: Credit risk; LiqiR: Liquidity risk; NII: the ratio of non-interest income to total operating 
income; ROA: Return on assets; SIZE: a log-transformation of bank assets; CapiR: total regulatory 
capital ratio. 
 
 
5.4 Results and Analyses of Empirical Work 
5.4.1 Basic Model  
 
Since this study is mainly interested in the causes of bank failure in the context of the recent 
banking crisis in 2007-08, we tend to estimate empirically based on two sub-periods: 
1999-2005 and 2006 -2008
69
; prior to the main estimation, we use the Chow test (1960) to 
identify whether there is a break within the sample period. The statistic of the Chow test is 
F(10, 3489)=29.22, which is more than the critical value (2.34) at the 1% significant level. 
Thus, we can reject the null hypothesis, in other words, there is a break within the whole 
period (1999-2005 and 2006-2008), so that we can investigate the causes of bank failure in 
terms of these two sub-periods. 
 
Table 5-6 shows the empirical results and overall model performance using a logit model in 
two sub-periods. Regarding RISK, z-score is a composite indicator of credit risk and has a 
significant and negative effect on the probability of bank failure in all estimations. This result 
is consistent with the implication of the GH model (1999), which suggests that a higher credit 
risk of banks usually stems from the default of borrowers, who are not able to repay owing to 
macroeconomic shocks; or are not willing (but are able) to repay lending, which may result 
                                                        
69 The failed time of banks for the first sub-period is from 2000 to 2006, and for the second sub-period it is from 2007 to 
2009. 
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from inefficient credit risk management. Thus, higher credit risk leads to a higher probability 
of bank failure.  
 
The liquidity ratio as a measure of the liquidity assets is positive and significant in the 
estimation in the earlier sub-period. This result is contrary to the implications of 
Gonzalez-Hermosillo’s (1999) theoretical work and the empirical findings of Demirguc-Kunt 
and Detragiache (1998), Logan (2000) and Heffernan (2003), suggesting that depositors have 
less confidence in bank performance, which triggers a bank run, particularly for banks with 
lower liquidity assets. This may further lead to a bank panic, as depositors doubt the 
repayment ability of other banks, considering asymmetric information. One possible 
explanation for my result is that inefficient liquidity management generates a higher level of 
operational costs, which is a reason for bankruptcy (Heffernan, 2005). 
 
Regarding bank specific variables (BS), return-on-assets (ROA) as a measure of bank 
profitability is significant and negative in all estimations, which is consistent with the 
implications of Gonzalez-Hermosillo’s (1999) theoretical work and the empirical findings of 
Logan (2000) and Heffernan (2003). The explanation is straightforward: a higher level of 
ROA increases bank profitability against potential risk-taking, which in turn reduces the 
probability of bank failure. In addition, the size effect is positive and significant in the 
estimations with the sub-period of 2006-2008, which is contrary to the findings of 
Gonzalez-Hermosillo (1999), Heffernan (2003) and Carling et al. (2004). The result fails to 
indicate “too big to fail”; in contrast, large banks are associated with a higher probability of 
bank failure. This can be interpreted by the view that because of the advantages (information 
availability, advanced technology and operating experiences) of large banks, they have more 
 185 
opportunities to be involved in risky activities than small banks, particularly non-traditional 
banking activities, which may increase the volatility of bank profits (Deyoung and Roland, 
2001; Stiroh, 2004; Stiroh and Rumble, 2006). In the second sub-period (during the crisis), 
governments allowed problematic large banks to fail, i.e., Bear Stearns and Lehman, since the 
funding requirement for rescuing large banks is huge, which is consistent with the argument 
of “too big to save” (Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2011).  
As concerns macro-variables and capital regulation (MV&RG), the significant coefficients of 
housing prices are found in all estimations. However, they vary in terms of different 
sub-periods. A positive result is indicated in the sub-period 1999-2005, which is consistent 
with Barrell et al. (2010) and Beltratti and Morana (2009). A rapid increase in housing prices 
indicates a housing market bubble and leads to potential higher risk-taking of banks with the 
large amounts of mortgage loans, which in turn increases the probability of bank failure. On 
the other hand, the negative result in the estimations of the later sub-period (2006-2008) 
suggests that, once the bubble bursts, banks cannot receive the re-payment of mortgage loans, 
particularly derivative markets, where large numbers of financial products with mortgage 
loans, i.e., CDS and CDO, default. As a result, the probability of bank failure increases, which 
is consistent with the scenario of the developed financial markets in 2007-08. These two 
different results in terms of housing prices can be used to support the argument of Reinhart 
and Rogoff (2008) that housing prices increase prior to a banking crisis, while the bubble 
bursts during the crisis. However, we do not find any significant coefficients of GDP growth 
rate in all estimations, which indicates that the economic situation, in terms of international 
trade, national income, consumption and spending, may have no impact on the probability of 
bank failure; instead, housing prices play an important role in determining the probability of 
bank failure occurring after 2000, particularly during the recent financial crisis. 
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The coefficients of capital ratio are positive and significant in all estimations, which is 
contrary to the implication of the GH model, but does follow the implications of the 
theoretical work of Kim and Santomero (1988), Koehn and Santomero (1980), Rochet (1992) 
and Demsetz and Strahan (1997). They suggest that, given a serious capital requirement, 
banks are inclined to operate risky activities associated with a higher level of profits in order 
to offset the regulatory costs, which increases the probability of bank failure. This result is 
also consistent with the empirical findings of Hovkimian and Kane (2000) and Barth et al. 
(2001, 2004). We do not find any significant parameters of interest rate risk and non-interest 
income share in all estimations, thus, we may try to control for the country specific effect in 
terms of these variables, using the interaction variables.  
 
As concerns overall model performance, Model Chi-square values are more than the critical 
value at the 1% significant level for all estimations, so we can reject the null hypothesis, 
which indicates that the estimated variables are not jointly equal to zero. In other words, 
employing these explanatory variables is reasonable. The overall model performance is better 
in the case of the earlier sub-period, owing to a lower AIC. To address the prediction accuracy 
of the logit model, the percentages of correct predications (PCP) are reported. All values of 
PCP imply that over 90% of samples are correctly classified. Therefore, these models perform 
well in general.  
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  Table 5-6 Results of Basic Models in Two Sub-periods 
Dependent variable: 
Banking crisis dummy 
1999-2005 2006-2008 
InterR 0.234 
[1.20] 
-0.148 
[-1.23] 
Cred -7.928*** 
[-9.77] 
-11.41*** 
[-14.69] 
LiqiR 4.141*** 
[3.82] 
1.24 
[1.43] 
NII -0.041 
[-0.49] 
-0.022 
[-0.32] 
ROA -0.075*** 
[-9.08] 
-2.018*** 
[-14.68] 
CapiR 0.055** 
[2.70] 
1.74*** 
[11.55] 
Size -0.468 
[-1.57] 
0.348** 
[2.14] 
REPI 0.013** 
[2.36] 
-0.005** 
[-2.67] 
GDP 
 
0.14 
[0.84] 
-0.056 
[-0.52] 
Constant -0.808 
[-0.50] 
-2.33** 
[-2.62] 
Diagnostics    
Total observations 2321 1188 
Model Chi-square (9) 76.43*** 34.88*** 
AIC -470.65 -249 
PCP 92.96% 91.34% 
Notes: InterR indicates interest rate risk; CredR indicates credit risk; LiqiR indicates liquidity 
risk; NII is non-interest income share; ROA is asset on return; CapiR is regulatory capital ratio; 
Size is a log-transformation of bank assets; REPI is housing price index; GDP is GDP growth 
rate. AIC is Akaike’s Information Criterion; PCP is the Percentage of Correct Predictions; *, **, 
*** indicates that coefficients are significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% significant level, 
respectively; t-statistics are in []. 
 
 
 
 
5.4.2 Extended Model with Country Dummies and Interaction Variables 
 
Because of fundamental differences in banking structures and financial regulation across 
countries, we take country dummy variables into consideration, and we also use interaction  
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variables of non-interest income ratio, controlling for the country specific effect
70
. Table 5-7 
shows the results of the estimations. The results of the Wald test Chi-square (6) show that we 
can reject the null hypothesis that all coefficients of interaction variables of non-interest 
income share are jointly equal to 0; thus, we use these variables in the estimations.   
 
Based on the country dummy variables, a higher probability of bank failure is indicated in the 
US, especially in the later sub-period 2006-08; Overall, the magnitude of the coefficients for 
country dummies is higher during 2006-08 compared with the earlier sub-period, which 
indicates that the likelihood of bank failure is higher in the later sub-period; this result is 
consistent with the scenario of the recent financial crisis, which is the largest, including 
numerous major bank failures in developed countries, since World War II (Reinhart and 
Rogoff , 2008).   
 
Regarding the interaction variables of non-interest income, the significant coefficients go in 
the opposite directions. Specifically, a negative result is found in the estimations of the UK, 
Switzerland (in the later sub-period) and Canada (in the earlier sub-period), while a positive 
coefficient is found in the estimations of the US. The negative result is consistent with the 
findings of Chiorzazzo et al. (2008), Baele et al. (2007) and Davis and Tuori (2000), who 
suggest that the shift towards non-traditional businesses may enhance bank performance, as 
an increase in non-traditional banking activities provides a function of risk-sharing and 
augments the risk-adjusted return. Moreover, a higher level of non-interest income can offset 
                                                        
70 In this extended model, we should use interaction variables for insignificant coefficients of independent variables in the 
basic model to control for the country specific effect. Specifically, we used the interaction variables for interest rate risk, bank 
size and non-interest income share in the extended model with the earlier sub-period; and we used interaction variables for 
interest rate risk, liquidity risk and non-interest income share in the extended model with the later sub-period. However, the 
statistics of the Wald test in terms of these interaction variables are smaller (Chi-square (18) is 12.89 in the extended model 
with the earlier sub-period; and Chi-square (18) is equal to 18.56 in the extended model with the later sub-period) than the 
critical value at the 1% significant level, thus, we accepted the null hypothesis is that the coefficients of these interaction 
variables are jointly equal to 0. The results of the Wald test suggest that we should use the interaction variables of 
non-interest income ratio in the extended models. 
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losses from traditional banking activities; however, the positive result implies that a large 
involvement in non-traditional activities increases the probability of bank failure in the US, 
which is consistent with the findings of Calmes and Theoret (2010), Stiroh (2006), Stiroh and 
Rumble (2006) and Stiroh (2004). Considering the US banks, they point out that a large 
number of small banks dominates the US financial market, so bank diversification associated 
with a risky product line has a negative impact on bank performance owing to less managerial 
experience of operating non-traditional activities (an increase in operational costs, i.e., 
switching costs and information costs), which in turn increases the probability of bank failure. 
Generally, the differences in the structure of financial markets, regulation and supervision 
may contribute to these various results. 
 
As concerns overall model performance, model Chi-square values are large enough to reject 
the null hypothesis at the 1% significant level for all estimations, which suggests that the 
estimated variables are not jointly equal to zero. All of the values of AIC are lower than that in 
the basic models, which imply that including dummy variables and interaction variables can 
improve model performance. The percentages of correct prediction are slightly higher than in 
the basic models.  
 
Basically, the empirical results are following the implications of the modified GH model, 
especially in terms of the significant effect of non-interest income ratio after controlling for 
the country specific effect. The results also suggest that the importance of bank profitability, 
liquidity and capital adequacy in determining the probability of bank failure. The negative 
effect of bank risk-taking, bank size and capital ratio may result from asymmetric information 
and moral hazard, which do not only exist in the banking sector but also in the rest of the 
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economy, such as shareholders, depositors and borrowers (Heffernan, 2003). In addition, the 
results in terms of the two sub-periods provide evidence on the importance of the housing 
price index, suggesting that housing prices increase prior to the banking crisis, while they fall 
during the crisis leading to numerous defaults on bank mortgage loans in derivative markets, 
which is consistent with the argument of Reinhart and Rogoff (2008). The role of GDP as a 
traditional macroeconomic indicator has been replaced by the housing price index in 
determining bank failure, at least during the recent financial crisis.  
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Table 5-7 Results of Extended Models in Two Sub-periods 
Dependent variable: 
Banking crisis dummy 
1999-2005 2006-2008 
InterR 0.133 
[1.01] 
0.217 
[0.97] 
Cred -0.01*** 
[-4.08] 
-10.98*** 
[-14.78] 
LiqiR 5.559*** 
[4.15] 
3.12** 
[2.85] 
NII ---- ---- 
ROA -0.07 
[-0.37] 
-1.94*** 
[-14.76] 
CapiR -0.011 
[-1.19] 
1.64*** 
[11.10] 
Size 1.147*** 
[5.51] 
0.55** 
[2.45] 
REPI -0.01 
[-1.63] 
-0.023*** 
[-5.08] 
GDP 0.04 
 [0.31] 
-0.164 
[-1.05] 
Constant -5.46*** 
[-4.9] 
-2.78** 
[-1.99] 
C_US 6.10*** 
[4.35] 
19.30*** 
[3.18] 
C_UK 5.05*** 
[3.70] 
6.67*** 
[3.18] 
C_GER 2.70** 
[2.17] 
-1.34 
[-0.74] 
C_FRA 2.34** 
[2.00] 
4.39** 
[2.07] 
C_SWI 3.43** 
[2.48] 
6.12** 
[2.59] 
USNii 4.33*** 
[3.29] 
5.26*** 
[3.50] 
UKNii -0.56* 
[-1.67] 
-3.33*** 
[-3.41] 
GERNii -0.07 
[-0.34] 
-2.78 
[-0.78] 
FRANii 0.042 
[0.27] 
0.098 
[0.20] 
SWINii 0.141 
[0.29] 
-1.30* 
[-1.65] 
CANNii 
 
-4.51* 
[-1.81] 
-1.33 
[-0.65] 
Diagnostics    
Total observations 2384 1210 
Wald test Chi(6) 56.78*** 30.45*** 
Model Chi-square (19) 93.89*** 112*** 
AIC -464.57 -163 
PCP 93.62% 92.33% 
Notes: InterR indicates interest rate risk; CredR indicates credit risk; LiqiR indicates liquidity 
risk;NII is non-interest income share; ROA is asset on return; CapiR is regulatory capital ratio; 
Size is a log-transformation of bank assets; REPI is housing price index; GDP is GDP growth 
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5.5 Conclusions 
 
Previous empirical studies were restricted to the investigation of banking crises using 
country-level data. Few have provided evidence for the causes of individual bankruptcy in the 
context of the recent financial crisis. Therefore, this chapter investigated the factors including 
RISK (three fundamental risk-taking), bank specific variables (bank profitability and bank 
size), product diversification, and macro-variables and regulation, based on the modified GH 
model considering changes in bank behaviour and the size effect. Basically, the results show 
that these factors play an important role in determining the likelihood of bank failure since 
2000. Regarding RISK, we notice that a higher probability of bank failure is induced by a 
higher level of liquidity assets; this is contrary to the implications of previous works, but 
suggests higher operational costs of managing liquidity owing to inefficient bank 
management. 
 
Regarding bank specific variables, the effect of “too big to fail” cannot be identified, which 
reflects potential huge costs saving for governments, taking the recent financial crisis into 
consideration. Although central banks try to make TBTF ambiguous, it is easy for banks to 
analyse which banks will be protected; this in turn generates moral hazard (Heffernan, 2003). 
Thus, central banks may need to allow large banks to fail in order to save social costs to 
taxpayers. 
 
Regarding the macroeconomic indicators, the GDP growth rate has an insignificant effect on 
rate. AIC is Akaike’s Information Criterion; PCP is the Percentage of Correct Predictions; 
C_Dummy denotes country dummy variables; C_Nii denotes country specific interaction 
variables in terms of Non-interest income share; *, **, *** indicates that coefficients are 
significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% significant level, respectively; t-statistics are in []. 
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the probability of bank failure; instead, the housing price index presents a significant effect on 
bank failure. The opposite coefficients in terms of two sub-periods imply the different roles of 
housing prices in determining the probability of bank failure. A rapid increase in housing 
prices in the run-up to the financial crisis reflects a house market bubble, which augments the 
risk level of banks associated with mortgage loans; when the bubble bursts in the second 
sub-period, it leads to the default of subprime and mortgages. Therefore, these results show a 
complete picture of the effect of changes in housing prices on the probability of bank failure, 
which is consistent with the argument of Reinhart and Rogoff (2008). Regarding bank 
regulation, the results of the capital ratio indicate that some banks may be harmed by capital 
regulation, since they prefer holding risky assets to offset regulatory costs. Hence, financial 
policy regarding capital requirement in different sample countries should consider ways in 
which to protect fragile banks and at the same time avoid a consequence form moral hazard. 
 
As regards the country specific effect, a higher probability of bank failure is presented in the 
US, particularly in the later sub-period 2006-08, which is consistent with the scenario of the 
recent financial crisis that initially stemmed from the collapse of mortgage loans in the US 
financial market. After controlling for the country specific effect, the opposite significant 
coefficients of interaction variables in terms of non-interest income are found in determining 
the probability of bank failure. Specifically, the employment of non-traditional activities 
increases the probability of bank failure in the US, this may follow the implication of Stiroh 
(2006), Stiroh and Rumble (2006) and Stiroh (2004) suggesting non-traditional activities 
associated with higher risk-taking; while it reduces the possibility of bank failure in the UK 
(both two sub-periods), Switzerland (the later sub-period) and Canada (the earlier sub-period). 
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                       CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 
This thesis has investigated bank behaviour up to the 2007-08 global financial crisis in the 
developed countries of Europe and North America, using four studies with empirical 
estimations. The first three studies concentrate on off-balance-sheet activities and loans, 
interbank lending and interest margins, and the last identifies the causes of bank failure. In 
this chapter, we provide a summary of the empirical results, along with contributions and 
limitations of this research, and discuss the future research.  
 
6.1 Answers to Study Questions and Contributions  
 
Revisiting the study questions proposed in the Introduction, we can summarise the answers 
using the empirical results found in the previous four chapters and show the contributions of 
this set of studies. 
 
 What is the effect of off-balance-sheet activities on bank performance and why, and what 
makes up an optimal bank portfolio including traditional activities and off-balance-sheet 
items? 
In Chapter 2, we investigate the effect of off-balance-sheet items and traditional activities, i.e., 
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loans, on bank profitability, taking the recent financial crisis into consideration. We firstly use 
standard portfolio theory (Stiroh and Rumble, 2006; Stiroh, 2006) as a basis to investigate 
bank diversified gains: the negative results of the non-interest income ratio suggest that the 
diversified gain is reduced if there is a positive correlation between interest income and 
non-interest income owing to the cross-selling of financial products. Then we consider a 
framework for the shift of OBSs in a bank portfolio, given a fixed capacity of bank activities 
in the three sub-periods (1996-2000; 2001-2006 and 2007). The implication of this framework 
is that, considering credit rationing for loans
71
, banks prefer holding more OBSs in order to 
make higher profits post-2000. However, the negative result of OBSs on bank profitability is 
not consistent with this implication and potentially suggests that idiosyncratic risk can be 
diversified, but the overall portfolio risk is higher and cannot be diversified. In addition, we 
present a framework of changes in the capacity of a bank portfolio including both OBSs and 
traditional activities, i.e., loans, in the three sub-periods. In regard to this framework, four 
cases are discussed, taking the situation in 1996-2000 as a base. In the sub-periods 2001-2006 
and 2007, regarding the capacity of bank activities: first, both OBSs and loans shift in the 
same proportion, suggesting an increase in the loans’ proportion in a bank portfolio, leading to 
a higher expected bank return in equilibrium; second, loans shift more than OBSs, suggesting 
an increase in loans in a portfolio, leading to a higher expected return in equilibrium
72
; third, 
OBSs shift more than loans, suggesting a higher proportion of OBSs and lower proportion of 
loans in a bank portfolio, leading to a lower expected return in equilibrium; and fourth, OBSs 
shift up but loans shift down, suggesting a higher proportion of OBSs and low proportion of 
loans in a bank portfolio, leading to a lower expected return; however, the expected return in 
                                                        
71 In the theoretical work, we present the effect of credit rationing on the composition of a bank portfolio, while the higher 
competition and regulation in the traditional market also drive changes in the composition of bank portfolios, especially 
regarding OBSs. 
72 As shown in Figure 2-4, in Cases 1 and 2, since both the bank capacity and the equilibriums (A’ A” or E’E”) move to the 
right, we cannot show whether the proportion of OBSs increases in a bank portfolio. However, we still can find a higher 
expected return with a large proportion of loans, whatever the proportion of OBSs. 
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equilibrium (A”) in 2007 in Case 4 is lower than that of Case 3 as shown in Figures 2-5 and 
2-6. The negative results of OBSs and positive results of loans in the sub-periods 2001-2006 
and 2007 follow the scenarios described in the third and fourth cases, suggesting that banks 
are involved in more OBSs but fewer loans, leading to a lower bank return owing to the 
higher risk and leverage resulting from inappropriate bank regulation and bank risk 
management. This result indicates an overcapacity problem regarding OBSs in a bank 
portfolio. The huge losses from the recent financial crisis have already called the positive 
effect of OBSs into question, requiring a policy response to distinguish between OBSs and 
loans. Thus, finally in this chapter we provide a theoretical work on the effect of a risk-based 
capital requirement on bank portfolios. The implication of this model is that banks are willing 
to operate more traditional activities with less risk-taking when facing large regulatory costs, 
given a risk-based capital requirement. The empirical result of the interaction variables 
between OBSs and the dummy of capital requirement is consistent with this implication, 
suggesting that a risk-based capital requirement generates a substitution in a bank portfolio 
away from risky assets, i.e. OBSs, to more traditional activities. 
 
Bank diversification (product diversification) has been a recent financial innovation, which 
contributes to the improvement of bank performance; however, this chapter states that an 
increase in OBSs has a negative effect on bank profitability, suggesting that an optimal bank 
portfolio should go for fewer OBSs: this seems reasonable, particularly taking the recent 
financial crisis into consideration. One possible interpretation is that cross-selling of financial 
products creates a positive link between interest income and non-interest income, according to 
the efficient set theory, which limits the benefits from bank diversification as demonstrated by 
the negative coefficients of non-interest income ratio in the three sub-periods. The other is the 
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overcapacity problem, especially regarding OBSs, as demonstrated by the negative 
coefficients of OBSs in the sub-periods, since banks have more incentive to enlarge the range 
of activities, which might be driven by the TBTF policy and stronger competition in 
traditional credit markets; however, traditional risk management is unable to hedge the risk of 
OBSs associated with complex characteristics, and inappropriate regulation also leads to 
higher risk-taking and leverage of non-traditional activities. In addition, given a risk-based 
capital requirement, banks should reduce the amount of OBSs holdings associated with higher 
risk-taking, because of considerable regulatory costs. This highlights the importance of capital 
regulation in solving the overcapacity problem regarding OBSs.  
 
 Does an increase in interbank lending lead to higher risk-taking by banks, particularly 
considering the bank size effect? 
The moral hazard problem has been enhanced during the recent financial crisis, especially in 
the context of the interbank market, where a large problematic bank potentially participates in 
a bail-out provided by the central bank (CB) in order to avoid a contagion risk resulting in an 
unstable financial system. This leads to the large bank possible being willing to become 
involved in more risky activities, which is the consequence of TBTF. In Chapter 3, we modify 
Dinger and Hagen’s (2005) model by considering the effect of TBTF suggested by Freixas et 
al. (2000), and we attempt to test three hypotheses: first, large banks protected by 
governments are associated with higher risk-taking under TBTF; second, an increase in 
interbank assets leads to a higher risk level of large banks as they have less incentive to 
monitor borrower activities; and third, that higher equities or deposits protect banks against 
the liquidity problem, so they are associated with a lower risk level, especially for small banks 
lacking protection from CB. Therefore, a threshold model in terms of bank size (Hansen, 2000, 
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and Caner and Hansen, 2004) is applied to endogenously divide banks into large and small 
groups in order to examine these hypotheses. The positive results of interbank assets in the 
large bank group imply that under the policy of “Too big to fail”, large banks have more 
incentive to engage in risky assets and less incentive to monitor borrowers, as they participate 
in potential bail-outs, which leads to higher risk-taking of interbank assets. The positive result 
of bank size on bank risk-taking found in the large bank group can also represent evidence for 
a consequence of moral hazard resulting from TBTF. The negative result of equity ratio in the 
small bank group suggests that small banks with large equities are likely to be safe, since 
shareholders have to monitor banks’ activities because of a lack of protection from CB, while 
this result is insignificant for large banks; overall, these results can support three assumptions. 
Considering the time trend, the coefficients of year dummy variables suggest that the level of 
risk-taking reduced over time for small banks, while the risk level of large banks increased, in 
particular after 2005. This might be a result of the fact that because of advantages in 
technology, management and information, large banks are inclined to engage in 
non-traditional activities associated with higher risk-taking, compared with small banks 
specialising in traditional activities. In addition, the magnitude of the negative effect of 
interbank lending on bank risk-taking was higher during the crisis period (2006-2008) when 
numerous banks with a shortage of liquidity had to refinance through the interbank markets. 
 
The liquidity problem of banks can be eased through the interbank markets; however, this 
chapter highlights a moral hazard problem in the context of interbank lending. Under the “too 
big to fail” policy, the size effect is significant in determining the risk-taking of interbank 
assets. An increase in interbank assets leads to higher risk-taking in the large bank group, 
which suggests that they have less incentive to monitor borrowers considering the protection 
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from CB. In addition, a hazardous incentive is found in shareholders, who have less incentive 
to monitor large banks protected by CB. This chapter shows that a lack of comprehensive 
regulation from both CB and shareholders, especially regarding large banks, might be a 
possible explanation for the recent financial crisis. 
 
 What is the effect of changes in bank behaviour on interest margins?  
Chapter 2 has shown that banks expand the scope of activities by increasing non-traditional 
activities partly because of higher competition in the traditional activities, which has an 
impact on bank income structure. Thus, in Chapter 4, we examine the effect of changes in 
bank behaviour on the determinants of interest margins, based on the multi-product bank 
model of Valverde and Fernández (VF) (2007), controlling for institutional imperfections, 
such as implicit payment, opportunity cost and the cost of holding capital. In addition to a 
significant effect of interest rate risk on interest margins, the VF model suggests that product 
diversification has a negative effect on interest margins, since it is associated with higher 
non-interest income that can be used to offset losses from traditional activities, i.e., loans, 
arising from higher regulatory costs and competition in the loan market. This chapter provides 
a country-by-country study, considering fundamental differences in banking systems and 
market structures, and this heterogeneous assumption is also identified by a robustness test. 
The significant coefficient of product diversification is found in a market-based financial 
system, i.e., those in the US and the UK, where banks with large non-traditional activities 
depend less on the traditional intermediary function; this leads to a lower interest income. 
However, this is insignificant in a bank-based financial system, such as France and Germany, 
where banks are reliant on traditional activities. This negative effect of product diversification 
also follows the conjecture of Lepetit et al. (2008b), who argue that in order to absorb new 
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customers, banks lower the price of traditional activities so that they can sell non-traditional 
products to the customers (cross-selling), the interest margin is therefore reduced. In addition, 
the positive coefficient of concentration ratio 5 indicates that banks in a less competitive 
market have more power to charge higher interest rates, which increases interest margins. The 
positive result of interest rate risk is found in most of the sample countries, where interest rate 
risk plays an important role in determining net interest margins following the theoretical 
model of Ho and Saunders (1981) and Valverde and Fernandez (2007). Therefore, this chapter 
may show an implication for policy-makers, who should pay more attention to the effect of 
diversification in a market-based financial system, such as those of the US and the UK, where 
banks heavily rely on bank diversification associated with a risky product line.   
 
 Why do some banks fail while others do not? 
The previous three chapters investigated the effects of bank behaviour, such as OBSs and 
interbank lending, bank size, bank risk-taking and capital regulation. In Chapter 5, we use 
these variables plus macroeconomic shocks to evaluate the causes of bank failure based on a 
modified Gonzalez-Hermosillo (GH) (1999) model considering product diversification and 
the size effect, as Chapter 2 has shown that bank diversification is associated with a risky 
product line, which has a negative impact on bank performance, considering the recent 
financial crisis; and Chapter 3 has implied the role of the size effect in determining bank 
risk-taking, considering the consequence of TBTF in the context of the interbank market. In 
Chapter 5, we find the significant effects of risk-taking, capital adequacy and the profitability 
of banks on the probability of bank failure, which is consistent with the implications of 
Gonzalez-Hermosillo (1999). We also find significant coefficients of product diversification 
after controlling for the country specific effect. It is worth noting that the positive coefficient 
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is only found in the US, suggesting that bank failure is induced partly by a higher level of 
product diversification, since a large number of small banks with less experience of operating 
non-traditional activities dominates the US bank market, which increases operational costs 
and bank risk-taking; and the cross-selling of financial products also reduces diversified 
benefits (see Calmes and Theoret, 2010; Stiroh, 2006; Stiroh and Rumble, 2006; Stiroh, 2004). 
The positive result of bank size during the crisis period (2006-2008) fails to indicate TBTF; in 
contrast, large problematic banks, i.e., Bear Stearns and Lehman, were allowed to become 
bankrupt, considering the huge cost of funding for rescuing banks, which is consistent with 
the argument of “too big to save” (Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2011). Regarding 
macro-variables, in the context of the recent financial crisis, we find that the proxy of housing 
prices replaced the traditional macroeconomic indicator, i.e., GDP, in determining bank failure, 
and this generates different effects on bank failure in terms of two sub-periods. An increase in 
housing prices in the early period (1999-2005) leads to a higher level of the probability of 
bank failure, owing to a potential housing market bubble, while a negative result in the later 
period (2006-2008) suggests that the probability of bank failure increases, since the financial 
products that depend on house prices are associated with abnormally higher risk-taking when 
the bubble bursts. This presents a complete picture of the effect of housing prices on the bank 
industry in the run-up to a financial crisis and the crisis period, suggesting that the effect of 
the traditional macroeconomic indicator, GDP, has been replaced by the proxy of housing 
prices in the context of the recent financial crisis, as demonstrated by the insignificant 
coefficient of GDP. Basically, this chapter presents the causes of bank failure, considering 
changes in bank behaviour and housing prices, which is the first step towards understanding 
the mechanism of the global financial crisis in 2007-08.  
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6.2 Remarks and Policy Implications 
 
The results of the four empirical studies generate some concerns surrounding bank regulation 
that need to be discussed along with policy recommendations. The first concern is bank 
regulation imposed on non-traditional activities. As shown by the results in Chapter 2, the 
application of bank diversification does not increase bank profits, while it does lead to the 
volatilities of bank return. The overcapacity problem of bank portfolios regarding OBSs 
challenges bank regulation and supervision. According to Furfine (2001), Mullings (2003) 
and Francis and Osborne (2009), we derive a theoretical model to compare the composition of 
bank portfolios in two cases, one considering a risk-weighted capital regulation and the other 
not. According to the implications of this model, the marginal benefits of OBSs and loans are 
reduced as risk-based capital regulation is augmented; moreover, the reduction in the marginal 
benefits of OBSs is more than that of loans, which shows that the introduction of risk-based 
capital requirement leads to a shift away from risky assets, i.e., OBSs, to safe assets in a bank 
portfolio when facing considerable regulatory costs. Therefore, we believe that policy-makers 
should implement prudent regulation and supervision, i.e., pay attention to leverage ratio and 
liquidity ratio, and impose an appropriate capital requirement on OBSs with a risky product 
line in order to maintain a stable financial market.  
 
The second concern is bank regulation imposed on large banks. The large banks are associated 
with a higher level of risk-taking, as shown by the results in Chapters 3 and 5, potentially 
suggesting that regulation does not work for big banks. The possible explanation stems from 
the impact of “Too big to fail”. According to the argument of Heffernan (2005, p395), all 
countries adopt TBTF to some extent; for example, France has a 100% safety net to protect 
large banks. The aim of TBTF is to provide final protection for large banks in order to 
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maintain a stable financial system, since large bank failures harm the whole financial system. 
However, the justification for TBTF is called into question. First, based on O’Hara and Shaw 
(1990), Kane (2000), Penas and Unal (2004) and Jagtiani and Keeton (2008), the TBTF policy 
gives rise to a problem of moral hazard. Large banks are reluctant to monitor bank behaviour 
but concentrate on maximising bank profits without considering the level of risk-taking, 
which may generate higher social costs from taxpayers. Second, all banks are willing to make 
efforts, i.e., enlarge non-traditional activities, to become large in order to benefit from TBTF. 
However, inefficient risk management is not able to hedge the risk-taking of non-traditional 
activities with complicated characteristics; this causes higher level bank risk, further leading 
to bank failure, since the funding requirement for rescuing large banks is considerable 
(“too-big-to-save” suggested by Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2011). Therefore, 
policy-makers on one side should provide bail-outs for large banks in order to build a stable 
financial market; on the other side, the moral hazard problem associated with TBTF should 
also be taken into account. 
 
The third concern is around regional and global bank regulation. Chapter 4 has identified the 
difference in bank operations and financial systems among sample countries. The response to 
shocks may vary across countries, suggesting that a global standard regulation might not be 
efficient; instead, a single regime based on one region, i.e., ECB
73
, might be more applicable 
for banking regulation and supervision. In addition, the results for equity ratio and loan 
deposit ratio in Chapter 3 suggest that comprehensive bank regulation, including government, 
shareholders and depositors, is essential to protect banks from bankruptcy. 
                                                        
73 Since the sample in this study is based on countries from the EU, outside the EU but in Europe and North America, the 
result of the Wald test indicates differences among these countries, which is reasonable; but this does not challenge the 
regional integration for banking regulation, i.e., ECB, which needs an investigation exclusively using more ECB members as 
a sample. 
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6.3 Future Research 
 
This thesis has shown an optimal bank strategy regarding traditional activities and 
non-traditional activities; the effect of interbank assets on bank risk-taking considering TBTF; 
the effect of the change in bank behaviour on interest margins; and identified the reasons for 
bank failure. It has also contributed evidence for the argument that there is a close relationship 
between financial markets and economic growth. However, some further related studies need 
to be conducted in the future.  
 
First, this thesis aims to investigate bank behaviour up to the 2007-08 global financial crisis 
and to compare bank activities in the run-up to the crisis with those in the crisis period. To 
make the results more comparable, we would extend the study period until 2012 and form a 
panel dataset with a longer period. The empirical results would be used to suggest differences 
in bank behaviour in three sub-periods: pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis, which would give a 
complete view regarding the effect of bank behaviour on bank performance, and allow the 
further proposal of more reliable policy implications. 
 
Second, the sample countries in this thesis are major developed countries in Europe and North 
America, but do not include any developing countries, i.e., BRICs
74
. Although the recent 
financial crisis has been significant in Europe and North America, it has also had an impact on 
the financial sectors of developing countries, through different approaches from those in 
developed countries. For example, the financial crisis has led to a global economic recession, 
particularly for the economic growth of developing countries which mainly rely on 
international trade with developed countries. To some extent, slow economic growth 
                                                        
74 The BRICs include Brazil, Russia, India and China. 
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generates changes in the banking sector. i.e., increasing default risk. Therefore, it is worth 
examining bank behaviour in developing countries in the context of the financial crisis.   
 
Third, we believe that other factors also contribute to the study of bank behaviour. The effect 
of bank behaviour on bank performance depends on financial systems and financial regulation 
(Heffernan, 2005, p285). It is necessary for policy-makers to balance the probable gains and 
losses, prior to implementing financial policy. Considering policy implications, to test the 
effect of bank behaviour, the differences in the law systems and political structures in the 
sample countries should be estimated. Therefore, any aims beyond the purposes of this thesis 
could be subjected to future research. 
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APPENDIX 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendices for Chapter 2 
 
 
Appendix 1: The efficient set theorem 
 
 
According to standard portfolio theory,  
 
  
( ) ( ) ( )(1 )p o tE R E r q E r q                                                                              
(1) 
2 2 2 2 2(1 ) 2 (1 )p o t o t obstraq q q q                                                                 
(2) 
 
The definitions of variables are displayed in the main body of the thesis.  
 
 
Assume that to rr   and to   ,  
 
Where,  
 
to rr ,  are the expected returns of OBSs and traditional activities, respectively. 
to  , are the risk of OBSs and traditional activities, respectively. 
 
Case 1: the correlation between OBS and traditional banking activities is equal to 1, the risk 
of the portfolio is calculated from Eq.2. 
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(3) 
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Recalling the assumptions, thus, the relationship between them is linear, and the slope is 
positive. Figure 1 shows a linear line between A (OBS) and B (Traditional behaviour) to 
display the relationship between the risk and the expected return of the portfolio when the 
correlation is equal to 1 
 
Figure 1: Relationship between return and standard deviation when the correlation is equal to1 
                     
 
 
 
Case 2: the correlation between OBS and traditional banking activities is equal to -1, the risk 
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of the portfolio is calculated from Eq.2. There are two results to be considered. 
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Recalling the assumption to rr  , the relationship between the return and risk of the portfolio 
is linear and the slope is positive.  
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Recalling the assumption to rr  , the relationship between the return and risk of the portfolio 
is linear and the slope is negative. The risk of the portfolio is equal to zero, requiring that the 
proportion of OBSs is the ratio of the risk of traditional activities to the sum of the risk of 
OBSs and risk of traditional activities, at the point S, where 
obstra
traq



 , as shown in 
Figure 2.  
 
Figure 2: Relationship between return and standard deviation when the correlation is equal to 
-1 
                      
 
 
Case 3: the correlation between OBS and traditional banking activities is equal to zero; the 
risk of the portfolio is calculated from Eq.2 and shown as below: 
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The results in terms of Eq.14 are shown as below: 
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Substituting Eq.15 into Eq.1,  
For the simplicity, set   
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Substituting Eq.16 into Eq.1 
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Since X is non-linear, the relationship between the risk and return of the portfolio is also 
non-linear. By taking first-order-condition (FOC) with respect to the proportion of OBS (q), 
we can minimise the risk of the portfolio, and the result is shown as follows: 
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With the value of *q , the risk of the portfolio is minimised at the point O, as shown in Figure 
3. It shows a non-linear line between A (OBSs) and B (Traditional behaviour) to display the 
relationship between the risk and the expected return of the portfolio when the correlation is 
equal to 0. We can minimise risk-taking of the portfolio at the point O. 
 
Figure 3: Relationship between return and standard deviation when the correlation is equal 0
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Appendix 2: Modelling the Impact of Risk-based Capital Requirement on Bank 
Portfolio 
 
In this model, there are two periods. In period 1, without considering risk-based capital 
regulation, we maximise the utility of the bank and the result is shown as follows: 
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where,  
U: the utility of the bank 
L: bank loans  
OBS: off-balance-sheet activities; both bank loans and OBSs are risky assets compared 
with government securities. Assume that the risk level of OBSs is higher than that of 
bank loans. 
S: government securities 
l
tr : the interest rate of loans 
s
tr : the interest rate of government securities 
o
tr : the rate of return of OBSs 
C: the costs, such as costs of issuing equities and adjustment costs. 
 
The evolution of capital is shown: 
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where, 
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tK : capital holding at t 
1tK : capital holding at t-1 
d
tr : the interest rate of deposits 
tD : deposits 
Q: the equities issued by banks 
Therefore, the balance sheet is identified as L+S=D+K. 
 
All items are divided by 1- dtr , the result is shown: 
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To maximise the utility of the bank, 
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The results of the first order condition (F.O.C.) in terms of S, OBSs and L, respectively, 
are shown as follows: 
0)
1
( 



d
t
s
t
d
ts
t
r
rr
r   
(5) 
0)
1
( 


d
t
o
to
t
r
r
r   
(6) 
0)
1
( 



d
t
l
t
d
tl
t
r
rr
r   
(7) 
                                                                                 
214 
 
In the period 2, risk-based capital regulation is considered. Assume that the risk of 
government securities is 0, so the capital holding in terms of government securities is 0. 
 
The utility function of the bank is shown: 
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where, 
td : a minima of risk-based capital requirement. 
 : risk weights of loans 
 : risk weights of OBSs; assume that  > . 
R
rk : risk-based capital ratio, and it is defined as 
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t
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. 
g: a function of the adjusted costs of additional capital holding )( t
R
r dk  , thus, the 
regulators desire t
R
r dk  ; g is a decreasing function and g’ <0. The function g is 
multiplied by risk-weighted assets to capture all risky assets that are subjected to the 
capital requirement in the period 2. 
C is the costs. 
 
The evolution of capital follows that in the period 1. 
Therefore, the integration function is shown by considering the maximisation of the 
utility: 
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The results of F.O.C in terms of S, OBS and L, respectively, are shown: 
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As capital regulation imposed on government securities is 0, the marginal benefits of 
government securities are equal in terms of two cases (Eq.5=Eq.10). 
 
Subtracting Eq. 6 from Eq.11, 
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The sign of Eq.13 depends on the g function. Since g is a decreasing function, g’ <0, 
-g’>0, thus, Eq.13<0, which suggests that the marginal benefits of OBSs is reduced as 
risk-based capital regulation is considered in the period 2. 
 
Subtracting Eq.7 from Eq.12, 
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The sign of Eq.14 is also negative, which follows the explanation of Eq.13. This 
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indicates that the marginal benefit of loans is reduced in the period 2 owing to the 
introduction of a risk-based capital regulation. 
 
Recalling the assumption  > , so the absolute value of Eq.13 is more than that of 
Eq.14, which suggests that the reduction in the marginal benefits of OBSs is more than 
that of loans in the presence of a risk-based capital requirement. This theoretical model 
implicitly shows a conjecture that the introduction of risk-based capital requirement 
leads to a shift from risky assets to safe assets in a bank portfolio. 
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Appendix 3: Proof of q* (see Eq. 2-11 in the main body of the thesis)  
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We derivative Eq.1 with respect to  , and the result is shown: 
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The denominator is always positive, and we suppose that the numerator is negative, 
therefore,  
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If the numerator is negative, requiring that Eq.3 should be held. As   is strictly 
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between 0.5 and 1, 4/12  . Therefore, q* function is a decreasing function with 
15.0   .
  






5.0
2/1
2
2
21
1
lim
2
*



q  
 

1
02lim 2*

q
 
Thus, q* is a decreasing function and strictly between 0 and 0.5 with 15.0   .
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Appendix 4: The Results of the Non-linear Regression 
 
 
The estimated function is shown as below: 


cateInterbankr
GDPoequityratitioloandeporassetratiointerbankaLassetLassetRisk
jt
jtijtijtijtijtijtijt
2
 
where, 
Risk is measured by LLP, and is defined as the ratio of loan loss provision to total 
assets.   
Lasset is bank size and is the log-transformation of bank total assets. 
Laaset^2 is bank size squared. 
Interbank asset ratio is defined as the ratio of interbank assets to total bank assets. 
Loandep ratio is defined as bank loans to total deposits. 
Equity ratio is defined as total equity to total bank assets. 
GDP is the GDP growth rate.  
Interbank rate is 3-month interbank rate. 
C is a constant.  
Results of the preliminary estimation  
Dependent variable:  
Loan loss provision ratio 
Coefficients  t-statistics 
 
Bank size 
 
-1.096*** 
 
-6.15 
Bank size square 0.161*** 6.15 
Interbank lending -2.58* -1.79 
Loandep ratio 0.115*** 3.36 
Equity ratio -0.257*** -8.18 
GDP growth rate -0.081*** -8.93 
Interbank rate 0.013* 1.67 
constant 2.69*** 8.07 
No. of observations 4615  
Hausman test Chi2 (7)/p-value 82.99*** 0.00 
Overall R-square 0.81  
Notes:. ***, **, * indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Appendix 5: The Result of the Wald test 
     (1)   (2) 
Variables   NIM Wald test 
    
nim1 0.390*** ( 1)  cnim1 = 0 
 (0.0544)  ( 2)  ccore = 0 
corecap 0.0294  ( 3)  cimpli = 0 
 (0.0253)  ( 4)  coppor = 0 
implicpay -0.0170  ( 5)  cdeposit = 0 
 (0.0285)  ( 6)  clend = 0 
opporc 0.496**  ( 7)  cother = 0 
 (0.202)  ( 8)  clr = 0 
deposits 0.552  ( 9)  cgdp = 0 
 (0.840)  (10)  fnim1 = 0 
lending -1.143  (11)  fcore = 0 
 (2.486)  (12)  fimpli = 0 
otherearning -2.166  (13)  fdeposit = 0 
 (2.177)  (14)  foppor = 0 
lr -0.0197  (15)  flend = 0 
 (0.0800)  (16)  fother = 0 
gdp 0.0747**  (17)  flr = 0 
 (0.0299)  (18)  fgdp = 0 
cr4 2.190**  (19)  gnim1 = 0 
 (1.029)  (20)  gcore = 0 
cnim1 0.0690  (21)  gimpli = 0 
 (0.0966)  (22)  goppor = 0 
ccore 0.0647  (23)  gdeposit = 0 
 (0.0637)  (24)  glend = 0 
cimpli 0.651***  (25)  gother = 0 
 (0.172)  (26)  glr = 0 
coppor -0.349  (27)  ggdp = 0 
 (0.304)  (28)  snim1 = 0 
cdeposit 0.651  (29)  score = 0 
 (1.955)  (30)  simpli = 0 
clend 1.479  (31)  soppor = 0 
 (3.065)  (32)  sdeposit = 0 
cother 0.0975  (33)  slend = 0 
 (2.266)  (34)  sother = 0 
clr 0.0268  (35)  slr = 0 
 (0.149)  (36)  sgdp = 0 
cgdp -0.0860**  (37)  uknim1 = 0 
 (0.0384)  (38)  ukcore = 0 
fnim1 0.031  (39)  ukimpli = 0 
 (0.106)  (40)  ukoppor = 0 
fcore 3.142***  (41)  ukdeposit = 0 
 (0.644)  (42)  uklend = 0 
fimpli 0.0528  (43)  ukother = 0 
 (0.0421)  (44)  uklr = 0 
foppor -0.111  (45)  ukgdp = 0 
 (0.216)  (46)  cc5 = 0 
fdeposit 0.193  (47)  fc5 = 0 
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 (0.909)  (48)  gc5 = 0 
flend 2.116  (49)  sc5 = 0 
 (2.528)  (50)  ukc5 = 0 
fother 0.663  
 (2.205)  F( 50,  509) =    9.28 
flr -0.325*    Prob > F =    0.0000 
 (0.168)  
fgdp 0.0403  
 (0.0460)  
gnim1 -0.0327  
 (0.0762)  
gcore 0.00927  
 (0.0324)  
gimpli 0.0181  
 (0.0306)  
goppor -0.495**  
 (0.202)  
gdeposit 0.402  
 (0.880)  
glend 1.982  
 (2.658)  
gother 2.320  
 (2.365)  
glr -0.0618  
 (0.115)  
ggdp -0.0721**  
 (0.0313)  
snim1 0.112  
 (0.0770)  
score 1.329*  
 (0.680)  
simpli -0.00593  
 (0.0291)  
soppor -0.327  
 (0.261)  
sdeposit -0.802  
 (0.950)  
slend -0.189  
 (2.592)  
sother 0.424  
 (2.262)  
slr 0.260**  
 (0.118)  
sgdp -0.0311  
 (0.0312)  
uknim1 0.108*  
 (0.0616)  
ukcore -0.00530  
 (0.0266)  
ukimpli 0.0284  
 (0.0360)  
ukoppor -0.298  
 (0.242)  
ukdeposit -1.201  
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 (0.970)  
uklend 1.741  
 (2.544)  
ukother 1.932  
 (2.198)  
uklr -0.116  
 (0.252)  
ukgdp -0.112  
 (0.0706)  
ukc5 -2.610**  
 (1.206)  
sc5 -0.122  
 (1.097)  
gc5 -0.357  
 (1.055)  
fc5 1.010  
 (1.191)  
cc5 -6.789  
 (4.712)  
Constant 0.337  
 (0.657)  
   
Observations 4,423  
R-square 0.335  
Hausman test 
Chi-square 
510 
 
Heteroskedasticity 
Chi2 (510) 
1.2e+06*** 
(0.00)  
Robust standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Appendix 6: The List of Failed Banks in Sample Countries 
France  
(27 banks) 
Royal Saint-Georges Banque, Intermedia Banque, Banque Nationale de Paris, 
Intercontinentale BNPI, Banque Alcyon, American Express Bank (France),  
Banque Leumi France SA, Bankers Trust France SA, Banque Bipop SA,  
Banco Popolare di Verona e Novara (France), KBL Richelieu Banque Privée,  
Banque Franco Portugaise, Banque Finaref, Banque Française de l'Orient BFO,  
Banque Marze, Banque Worms, Chase Manhattan Bank SA, Transbanque,  
Citibank SA, Finter Bank France, Omnibanque, Natixis Transport Finance, 
SOGENAL (Groupe Société Génerale), Union de Banques Régionales pour le 
CIC, Axa Crédit, Banque CPR, Financière de Banque et de l'Union Meunière  
 
Germany  
(27 banks) 
Rabobank Deutschland AG, Arab Banking Corporation, Daus & Co. GmbH,  
BANK COMPANIE NORG GmbH, Bank of Tokyo - Mitsubishi (Deutschland) 
AG, Bankhaus Partin GmbH & Co. Kommanditgesellschaft auf Aktien, Emporiki 
Bank - Germany GmbH, Dresdner Bank Lateinamerika AG, Mizuho Corporate 
Bank (Germany) AG, JP Morgan GmbH, Resba GmbH, Weserbank AG, MTBC 
Bank Deutschland GmbH, Dai-ichi Kangyo Bank (Deutschland) DKB, Service 
Bank Gmbh & Co. KG, Nissan Bank Gmbh, CIT Industrie Bank Gmbh, Caisse des 
Dépôts et Consignations GmbH, A&A Actienbank AG, Privatbank Reithinger 
GmbH & Co KG, Deutsche Handelsbank AG, Erste Rosenheimer Privatbank AG, 
Arab Bank AG, Credit Suisse First Boston AG, BkmU Bank AG, Gontard & 
Metallbank AG, Yapi Kredi Bank (Deutschland) AG, Falke Bank AG 
 
Canada 
(17 banks) 
UFJ Bank Canada, Deutsche Bank Canada, Banque Nationale de Paris (Canada) 
BNP, Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank (Canada), Sanwa Bank Canada, Republic National 
Bank of New-York (Canada), Industrial Bank of Japan (Canada) (The), Bank of 
America Canada, Tokai Bank Canada, Sumitomo Bank of Canada, United 
Overseas Bank (Canada), Sakura Bank (Canada), Hanvit Bank Canada, Intesa 
Bank Canada, Crédit Lyonnais Canada, Dresdner Bank Canada, Bank One Canada  
 
Switzerland 
(16 banks) 
Redsafe Bank, Skandia Bank (Switzerland) Ltd, ASTON BANK SA,  
Tokai Bank (Schweiz) AG, Bank of Tokyo - Mitsubishi (Switzerland) Ltd.,  
UFJ Bank (Switzerland) Ltd, Rüd, Blass & Cie AG, Sakura Bank (Schweiz) AG, 
Banque Diamantaire (Suisse) SA-Diamond Bank (Switzerland) Ltd,  
BIPIELLE Bank (Suisse) SA, Daiwa Securities Bank (Switzerland),  
Banque Galland & Cie SA, Spar-und Leihkasse Rebstein, Ersparnisanstalt 
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Unterwasser,  HSBC Bank (Suisse) S.A., Zurich Invest Bank AG 
 
The UK 
(40 banks) 
Fairbairn Private Bank Ltd, London International Bank Limited, Credit Agricole 
Lazard Financial Products Bank, Leumi Bank & Trust Company (Channel Island) 
Limited, Legal & General Bank Ltd, Kaupthing Singer & Friedlander (Isle of 
Man) Limited, Bank of Ireland (Jersey) Ltd, Finsbury Pavement Limited, 
Anglo-Romanian Bank Limited, Bank of Cyprus (London) Limited, Bank of 
Tokyo - Mitsubishi (UK) Limited, Bank of Wales Plc, Dao Heng Bank (London) 
Plc, BBVA Privanza (Jersey) Limited, Dunbar Bank Plc, BSI (Channel Islands) 
Limited, Financial & General Bank Plc, Alliance & Leicester Commercial Bank 
Plc, Gresham Trust Plc, Capital Bank Plc, Royal Bank of Canada (Jersey) Ltd, 
Saudi American Bank (UK) Ltd, Yorkshire Bank Plc, Riggs Bank Europe Limited, 
Merrill Lynch International Bank Limited (old), Bank Hofmann (Guernsey) Ltd, 
Cater Allen Bank (Isle of Man) Limited, Fleet Bank (Europe) Ltd,  
HBOS Treasury Services Plc, SBI European Bank Plc, Dexia Municipal Bank,  
HSBC Private Bank (Jersey) Limited, Bank of Nova Scotia Channel Islands 
Limited (The), Leopold Joseph & Sons (Guernsey) Limited, Cater Allen Bank 
(Jersey) Limited, Bristol & West International, Prudential-Bache International 
Bank Limited,Alliance & Leicester Plc, Bankgesellschaft Berlin (UK) Plc,  
BBL International (UK) Limited 
 
The US 
(36 banks) 
National Bank of Vernon, LBS Bank - New York, RBC Bank (USA),  
Alger National Trust Company, American Home Bank, N.A., Arkansas Bankers 
Bank, Athol-Clinton Co-operative Bank, Axsys National Bank, Banco Popular, 
Bank Iowa. Altoona. Iowa, Bank Iowa. Denison. Iowa, Bank Iowa. Red Oak. 
Iowa, Bank of Mountain View, Bay-Hermann-Berger Bank, Belk National Bank,  
Chevron Credit Bank. National Association, Chicago Community Bank,  
Citizens National Bank of Springfield, Citrus Bank. National Association, 
Community Bank Plymouth, Community Banks, Concord EFS National Bank, 
Downers Grove National Bank, Escrow Bank USA, Fireside Bank,  
First Capital Bank. Illinois, First Heritage Bank. Pennsylvania, First National 
Bank and Trust of Syracuse, First North American National Bank,  
First State Bank of Hill County, First State Bank. Italy. Texas, First Fed Trust 
Company. National Association, Grafton State Bank, Granite National Bank,  
Harris Bank (NH). National Association, Intercontinental National Bank 
Source: Bankscope. 
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